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LABOR LAW
I. ORGANIZATIONAL AND REPRESENTATIONAL ACTIVITY
A. *Paid Union Organizers Within the Definition of "Employee":
NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, inc.'
Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") in
1935, guaranteeing employees the right to organize for the purpose of
collective bargaining in order to promote peaceful industrial relations. 2
The Supreme Court of the United States has included paid union
organizers within the definition of "employee" as defined by section
2(3) of the NLRA ("section 2 (3) ") . 3 Previously, there had been conflict
among the circuits as to whether or not paid union organizers are
"employees" under the NLRA. 1 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
to resolve this conflict and held that paid union organizers are "em-
ployees" for purposes of the NLRA. 5 Thus, non-unionized employers
may not refuse to hire paid union organizers who are applying for jobs
in order to organize the work force.' The Court allowed the National
Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") to include paid organizer applicants
in the statutory definition of "employee" because protecting union
organizers is consistent with the broad language and legislative history
* By Diane E. Gwin, Staff Member, Bos•oN CoLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
I NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 116 S. Ct. 450, 150 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2897 (1995).
2 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
3
 Town & Country Flee., Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 452, 150 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2898 (construing 29
U.S.C. § 152(3)). Section 2(3) of the NLRA states:
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the
employees of a particular employer, unless [the Act] explicitly states otherwise, and
shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in
connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice,
and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employ-
ment
29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
4 The District of Columbia and Second Circuits held that paid union organizers are "employ-
ees," while the Eighth and Fourth Circuits held that they are not. Compare Willmar Elec. Scrv„
Inc. v. NLRB, 968 F.2t1. 1327, 1330-31, 140 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2745, 2747 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (paid
organizers are "employees'. under NLRA) and NLRB v. Ilenlopen, 599 F.2d 26, 30, 101 L,R.R.M.
(BNA) 2247, 2250 (2d Cir. 1979) (same) with Town & Country Elec., Inc, v. NLRB, 34 E3d 625,
626, 147 L.R.R.M (BNA) 2133, 2134 (8th Cir. 1994) (paid union organizers are not "employees"
under NLRA) and H.B. Zachry Co. v. NLRB, 886 F.2d 70, 71, 132 LRAM.. (BNA) 2377, 2377
(4th Cir, 1989) (same).
'Awn & Country Elec., 116 S. Ct. at 452-53, 150 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2897, 2898 (1995).
6 See id.
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of the statute and effectuates the purposes of the NLRA, namely,
protecting both the employees' right to organize and the collective
bargaining process.'
In 1979, in H.B. Zachry Co. v. NLRB, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a paid professional union or-
ganizer was not considered an "employee" for purposes of the NLRA. 8
H. B Zachry involved a journeyman boilermaker welder who, at the time
he applied for work with the company, was also a fully paid, profes-
sional union organizer.' The company refused to hire the employee
because of his union affiliation and also because of his participation
in an earlier NLRB proceeding against the company.'°
In construing the plain meaning of the statute, the court reasoned
that one cannot be employed by two people at the same time and
during the same hours.' Thus, while the employee worked for Zachry,
he was fundamentally an employee of the union and worked for Zachry
solely on union orders.' 2 The court further reasoned that affording
professional organizers the protection of the NLRA would upset the
balance Congress had intended between the rights of employees to
organize and the rights of employers to prohibit the use of their
facilities by outside union organizers.' 3 The court noted that manage-
ment's right to refuse to hire someone because he or she is employed
full-time by another employer is an inherent part of "management
prerogative" and should be protected." Thus, the court concluded that
a paid professional union organizer was not an "employee" under the
NLRA and was not protected from anti-union discrimination.' 5
In 1979, in NLRB v. Henlopen, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit held that an employee paid by a union to
organize other employees was an "employee" under the NLRA.' 6 A paid
union organizer alleged that her employer first transferred her to a
more difficult job and then fired her because of her union activities.''
In rejecting the company's argument that the employee was not an
"employee" under the NLRA because she was a "paid union infiltrator,"
7 See id. at. 453, 454, 150 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2899.
8 886 F.2d at 71, 132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2377.
9 Id,
11 ' See id. at 71 -72, 132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2378.
"Id. at 73, 132 L.R.R.M. (RNA) at 2379.
12 See id.
13 H.B. Zachry, 886 F.2d at 74, 132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2380.
14 1d. at 75, 132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2380-81.
15 M. at 71, 132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2377.
16 599 F.2d at 30, 101 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2250.
17 See id. at 27, 28, 101 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2248.
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the court stated only that "[o]n these Pacts, and on the basis of the
Board's decisions, we find that [the employee] was an employee pro-
tected by the NLRA."'s Thus, the Second Circuit summarily concluded
that one who is paid by a union to be an organizer is an "employee"
under the NLRA.'"
In 1992, in Willmar Electric Service, Inc. v. NLRB, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that a paid
union organizer who applies for a job in order to organize the workers,
and intends to remain affiliated with the union and possibly return to
full-time employment with the union, is an "employee" under section
2(3) of the NLRA.2" In Willmar, a field organizer for the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers applied for a job with Willmar in
order to organize the workers. 2 ' Willmar refused to hire the employee
because of his union affiliation." The court first focused on congres-
sional intent and analogized the NLRA to the Labor Management
Relations Act ("LMRA"), which indicated that Congress contemplated
the possibility that one could be employed by both a union and a
company. 23 The court also relied on common-law principles to demon-
strate that one can be the servant of two masters, provided that service
to one does not lead to abandonment of the duty to the other. 21 The
court reasoned that if an employee's service to the union does not
interfere with service to the employer, then the employee should be
afforded the protection of the NLRA. 2" The court also rejected Will-
mar's practical arguments, reasoning that the disloyalty and harm the
company feared could just as likely come from a non-union employee
as it could from a union employee. 2" Thus, in Willmar, the court held
that a paid union organizer is an "employee" and therefore entitled to
the protection of the NLRA. 27
18 Id, at 30, 101 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2'250 (citing Anthony Forest Prod. Co., 231 N.L.R.B. 976
(1977): Dee Knitting Mills, inc., 214 N.L.R.B. 1041 (1975); Oak Apparel, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B, 701
(1970).
19 See Ilenlopen, 599 F.2(1 at 30, 101 L.R.R.M. (11NA) at 2250.
20 968 F.2(1 at 1328, 1330-31, 140 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2745, 2747.
21 Id. at 1328, 140 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2745-46.
22 See id. at 1328, 140	 (RNA) at 2744).
23 See id. at 1329, 140 L.R.R.M. (RNA) at 2746. Section 302 of the LMRA prohibits payments
from another employer to an employee of a union; it excludes from that prohibition, however,
payments "to any . . . employee of a labor organization, who is also an employee ... of such
employer, as compensation to I, ur by reason tit', his service as an employee of such employer." 29
§ 186(c) (1) (1994).
21 Willmar Elec. Serra, 968 F.2d at 1329-30, 140 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2746-47; see REsTATEmENt
(SEcontn) or AGENCY § 226 (1957).
29 Willmar Elec. Seru, 968 F.2d at 1330, 140 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2747.
See id,
27 Id. at 1330-31, 140 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2747.
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During the Survey year, in NLRB v. 'Awn & Country Electric, Inc.
(Town & Country), the United States Supreme Court held that a
worker can be a company's "employee" within the meaning of the
NLRA even if, at the same time, a union pays the worker to help the
union organize the company.''' The Court stated that allowing the
NLRB to include paid union organizers within the statutory definition
of "employee" was consistent with both the meaning of the term "em-
ployee" and the purposes of the NLRA.29 By holding that paid union
organizers may be included in the NLRA's definition of "employee,"
the Court resolved the conflict among the circuit courts."
The dispute in "Town & Country arose after the company (Town
& Country), a non-union electrical contractor, advertised through an
employment agency for licensed electricians.' [ The company refused
to interview ten out of the eleven applicants because they were mem-
bers of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers; two of
them were also professional union staff." The union members filed a
complaint with the NLRB, claiming that the company had violated
sections 8(a) ( I) and 8(a) (3) of the NLRA by refusing to interview or
retain them because of their union membership."
In deciding that Town & Country had committed an unfair labor
practice by discriminating against the union members, the NLRB con-
cluded that the eleven applicants were "employees" as defined by
section 2(3) of the NLRA. 34 The NLRB relied on the broad common
and statutory definitions of the word "employee," the statutory ex-
clusions to the definition of "employee" and the legislative history of
the NLRA. 35 The NLRB also concluded that including paid organ-
izer applicants within the definition of "employee" was consistent with
both Supreme Court and NLRB precedent. 36 Finally, the NLRB deter-
mined that public policy considerations weighed in favor of protecting
24 1 16 S. Ct. 450, 452-53, 150 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2897, 2898 (1995).
26 Id. at 453-54, 150 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2899. Section 7 or the NLRA grants employees the
right "to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively ..
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection," '29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
'() See 'Awn & Gauntry Eke., 116 S. Gt. at 452-53, 150 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2898.
Id. at 452, 150 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2898.
32 See id. The company interviewed one applicant and the employment agency hired him,
but the company dismissed bins stricn only a iew days of work. See id.
:11
 See id.
34 `11twtt & Country Elec., Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 1250, 1258,.142 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1036, 1045
(1992).
3 1d. at 1253-54, 142 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1040-41.
36 Id. at 1254-55, 142 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1041-42.
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employees' right to organize: 47 Thus, the NLRB concluded that the
NLRA's definition of "employee" included paid union organizers." 8
Town & Country petitioned the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
for review of the NLRB's decision, and the NLRB cross-petitioned for
enforcement of its order." The Eighth Circuit refused to enforce the
Board's order, following the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in 1-113. Zachry,
and held that the union members were not entitled to protection of
the NLRA because they were not employees as defined by section
2(3).41 The Eighth Circuit relied on a common-law agency argument
that an agent has a duty to act solely for the benefit. of his principal in
all matters connected with his agency and has a duty not to act on
behalf of others whose interests conflict with those of the principal.'"
The Eighth Circuit concluded that, in an employment situation, a
union organizer is unable to be loyal to both the union and the
employer at the same time and, therefore, a union organizer's dual
employment constitutes a conflict of in terest. 42
 Thus, the Eighth Circuit
held that the union organizers were not "employees" tinder section
2(3) of the NLRA."
The United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded the
Eighth Circuit decision, holding that paid union organizers arc "em-
ployees" under section 2(3) of the NLRA.'m The Court recognized that
Congress created the NLRB to administer the NLRA, and considered
the NLRB's understanding of labor relations necessary for proper
application and interpretation of the NLRA.''' Although the Court
acknowledged the deference generally given to the NLRB in interpret-
ing the NLRA, the Court added that. the NLRB needed little deference
to convince the Court that its interpretation was propen 4 "
In analyzing the NLRB's decision, the Court noted that the
NLRB's interpretation of the term "employee" as including paid union
organizers was consistent with the broad language contained in the
37 1d. at 1256-57, 142 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1043-44.
3s Id. at 1258, 142 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1045.
"Town & Country Elec., Inc., v. NLRB, 34 F.3(1 (125, 626, 147 L.R.R,M. (RNA) 2133, 2134
(8th Cir. 1994).
4 " Id. at 628-29, 147 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2135-36.
11 Id. at 628-29, 147 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2136; APif RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or Actmex §§ 387,
394 (1957).
12 	& Country Elec., 34 Rid at 628-29, 147 L.R.R.M. (BNA) itt 2136.
" Id. at 629, 147 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2136.
11 Mum & Country Elec., 116 S. CA, at 452-53, 151) L.R.R.M, (BNA) at 2898.
15 Id. at 453, 150 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2899.
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NLRA.47 While noting that the statutory interpretation is even broader
than the dictionary definition, the Court examined the ordinary dic-
tionary definition of "employee" which stated that It] he term 'em-
ployee' shall include any employee."ari The Court also noted that al-
though the statute contains several exceptions to the definition of
"employee," the union members in this case fell under none of those
exceptions.49
The Court reasoned that the NLRB's interpretation of the term
"employee" was consistent with the purposes of the NLRA, namely,
"protecting the right of employees to organize for mutual aid without
employer interference," and "encouraging and protecting the collec-
tive-bargaining process."5" The Court further reasoned that the Board's
broad interpretation of the NLRA was consistent with the legislative
history of the NLRA.51 The Court cited several examples of broad
congressional definitions and noted that there were few, if any, state-
ments in the legislative history indicating that. Congress ever contem-
plated a narrow definition of the term "employee." 52
The Court further concluded that the NLRB's interpretation of
the term "employee" is consistent with earlier cases decided by the
Court." The Court noted, in particular, its decision in Sure-Tan, Inc. v.
NLRB, in which the Court observed that the "breadth of § 2(3)'s
definition is striking: the NLRA squarely applies to 'any employee." 54
47 Id. The relevant statutory language states that: Itlhe term 'employee' shall include any
em ployee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless this sub-
chapter explicitly states otherwise ...." 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994).
"18 "Town & Ccnintry Elec., 116 S. Ct. at 453-54, 150 	 (BNA) at 2899 (citing AM EIMAN
HERITAGE 1)1(1'1'10NA RY 604 (3d ed. 1992) (defining "employee" as "any person who works for
another in return for financial or other compensation"); Bu. ick's LAw Dici RV 525 (6th ed.
1990) (defining "employee" as "person in the service of another tinder any contract of hire,
express or implied, oral or written, where the employer has the power or right to control and
direct the employee in the material details of how the work is to be perfOrmed")).
42 Id. at 454, 150 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2899 (construing 29 U.S.C. § 152(3)). The statute states
that the term "employee" shall not include agricultural laborers, domestic workers, those em-
ployed by a parent or spouse, independent contractors. supervisors and employees subject to the
Railway Labor Act. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
5" 'Town	 Country Elec., 116 S. Ct.. at 454, 150 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2899.
51 a
52 Id. (noting that "[lit is fairly easy to find statements to the effect that an 'employee' simply
'means someone who works for another for hire,' I-I.R.Rcp. No. '245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 18
(1947), and includes 'every man on a payroll.' 79 Cong. Rec. 9686 (1935) (colloquy between
Reps. Taylor and Connery)") (also citing S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong. 6 (1935) (referring to an
employcc as a "worker"); H.R. Rio'. No. 969, 74th Cong. 8 (1935) (same); H.R. REP. No. 972,
74th Cong. 8 (1935) (same); H.R. Ret'. No. 1147, 74th Cong. 10 (1935) (same)).
" See id.
54 Id. at 454, 150 L.R.R.M. (DNA) at 2899-900 (citing Sure-Tan v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891
(1984)).
March 19971	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 309
The Court then cited several other cases in support of the NLRB's
interpretation •u
The Court next decided that a provision of the 1947 LMRA al-
lowed it to conclude that Congress may have specifically considered
the possibility that an employee of a company may also be employed
by a union.56 This provision prohibits a company from paying someone
who is employed by a union, but exempts from this prohibition wages
that are "paid by the company to 'any . . . employee of a labor organi-
zation, who is also an employee' of the company." 57 Thus, the Court
concluded that the Board's determination that paid union organizers
are "employees" within the NLRA was consistent with this provision of
the LMRA. 58
The Court then dispensed with the common-law agency argument
raised by Town & Country.'" Town & Country argued that common-law
principles, which require that the term "employee" exclude paid union
organizers, should govern the determination of whether or not paid
union organizers were "employees."t'° Although the Court accepted
Town & Country's argument that common-law principles should gov-
ern the determination, the Court concluded that the NLRB's determi-
nation was consistent with the common law. 61 Town & Country argued
that, based on the Restatement (Second) of Agency, one cannot be a paid
union organizer and an employee of a company simultaneously." 2 Town
& Country further argued that by serving the union, the organizer acts
against the best interests of the company."
55 See ']'own' Country Elec., 116 S. Ct. at 454, ISO L.R.R.M, (BNA) at 2900 (citing NLRB v.
Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 189-90 (1981) (certain "con-
fidential employees" fall within the definition of "employees"); Pac kard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB,
330 U.S. 485, 488-90 (1947) (company ibremen are "employees"); NLRB v. Hearst Publications,
Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131-32 (1944) (independent contractor-like newsboys are "employees");
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 185-86 (1941) (job applicants are "employees")).
Hearst and Packard were overruled by 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994), which explicitly excluded
independent contractors and supervisory employees. See id. at 454, 150 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2900
(1995).
56 Id. (construing 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(1) (1994)).
57 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (1) (1994); Town & Country Elec., 1 16 S. Ct. at 454, 150 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
at 2900.
58 Toren & Con nit). Elec., 110 S. Ct. at 454, 150 L.R.R.M. (BNA) u '2900.
58 Id. at 454-SO, 150 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2900-01.
6° See id. at 454-55, 150 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2900.
61 /d. at 455, 150 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2900-01.
61 See id. at 455, 150 L.R.R.M. (RNA) at 2900; see also RESTATEM	 (SECOND) Up AGENCY
§ '226 colt. a, at 499 (1957) (stating that Igliving service to two masters at the same time normally
involves a breach of duty by the servant to one or both of them
	 . .").
" See Thum & Gauntly Elec., 116 S. Ct. at 455, 150 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2900.
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The Court rejected this argument, concluding instead that the
Restatement's hornbook rule allows the determination that a paid union
organizer can be a company employee at. the same time. 64 The horn-
book rule states that a "person may be the servant of two masters .. .
at one time as to one act, if the service to one does not involve the
abandonment of the service to the other." 65 The Court upheld the
Board's determination that serving the union as a paid organizer does
not involve the abandonment of service to the employer."6 The Court
further held that union organization, which Town & Country asserted
to be abandonment, is an activity protected by the NLRA. 67
The Court also rejected the practical arguments raised by Town
Country.68 The company argued that including paid union organiz-
ers within the definition of "employees" would allow unions to "salt"
non-unionized companies with employees who intended to organize
the work force. 69 The company argued that Congress did not intend
for the "salts" to be included within the definition of "employees"
because they might hurt the company by quitting or engaging in
sabotage. 7° The Court rejected this argument, reasoning that non-un-
ion employees could just as easily engage in the same types of harmful
behavior as the "salts."7 ` The Court reasoned that just because someone
might engage in this kind of behavior does not mean that he or she is
not an employee. 72 The Court also noted that the company would have
other legal remedies available to it if the "salts" harmed the company."
Finally, the Court clarified that it was not holding that paid union
organizers and employees are identical within the context of every
labor issue. 74 The CoUrt suggested that paid union organizers may not
have the same "community of interest" as other employees to justify
placing them in the same bargaining unit, although it declined to
44 Id. at 455-56, 150 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2901; See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or AGENCY § 226,
at 498 (1957).
65 See Town & Country Elec., 116 S. Ct. at 455-56, 150 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2901 (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or AGENCY § 226, at 498 (1957)).
66 Id. at 456, 150 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2901.
67 Id.
68 See id. at 456-57, 150 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2901-02.
69 See id. at 456, 150 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2901. "Salting" is the process by which unions
authorize their members to apply for jobs with non-unionized companies in order to organize
the workers. See Town & Count?) Elec., 309 N,L.R.B. at 1251, 1252, 142 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at
1038-39, 1040. The work force is thus "salted" with union organizers. See id.
79 See Town & Country Elec., 110 S. Ct. at 456, 150 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2901.
71 Id. at 456, 150 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2901-02.
72 Id. at 456, 150 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2902.
" Id. at 457, 150
	
(BNA) at 2902.
74 Id.
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decide whether this was true. 75 Thus, the Court held only that the
NLRB's interpretation of the term "employee" as including paid union
organizers was lawful. 78
The Supreme Court's decision in Town & Country provides organ-
ized labor with an unprecedented opportunity to expand their efforts
to organize non-unionized work forces. 77 Because union organizers are
protected as "employees" under the NLRA, a company can no longer
claim that the NLRA does not protect union organizers who are apply-
ing for work in order to organize that company's labor. 78 In response
to a continuing decline in union membership, the American Federa-
tion of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) has
made union organizing its top priority. The decision in Town & Coun-
try is likely to facilitate this goal by allowing unions to increase their
organization efforts through its paid organizers, now protected as
"employees" for purposes of the NLRA. 7"
If the Court had followed the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit in
Town & Country or the Fourth Circuit in Zachry and decided that paid
organizer applicants were not included in the statutory definition of
"employee," labor unions would be severely limited in their ability to
organize non-unionized work places, and non-union employees would
have limited opportunities to hear the union message. 8" The inability
of union organizers either to enter the property of a company or to
access the workers from within would create a severe encroachment on
employees' right to organize as guaranteed by section 7 of the NLRA. 81
78 Town & Country Elec., 116 S. Ct. at 457, 150 L.R.R.M. (BNA) in '2902.
701 Id.
SPe id. at 452-53, 150 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at '2898.
78 See id.
7111 The percentage of the American work fOrce belonging to labor Intions has declined
steadily, from ;I high of 35,5% of non-agricultural establishments in 1945 to a near-lciw of 14.9%
in 1995. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT or LABOR, No. 43, EMPLOYMENT AND
EARNINGS 2101bl. 40 (Jan. 1996); BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. Dr.r"r or ',Alum No. 2970,
linNinua)K Or LA BUR STATISTICS 412 tbl. 165 (1980). The new president of the AFL-CIO, John
Sweeney, was elected in October, 1995, and increased organization was a key component of his
(deo ion plat Corm. See Sweeney Announces Sweeping Changes at AFL-CIO, Names Richald Bensinger
to '4 Organizing Post; Allison Porter to Head Organizing Institute, AFL-CIO Press Release (fan.
24, 1996). Sweeney created a new Organizing Department which oversees the Organizing Institute
and administers a $20 million organizing fund. See id.
80 See generally Town & Country Elec. v. NLRB, 34 F.3d 625, 147 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2133; 14.B.
Zachry Co. v. NLRB, 886 F.2(1 70, 132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2377 (4th Cir. 1994). The.sc outcomes
would have exacerbated the impact of Lechwere, Inc. is NLRB, an earlier Supreme Court decision
which held that employers did not commit an unfair labor practice by excluding non-employee
union members from company property. 502 U.S. 527, 541, 139 L.R.R.M• (BNA) 2225, 2231
(1992).
81 See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994); Town C? Country Elec., 116 S. Ct. al 452-53, 150 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
at 2898; Lechmere, 502 U.S. al 541, 139 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2231.
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Thus, the decision of the Town & Country Court, following the deci-
sions of the District of Columbia Circuit in Willmar and the Second
Circuit in Henlopen, was necessary in order to preserve employees'
section 7 rights. 82
Town & Country's extension of the protections of the NLRA to
paid union organizers applying for jobs with non-unionized companies
prohibits employers from discriminating against union organizers in
hiring.83 As a result, it may be much more difficult for employers to
oppose union organization and prevent their employees from hearing
the union message. It remains to be seen how employers will respond
to the Town. & Country decision, including how their hiring practices
will change.
Although Thwn & Country prohibits employers from discriminat-
ing against qualified applicants who are also union organizers, this type
of discrimination may simply become more subtle and thus harder to
detect and prove. 84 In his concurrence in the NLRB's 'Awn & Country
decision, Board Member Raudabaugh suggests that employers will be
able to continue to fight union organization after this decision through
"nondiscriminatory" hiring practices."-`' Board Member Raudahaugh
states that he would not consider it an unfair labor practice for em-
ployers to engage in "nondiscriminatory practices" such as refusing
to hire temporary employees or employees who are simultaneously
employed by another employer." Thus, according to Board Member
Raudabaugh, employers could continue to refuse to hire applicants
who are also paid union organizers as long as they are treated like any
other "employee" during the hiring process.°
Employers could conceivably engage in even more subtle types of
discrimination against union organizers as well." For example, employ-
82 See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994); see generally Willmar Eke. Scrv., Inc. v. NLRB, 968 F.2d 1327,
140 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2745 (D.C. Cir. 1992); NLRB v. Henlopen, 599 F.2d 2(1, 101 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2247 (2d Cir. 1979). For the text of section 7, see supra note 29.
83 See Thum & Country Elec., 116 S. Gt. at 452-53, 150 L.R.R.M. (RNA) at 2898,
" See id.
45 See Thum & Country Elec., 309 N.L.R.B. at 1258, 142 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1045 (Raudabaugh,
Board Member, concurring) (adopting his concurrence in Sun Iand Construction Co., 309
N.L.R.B. 1224, 1232-33, 142 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1025, 1035 (1992) (Raudahaugh, Board Member,
concurring)).
(Raudahaugh, Board Member, concurring).
87 See id. (Raudabaugh, Board Member, concurring). At least one NLRB decision since Town
& Country, however, has held that the "moonlighting" policy advocated by Raudahaugh consti-
tuted an unfair labor practice because its intent was to prohibit union organizing. See Tualatin
Elec., Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. 1237, 1237, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1159, 1160 (1995).
"Interview with Thomas C. Kohler, Professor, Boston College Law School, in Newton, Mass.
(Oct. 10, 1996).
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ers could begin screening applicants for certain personality traits.""
Employers could refuse to hire applicants who display too many "lead-
ership" qualities and claim that this disqualification is necessary for
them to hire a "compliant" work force when, in reality, they may be
trying to eliminate union leadership.'' [ This type of strategy would likely
be more difficult for unions to detect and substantiate in order to file
an unfair labor charge.9 I
If employers' efforts to fight union organization lead them to
engage in these more subtle kinds of hiring practices designed to avoid
union organization, unions may have a difficult time taking advantage
of the protection afforded by the "Town & Country decision. These
discriminatory practices may be difficult to substantiate for the pur-
poses of filing an unfair labor charge or, as Board Member Raud-
abaugh suggests, may not constitute unfair labor practices at al1. 92 Thus,
although Town & Country extends the protection of the NLRA to paid
organizers, the actual impact of the decision on unions' ability to get
their organizers hired remains to be seen and is somewhat dependent
on how employers change their hiring practices in response to the
decision.
It also remains to be seen how the legislature will respond to the
nwn & Country decision. Members of both the United States House
of Representatives and the United States Senate have already intro-
duced the "Truth in Employment Act of 1997," which would amend
section 8(a) of the NLRA by permitting an employer to deny employ-
ment to "[a] ny person who seeks or has sought employment with the
employer in furtherance of the objectives of an organization other
than the employer."`-'° Supporters of the bills believe that forcing em-
ployers to hire "salts" places them in a no-win situation."' They assume
that once hired, "salts" will disrupt the work place and pursue frivolous
'' 1(1.
90 Id.
91
92 See Mum &' Country Elec., Inc. 309 N.L.R.B. at 1258, 142 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1045 (Rand-
abaugh, Board Member, concurring) (adopting his concurrence in Stiniand Construction Go.),
SeuSunkind Construction Co., 309 N.L.R.B. at 1232-13, 142 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1035 (Ratulabaugh,
C u d• Member, concurring).
93
 Troth in Employment Act, S. 328, 105th Cong. (1997); Truth in Employment Act, H.R.
758, 105th Cong. (1997) (permits employers tt I deny employment to "lalny person who seeks or
has sought employment with the employer in furtherance of other employment or agency
status."), -rhe Act was also introduced in the 194111 Congress, but had to he reintroduced in the
new term. Truth in Employment Act, S. 1925, 104th Cong. (1996); 'Truth in Employment Act,
H.R. 5211, 104th Cong. (1996).
9.1 Organizing: Faulell's Wuth in Employment Ad' Would Curl' Organizing II); 'Salts; 63 Dmix
Rio'. (BNA), Apr. 2, 1996, at d6 (quoting Republican Rep. Harris Fawc11 of Illinois).
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unfair labor charges against the employer. 95 If the employer refuses to
hire the "salt," the employer faces a discrimination suit. 9" The legisla-
tors fail to realize, however, that once employed, "salts" are required
to perform their jobs, follow the rules of the work place and comply
with the same guidelines as other employees in terms of union activities
in the work place.97 The arguments made in support of this legislation
are the same practical arguments that the Town. & Country Court
rejected.98 If this legislation is ultimately passed, it will severely limit
employees' right to organize in the same way as the Town & Country
Court would have if it had decided that paid union organizers were
not "employees" under the NLRA.'")
In conclusion, the Supreme Court determined in Town. & Country
that paid union organizers who apply for jobs in non-unionized work-
places for the purpose of organizing the work force are "employees"
under section 2(3) of the NLRA and, thus, are afforded the protection
of the NLRA.""' The Court allowed the NLRB to include paid organizer
applicants in the statutory definition of "employee" because protecting
their right to organize is consistent with the purposes of the NLRA.'"'
Non-unionized employers may no longer claim that paid union organ-
izers who attempt to organize their labor from within are not "employ-
ees" under the NLRA. 1 °2 While the Town & Country decision should
provide unprecedented opportunity for unions to expand their organ-
izing efforts, it remains to be seen whether employers will try to avoid
hiring union organizers in more subtle ways, and if so, whether their
new methods for excluding union organizers are detectable and able
to be substantiated. It also remains to he seen whether the legislature
will respond by amending section 8(a) of the NLRA to allow employers
to refuse to hire "salts."
95 See Gorton Introduces Senate Anti-Salting Bill, 126 DAILY Lut. Rep'. (BNA), July 1, 1906, at
a12; Organizing: Fowell's 'Truth in Employment Act' Would Curb Organizing by 'Salts; supra note
94, at d6.
96 See Organizing: Powell's Truth in Employment Act' Would Curb Organizing by 'Salts; supra
note 94, at d6.
97 See	 & Country Elec., 116 S. CA. al 457, 150 L.R.R.M. (MIA) at 2902.
98
 See id. at 454i-57, 150	 (BNA) at 2902.
99 See id. at 452-53, 150 L.R.R.M. (11NA) it 2898. The bills were introduced in both the House
and the Senate in February 13, 1997, but as of this printing no action has been taken on either.
See S. 328, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 758, 105th Cong. (1997): see generally Cong. Ind. (CCII)
20,001 (105th Cong. Senate 1997-98): Cong. hid. (CCH) 35,001 (105th Cong. 1 -louse 1997-98).
1 °0 Thum	 Country Elec., 116 S. Ct. at 452-53, 150 L.R.R.M. (LINA) at 2898.
1 ° 1 See id. at 454, 150 L.R.R.M. (11NA) at 2899.
1 °2 See id. at 452-53, 150 L.R.R.M. (11NA) at 2808.
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B. *No Exception liar Employers with Precontractual Good Faith Doubt
in Union Majority Status: Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. NLRB 1
Sections 8(a) (1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act (the
"NLRA") make it. an unfair labor practice for employers to restrain
employees in the exercise of their rights or to refuse to bargain with
employees' chosen representatives. 2
 The objective of the NLRA is to
promote industrial peace and stability in collective bargain ing.sToward
that end, the National Labor Relations Board (the "Board") has estab-
lished conclusive presumptions of union majority status which may be
rebuttable at a collective bargaining agreement's expiration if the
employer has a good faith doubt in the union's majority support. 4 The
United States Supreme Court in Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. NLRB
upheld the Board's refusal to extend the period during which the
presumption is rebuttable to a reasonable time after a new contract
has been formed' By clearly defining the time period during which
employers may rebut a union's presumption of majority status, the
decision in Auciello lends certainty to the collective bargaining process
and thus will promote industrial peace and stability."
In 1961, in Garment Workers v. NLRB, the United States Supreme
Court held that an employer committed an unfair labor practice by
mistakenly recognizing a union which did not represent a majority of
its employees.? In Garment Workers, the International Ladies' Garment
Workers' Union ("Garment Workers' Union") underwent an organiza-
tional drive at Bernhard-Altmann Texas Corporation's San Antonio,
Texas, plant when a department of the plant went on strike to protest.
a wage reduction!' The Garment Workers' Union and the employer
* By Amanda C. Buck, Stall Member, BosTox Cot.LEGE LAW REVIEW.
1
 116 S, Ct. 1754, 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2385 (1996).
2
 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (1),(5) (1994). The NLRA provides in relevant part that:
It shalt be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
(l) to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157 of this title; .. .
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of Iris employees,
subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title.
Id.
3 See Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. V. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 38, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2441,
2445 (1987).
4 See NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 778, 133 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3049,
3049-50 (1990); NLRB v. Burns Intl Security Services, Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 279 n.3, 80 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2225, 2228 n.3 (1972).
5 I 16 S. Ct. at 1756, 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2385,
See id. at 1758, 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2386-87.
7 366 U.S. 731, 732-33, 48 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2251, 2251-52 (1961).
" Id. at 733, 48 L.R.R.M. (RNA) at 2252.
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entered into negotiations, and the employer signed a memorandum
recognizing the Garment Workers' Union as the exclusive bargaining
representative of its employees." The Garment Workers' Union claimed
that it had received authorization cards from a majority of employees,
but neither the employer nor the union checked the accuracy of this
assertion.'° After finding that the employer and the Garment Workers'
Union had interfered with the employees' organizational rights, the
Board refused to give force to the agreement and ordered the union
to stop acting as the employees' representative until a Board-certified
election demonstrated its majority status." The Supreme Court upheld
the Board's finding that the employer's good faith belief in the Gar-
ment Workers' Union's majority status was not a defense to unfair labor
practice charges, stating that recognizing a union with only minority
status was a violation of employee rights and that allowing such a
defense would encourage employer carelessness.' 2 The Court further
reasoned that refusing to create a good faith exception does not place
a hardship on employers or unions because it merely requires employ-
ers to withhold recognition until a Board-supervised election occurs.''
Therefore, the Supreme Court held that an employer who recognizes
a union that does not enjoy majority status cannot raise the defense of
a good faith belief to unfair labor practice charges."
In 1972, in NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, Inc., the
United States Supreme Court held that although a successor employer
was not bound by its predecessor's collective bargaining,'' it did have
a duty to bargain with a recently certified incumbent union when it
hired a majority of its predecessor's employees.' 6 In Burns, a security
business hired the majority of its predecessor's employees, whose un-
ion, the United Plant Guard Workers (the "UPG"), had been recently
certified. 17 Although the employer was aware of the UPG's status, the
employer supplied its new employees with union cards for a competing
union, the American Federation of Guards (the "AFG"), telling the
employees that they had to belong to the AFG. 18 When the employer
refused to recognize the UPG, the union filed unfair labor practice
9 See id. at 734, 48 L..R.R.M. (BNA) at 2252.
19 See id.
"See id. at 735, 48 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2252-53.
12 Garment Workers, 366 U.S. at 738-39, 48 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2254.
" Id. at 739, 48 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at '2254.
1.1 Id. at 732-33, 48	 (BNA) at 2251-52.
15 406 U.S. at 281-82, 80 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2228-29.
l" Id. at 278-79, 80 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2227.
17 Id, at 274-75. 80	 (BNA) at 2226.
18 See id. at 275, 80 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2226. The employer had negotiated collective bar-
gaining agreements with the AFG at other work sites. See id.
March 1997]	 ANNUAL SUI?VIEY OF LABOR LAW	 317
charges. t`' The Board found that the employer had unlawfully recog-
nized the AFG, refused to recognize the UPG and failed to honor the
collective bargaining agreement negotiated by its predecessor. 2" The
Court upheld the Board's finding that there was a presumption of
majority status when a union had recently represented the employees
of a predecessor and its members were the majority of a successor's
employees. 2 ' The Court reasoned that this presumption could not be
rebutted in this case because the employer could not. have a good faith
doubt about the UPG's majority status. 22 Thus, the Supreme Court held
that a successor employer has a duty to bargain with a recently certified
incumbent union when a majority of its employees were previously
employed by its predecessor."
In 1987, in Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Catp. v. NLRB, the United
States Supreme Court extended its holding in Burns to situations in
which the union had not been recently certified, holding that the
union's presumption of majority status continued despite a change in
ownership, and therefore, the successor employer had a duty to bar-
gain with the union if a majority of its employees worked for the
previous etnployer. 21 In Fall River Dyeing, the employer bought the
assets of its predecessor, conducted a similar operation and hired many
of the predecessor's employees." When the predecessor's employees
became the majority of those employed at Fall River Dyeing, the in-
cumbent union, United Textile Workers of America, Local 292 ("Local
292"), requested recognition and collective bargaining. 26 When the
employer refused to honor this request, Local 292 filed an unfair labor
practice charge with the Board.27
 The Board upheld the finding of an
Administrative Law Judge ("ALF) that the employer had committed
an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with Local 292 once the
predecessor's employees comprised the majority of the successor's
work force. 28
 In affirming the Board's decision, the Court extended the
holding in Burns beyond situations in which the union was recently
certified."' The Court held that a union's rebuttable presumption of
majority status continues, regardless of a change in employers, as long
I" See id. at 276, 80 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2226.
20 See Burns, 406 U.S. at 276, 80 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2226.
21 Id. at 278, 281, 80 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2227-28.
22 Id. at 278, 80 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2'227.
22 Id. at 278, 281, 80 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2227-28.
L1 982 U.S. at 41, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2446-47.
25 Id. at 32-33, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2443.
` 6 See id. at 31, 33, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2442-43.
27 See id. at 33-34, 125 L.R.R.M. (RNA) at 2443-44.
28 See id. at 34-35, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2444.
11
 Fall River Dyeing, 482 U.S. at 41, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2446.
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as the new employer is truly a successor and a majority of its employees
worked for its predecessor." The Court reasoned that an employer who
chooses to take advantage of its predecessor's trained work force by
operating a similar business and hiring the majority of its employees
from that work force has a duty to bargain with the incumbent union.31
The Court noted that without such an extension of Burns, employers
could simply reorganize the business, terminate existing labor con-
tracts and use the ensuing uncertainty to undermine the union." Thus,
the Supreme Court held that a successor employer must bargain with
an incumbent union if a majority of its employees worked for its
predecessor, reasoning that a union's presumption of majority status
continues despite a change in ownership."
In 1990, in NLRB v. Curtin. Matheson Scientific, Inc., the United
States Supreme Court held that the Board rationally refused to pre-
sume that striker replacements oppose the union when determining
whether there was an objective basis for an employer's good faith doubt
in the union's majority status. 34 In Curtin Matheson, an employer hired
replacement workers after locking out the employees in the bargain-
ing union, Teamsters Local 968, General Drivers, Warehousemen and
Helpers ("Local 968"). 35 When Local 968 ended its strike and offered
to accept the contract previously proposed, the employer responded
that the offer was no longer available and withdrew recognition of the
union. 36 The employer justified its refusal to negotiate with Local 968
on its doubt that the union was supported by a majority of the work-
ers. 37
 In hearing Local 968's unfair labor practice charge, the Board
held that the employer did not have a sufficient objective basis to doubt
the union's majority support." The Supreme Court held that the
Board's refusal to presume that striker replacements opposed Local
968 was rational, supporting the Board's recognition that the situations
surrounding strikes vary greatly and that the chance that replacement
workers do not support the union is not great enough to justify a
presumption of opposition to the union.39 The Court further stated
that the Board's decision was consistent with the NLRA's policy of
39 Id. at 41, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2447.
31 Id. at 41, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2446.
32 Id. at 40, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2446.
33 1d. at 41, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2446-47.
34 494 U.S. at 787-88, 133 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3053-54.
33 Id. at 782, 133 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3051.
3" See id.
37 See id.
3H See id. at 783, 133 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3051.
39 Curtin Matheson, 494 U.S. at 793, 133 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3056.
March 1997]	 ANNUAL. SURVEY OF LA1301? LAW
	 319
industrial peace because it. promoted industrial stability. 40
 Therefore,
the Supreme Court concluded that the Board was rational in its refusal
to presume that striker replacements oppose the union when deter-
mining whether an employer had a good faith doubt as to the union's
majority status.'"
During the Survey year, in Auciello Iron Works, Inc., v. NLRB, the
United States Supreme Court held that the Board was reasonable in
finding that an employer's disavowal of a contract with a certified
union because of its good faith doubt in the union's majority status
constituted an unfair labor practice." The Court refused to make an
exception to the conclusive presumption of a union's majority status
for an employer with precontractual good fitith doubt in majority
status. 13
 The Court held that once an employer's offer has been ac-
cepted, good faith doubt as to majority status is not a defense to an
unfair labor practice charge
After a union election in 1977, the NLRB certified Shopmen's
Local No. 501 (the "Union") as the collective bargaining agent of
the employees of Auciello Iron Works ("Auciello") of Hudson, Massa-
chusetts. 45
 Auciello and the Union successfully negotiated collective
bargaining agreements until the expiration of one of these agreements
on September 25, 1988. 46
 When the employer and the Union did not
reach an agreement by October 14, the employees went on strike while
negotiations continued. 47 Auciello presented the Union with a contract
proposal on November 17, 1988, and picketing stopped the next day."'
According to Auciello, a company with only 23 employees, prior to the
Union's acceptance, 9 employees crossed the picket line, 13 resigned
from the Union and 16 expressed dissatisfaction with the Union.'"
Despite its doubt in the Union's majority status, Auciello did not
withdraw its outstanding offer. 5" Instead, based on its doubt that the
Union represented a majority of its employees, Auciello disavowed the
collective bargaining agreement the day after the Union accepted it
and refused to continue negotiating. 51
' 10 Id. at 794, 133 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3056.
41 Id. at 787-88, 133 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3053-54.
4 '2 1 i6 S. Ct. 1754, 1756, 152 L.R.R.M. (11NA) 2385, 2385 (1996).
43
 Id. at 1701, 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2389.
41 Id. at 1758-59, 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2387.
15 ,5re id. at 1756, 152 L.R.R.M. (RNA) at 2385-86.
46 See id. at 1756, 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2386.
'17
 See. Auciello, 116 S. Ct. at 1756-57, 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2386.
'15 See id. at 1757, 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2386.
41 Sell id. at 1756-57, 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2385-86.
59 See id. at 1757, 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2386.
51 See. id.
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The Board charged Auciello with violating sections 8(a) ( 1 ) and
(5) of the NLRA."2 The Board affirmed an AU 's ruling that Auciello
had violated the NLRA by withdrawing from the contract between the
parties, refusing to consider Auciello's defense of a good faith doubt
in the Union's majority status!' When the Board sought enforcement
of its order requiring Auciello to honor the contract, the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit refused to enforce the order and
remanded the case for further discussion of the Board's refusal to
consider the defense of good faith doubt in the Union's majority
status." The Board then issued a supplemental opinion supporting its
decision, and the First Circuit enforced the order."
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, and Justice
Souter, writing for a unanimous court, affirmed the First Circuit's
decision.'" In determining the reasonableness of the Board's decision,
the Court stated that the conclusive presumptions regarding majority
status articulated in Burns and Fall River Dyeing were intended to
promote the "orderly resolution of disputes between workers and em-
ployers."57 The Court reasoned that the presumption of majority status
allows unions to bargain collectively without facing decertification and
prevents employers from attempting to undermine union support dur-
ing bargaining periods,"
The Court rejected the employer's argument that it should extend
the exception in Curtin Matheson—the presumption of majority status
is rebuttable if the employer has a good faith doubt in such status based
on a sufficient objective basis—to situations where a contract has al-
ready been formed." The Court stated that the same rationale that
prompted the Board to presume majority status required the Board to
reject an exception for employers whose doubt in majority status ex-
isted before the contract was formed." The Court reasoned that ex-
tending this exception to employers whose good faith doubt in a
union's majority status is based on information obtained before con-
tract formation contradicts the very aims of "industrial peace and
stability" that the NLRA was enacted to promote."' The Court deferred
52 See Auciello, 116 S. Ct. at 1757, 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2386.
53 See id.
51
 See Id.
55 See Id.
55 Id. at 1756-57, 152 L.R.R.M. 2385-86.
57 Auciello, 116 S. Ct. at 1758, 152	 (BNA) at 2386-87.
" Id. at 1758, 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2387,
59 Id.
6o jrd.
61
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to the Board's judgment, reasoning that the costs of an exception of
the type Auciello sought outweighed any possible benefit because it
would give employers too much control over the bargaining process
and could be detrimental to the stability sought by the NLRA. 62
The Court also rejected the employer's argument that the facts of
the case warranted an exception because the employer expressed its
doubt about majority status so soon after contract formation." The
Court stated that the argument for a case-by-case determination of
what constitutes a reasonable time in which employers could repudiate
a contract did not address the issue of the reasonableness of the
Board's decision." The Court noted that Auciello could have with-
drawn its offer and petitioned for an election, withdrawn the offer and
refused to negotiate further or withdrawn the offer. and investigated
while continuing to bargain." 5 The Court stated that an exception is
not needed because employers have ample opportunity to express
doubts about a union's majority status before a contract is formed. 66
Furthermore, the Court concluded that, if the exception were adopted,
employers could bargain despite doubts about majority status in order
to obtain a satisfactory deal and then challenge the majority status in
hopes of getting a more favorable agreement."" The Court upheld the
reasonableness of the Board's belief that such challenges after contract
formation would not be conducive to the NLRA's goal of stability and
industrial peace. 68
 The Court also rejected Auciello's argument that the
Board's position undermines the employees' right to have repre-
sentatives of their choosing conduct their collective bargaining, stating
that the Board is justified in being skeptical when an employer presents
itself as the champion of its employees' rights. 66
Finally, the Court rejected Auciello's contention that Garment
Workers required reversal of the Board's decision.'" The Court stated
that in contrast to Garment Workers, the employees in this case had the
opportunity to initiate decertification of the Union but chose not to
do so."' The Court stated that the two decisions were consistent because
both good faith doubt and belief in majority status were insufficient to
152
 Auciello, 116 S. Ct. at 1759, 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2387.
63 Id.
61 Id. at 1759, 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2388.
61", hi .
6"Id.
Auciello, 116 S. Ct. at 176(1, 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2388.
Id.
6  Id. at 176{}, 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2388-89.
7"Id. at 176(1, 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2389.
71 Id.
	•
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either compel recognition of a union or deny a union's contracting
authority. 72
The Court's affirmance of the Board's decision in Auciello protects
the integrity of the collective bargaining process and promotes the
NLRA's policy goals of industrial peace and stability. 73 The presump-
tions of majority support ensure industrial peace and stability by allow-
ing unions to concentrate on obtaining a collective bargaining agree-
ment without worrying about their support being undermined. 74 The
Court wisely refused to extend the Curtin Matheson exception to a
period after a new contract has been formed. 7' If employers were
allowed to first enter into a collective bargaining agreement and then
attack the union's majority status in hopes of getting a better deal,
industrial stability would suffer greatly because entering into a collec-
tive bargaining agreement would no longer be the resolution of the
conflict. 76
The Court's decision in Auciello further solidifies the security that
unions enjoy without leaving employers who doubt the union's major-
ity status without recourse. 77 In refusing to extend the good faith ex-
ception to the period after contract formation, the Court thus protects
the rights of employees by ensuring that the union of their choice will
not be undermined, that contracts will be enforced and that their work
environment will be peaceful and stable. 78 In the event that the union
is not supported by a majority of employees, however, the Board's
decision reserves the employees' right to initiate decertification of
the union. 7° At the same time, the decision gives employers ample
opportunity to challenge majority status before contract formation,
although the employer in Auciello did not avail itself of those opportu-
nities. 80 In short, the Auciello decision prevents the employer from
having too much control over the bargaining process, but gives the
employer several opportunities to withdraw offers before contract for-
mation.81
71 Auciello, 116 S. Ct. at 1760-61, 152 L.R.R.M.(BNA) at 2389.
73 See id. at 1758-59, 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2386-87.
74 See id. at 1758, 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2387; Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB,
482 U.S. 27, 38, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2441, 2445 (1987).
75 See Auriello, 116 S. Ct. at 1758-59, 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2387.
76 See id. at 1760, 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2388.
77
 See id. at 1759, 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2388.
7m See id. at 1758-60, 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2387-88.
See id. at 1760, 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2389.
8" See Auciello, 116 S. Ct. at 1759, 152 L.R.R.M. (13NA) at 2388.
at See id. at 1758-59, 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2387-88.
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Furthermore, adopting a bright line test is more conducive to
industrial stability than case-by-case determinations of what constitutes
a reasonable time after contract formation in which an employer can
assert good faith doubt and disavow the contract. 82 Although adopting
a bright line test could be seen as somewhat unfair on the Facts of the
case as relayed in the petitioner's brief," the Court held that the Board
was rational in refusing to look at the circumstances on a case-by-case
basis.84 The Board's decision decisively instructs employers about when
a good faith doubt in majority status can be a successful defense to
unfair labor practice charges." Determining reasonableness on a case-
by-case basis would not deter employers from obtaining a contract and
then questioning its majority status in an attempt to get a better deal! 8
The certainty accompanying a bright line test will better promote
industrial stability. 87
In conclusion, in Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. NLRB, the Supreme
Court established that an employer who disavows a collective bargain-
ing agreement based on a precontractual doubt as to the union's ma-
jority status commits an unfair labor practice." The Court refused to
extend the good faith doubt exception articulated in Curtin_ Matheson
to the period after contract formation. 8" The Court established a bright
line rule rather than endorsing a determination of the reasonableness
of the period of time after contract formation on a case-by-case basis."
The bright line test will promote certainty and industrial stability and
protect employees' rights.
C. * Status of Nurses as "Supervisors" Under the
National Labor Relations Act: Nymed, Inc.I
The National Labor Relations Act (the "Act") protects the right
of employees to organize collectively by forming and joining labor
82 See id. at 1759, 152 L.R.R.M. (RNA) at 238.
83
 Brief for the Petitioner at 6-7, Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. NLRB, 116 S. Ct. 1754
(1996)(No. 95-688). 'rite employer repudiated the contract the day alter the Union, sensing that
its support was waning, telegraphed its acceptance to the home of ilte company's president on
Sunday evening before the employer could take action to withdraw the offer on Monday. See id.
8 ' 1 See Auciello, 116 S. CI. at 1759, 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2388.
st See id.
88 See id. at 1758-59, 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2387.
87 See id. at 1758-59 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 238088.
88 Id. at 1756, 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2385.
89
 Auciello 116 S. Ct. at 1758-59, 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2387.
9° Id. at 1759, 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2388,
* By Peter R. MacLeod, Staff Member, BosToN Co1,I,EGE. LAW REVIEW.
1 320 N.L.R.B. 8116, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1198 (1996).
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unions.' Originally, the Act protected all employees, but in 1947, it was
amended by Congress to exclude "supervisors." 3 Section 2(11) of the
Act defines "supervisor" to include any individual who uses indepen-
dent judgment to carry out any one of twelve listed supervisory activi-
ties in the interests of the employer. 4 If individuals are "supervisors"
within the meaning of the Act, employers are not compelled to recog-
nize their right to organize. 5
 Conversely, section 2(12) of the Act
specifically protects the bargaining rights of "professional" employees,
who are defined as employees whose work involves the use of consistent
judgment!' Thus, the definitions of "supervisor" and "professional"
both concern an employee's use of judgment.' The courts and the
National Labor Relations Board (the "Board") have noted that differ-
entiating between the two can be difficult. 8 In Nymed, Inc., the Board
set out guidelines for deciding whether a nurse is a supervisor under
the Act.'
In 1993, in Northcrest Nursing Home, the Board applied the so-
called patient care analysis, holding that licensed practice nurses
("LPNs") at Northcrest Nursing Home were not supervisors under the
Act because they exercised their judgment in the interests of the
2
 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994). This Act is commonly known as the Taft-Hartley Act.
3 Id. § 152(3).
4 Id. § 152(11). Section 2(11) defines a supervisor as:
[A]ny individual having the autluirity, in the interest of the employer, to hire,
transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline
other employees, or responsibly' to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or
effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the
exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires
the use of independent judgment.
Id.
5 See. id. § 164(a).
' 3 Id. § 152(12). Section 2(12) defines a professional employee as;
[Alny employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and varied in
character as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work; (ii)
involving the consistent use of discretion and judgment in its performance; (iii) of
such a character that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be
standardized in relation to a given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of an
advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged
course of specialized intellectual instruction and study in an institution of higher
learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a general academic education or from
an apprenticeship or from training in the performance of routine mental, manual,
or physical processes.
Id.
7 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(11), 152(12)(a).
See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Health Care & Retirement Corp., 511 U.S. 571, 581, 146 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2321, 2325 (1994); Providence Hosp., 320 N.L.R.B. 717, 728, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1172,
1190 (1996).
3
 320 N.L.R.B. at 809, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1198, 1202-03.
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patient, rather than in the interests of the employer.'" In Northcrest, the
LPNs all worked as charge nurses for part of their shift." As charge
nurses, their duties included checking on patients, giving reports on
patients to nurses' aides and administering medication. 1 " Charge
nurses directed aides, assigned them to shills if they were short-handed
and wrote reports on aides who violated the employer's policies.l.'
In reasoning that the LPNs working as charge nurses were not
supervisors under the Act, the Board concentrated on their role in
assigning, directing, disciplining and evaluating the nurses' aides."
Following its well-established precedents, the Board examined whether
the LPNs' exercise of these indicia was an exercise of professional
judgment incidental to patient care or an exercise of supervisory
authority in the interest of the employer. 15 The Board determined that
the LPNs exercised these indicia as an extension of their role as
professionals providing care to the patients; therefore, they were pro-
tected as professional employees. 1 " Thus, the Board held that because
the LPNs exercised their professional judgment in the interests of the
patient rather than the employer, the nurses were not supervisors
under the Act. 17
In 1994, in NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp., the United
States Supreme Court rejected the patient care analysis employed in
Northcrest and held that four LPNs were supervisors within the mean-
ing of section 2(11) .'s In Health Care & Retirement Corp., the Board's
counsel issued a complaint on behalf of four LPNs who had recently
been disciplined, claiming that they were protected by the Act as
employees. 19 The LPNs' duties included assigning work, monitoring
and evaluating the nurses' aides and ensuring that adequate staffing
levels existed.'" These tasks were similar to those that the nurses in
Northcrest carried out and the Board applied the same analysis as it had
in Northcrest, holding that the LPNs were professional employees pro-
tected by the Act rather than unprotected supervisors."'
19 311 N.L.R.B. 491, 493, 145 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1213, 1216 (1993).
" Id. at 500-02, 145 t.. R.R.M. (BNA) at 1225.
12 See id. at 501-02, 195 L.R.R.M. (RNA) at 1227.
13 See id. at 502, 145 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1227.
' Id. at 592-09, 145 1...K.R.M. (BNA) at 1227-33.
15 Northerest Nursing Notre, 313 N.L.R.B. at 493, 145 L.R.R.M. (IINA) at 1218.
16 Id. at 505, 195 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1229.
17 Id. at 509, 145 l...R.R.M. (BNA) at 1233.
18 511 U.S. at 584, 146 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2327.
19 id. at 574, 140 1...R.R,M. (BNA) at 2323.
20 See id. at 575, 146 L.R.R.M. (11NA) at 2323.
21 Id.; see 313 N.L.R.B. at 500-03, 145 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1226-29.
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In rejecting the Board's reasoning, the Court stated that there was
no sound reason for the Board to employ the patient care analysis,
which created an industry-specific false dichotomy between the inter-
ests of the employer and those of the patient.'22 The Court reasoned
that this was a false dichotomy because the care of the patient was the
business of the employer.23
 Although rejecting the Board's non-statu-
tory grounds for applying this distinction, the Court stated that it was
the proper function of the Board to examine the nurses' positions and
to determine whether or not the nurses were supervisors." The Court
further stated that the Board could distinguish between nurses whose
authority encompassed front-line management prerogatives and thus
were supervisors, and nurses whose authority arose from professional
knowledge.25
 After rejecting the argument that there was a difference
between the interests of the employer and those of the patient, the
Court held that the nurses were supervisors. 26
In 1996, in Providence Hospital, the Board interpreted the Su-
preme Court's decision in Health Care & Retirement Corp. for the first
time, holding that. nurses working at a hospital were not supervisors
within the meaning of the Act because they did not exercise inde-
pendent judgment in assigning and responsibly directing employees.v
The nurses in Providence Hospital worked as charge nurses, home
health assistants and on-call leaders. 28
 The charge nurses were regular
registered nurses ("RNs") the majority of the time and only assumed
the extra responsibilities of charge nurses when supervisor RNs were
absent.29
 The home health team leaders coordinated the RN home
health teams and the on-call leaders made assignments only when an
assigned worker was absent. 3°
Heeding the Supreme Court's directive in Health Care & Retire-
ment Corp., the Board concentrated on the question of whether the
nurses used independent judgment in assigning and responsibly direct-
ing employees so as to render them supervisors.'' The Board reasoned
22 Health Care & Retirement Corp., 511 U.S. at 577, 146 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2324.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 582-83, 146	 (BNA) at 2326.
25 Id. The Court indicated that a proper analysis may include an examination of whether the
nurses' actions were routine or required independent judgment. Id.
26 Id. at 584, 146 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2327.
27
 320 N.L.R.B. at 717, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1180.
26 id.
29 See id. at 730, 15]	 (BNA) at 1192.
3" See id. at 733, 734, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1194, 1195.
31 id. at 717, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1180. The Board mentioned a number of guiding
principles to use to decide whether a person is a "supervisor" under the Act. Id. at 729, 151
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that the routine, clerical nature of the assignments showed that the
nurses did not use independent judgment and thus were not supervi-
sors. 32 In addition, the Board construed the meaning of "responsibly
to direct" narrowly, reasoning that Congress intended for the Act to
protect those workers who directed others as a function of their pro-
fessional knowledge or experience." The Board emphasized that any
judgment used by the nurses arose from their position as professional
employees, rather than from a shared power with management."^ Thus,
the Board held that the nurses were not supervisors under the Act. 35
During the Survey year, in Nyrned, Inc., the Board held that forty-
five LPNs were not supervisors within the meaning of the Act because
they did not have the authority to assign, responsibly direct, discipline,
evaluate or transfer other employees, or effectively to recommend such
action.36 The forty-five LPNs in Nyrned, Inc. were employed at Ten
Broeck Commons, a nursing home which provided services to about
240 residents." The Board examined each of the supervisory indicia
and held that the LPNs did not exercise any of the indicia in such a
way as to render them supervisors. 38
The nursing department consisted of the director of nursing (the
"DON"), the assistant director of nursing, staff development person-
nel, RNs, LPNs and certified nursing assistants ("assistants")i' Dur-
ing the day, the full nursing department was present, but during the
night, there were fewer staff members present. 4° The patients in the
facility were divided into four or five "runs," or groups of patients,
depending on the number of assistants.^' The LPNs assigned each
assistant to a run on a monthly basis. 42
 The RNs or LPNs were respon-
sible for filling out a long-term care plan when a new resident first
(BNA) al 1191. 'These included fitetors such as the length of time during which the
person was "supervising," the skill levels of those whom the person was directing and the routine
nature of the tasks. See id.
:12 Providence Hosp., 320 N.L.11,11, at. 731-735, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1193-96.
33
 Id. at 728, 151 1,,R,R,M, (BNA) at 1189-90. The Board indicated in dicta that the meaning
of the word "responsibly" was also ambiguous but dial the proper procedure was to first examine
whether the nurses employed independent judgment. Id. Because the Board decided that they
did not in this situation, the Board did not need to discuss the meaning of "responsibly." See id.
:14 M. at 733, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1194.
35 Id, at 736, 151 L. R.R.M. (11NA) at 1196,
320 N.L.R.B. 80(3, 805, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1198, 1200 (1996).
37 id.
38 See id.
39 See id.
'111
 See id. at 807, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1200.
41 See. Nyined, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. at 807, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1201.
. 12 See id.
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arrived." The plan, called the Aidex, detailed the resident's daily
requirements and was changed as necessary.'" The LPNs checked the
Aidex to ensure that the assistants were completing each task prop-
erly. 45
 LPNs issued oral warnings to the assistants for initial infractions,
followed by written reports if the conduct continued." The nursing
supervisor read these reports and then talked with the people involved
and the assistant director of nursing before deciding whether to take
any action. 47
 LPNs were also responsible for filling out a portion of the
assistants' evaluation forms, which were reviewed by the DON and
others who then decided what action to take." Both the LPNs and the
RNs occasionally recommended the transfer of certain assistants to
different shifts or units because they were not working well in their
present placement.49
 The DON, however, made the final decision
either to transfer the assistants or give them further training. 50 In
addition to these tasks, the LPNs performed duties as treatment nurses
or medication nurses.• 1
The United Industry Workers Local 424 (the "Local") petitioned
to represent the LPNs, and a hearing was held before a hearing offi-
cer of the Board. 52
 The hearing officer concluded that the LPNs were
not supervisors and thus allowed the Local's petition." The employer
sought review of the decision and the case was transferred to the
Board.54
 The Board found that the hearing officer's rulings were free
from prejudicial error and affirmed."
The Board focused its discussion on five of the twelve indicia of
supervisory status set out in section 2(1 I), namely whether the indi-
viduals in question had the authority to assign, responsibly direct,
discipline, evaluate or transfer other employees. 56
 The Board first in-
quired whether the LPNs exercised one of these criteria or had the
43 See id.
11 See id.
15 See id. at 808, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1201. They also assigned extra duties to the assistants
on a rotational basis. See id.
16 See Nymed, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. at 808, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1202.
17 See id, at 808-09, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1202.
18 See id. at 809, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1202.
' 19 .See id.
5" See id.
51 See Nymed, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. at 807, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1201.
52 See id. at 806, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1198.
53 See id.
5
 See id.
55
 Id.. at 806, 151 L.R.R.M, (BNA) at 12011.
56 Nymed, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B, at 809, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1202-03.
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authority to recommend such action effectively." The Board then ex-
amined whether the exercise of authority required the use of inde-
pendent judgment so as to render the LPNs supervisors under the
Act."
The Board first examined the statutory indicia of assignment and
responsible direction!'" The Board determined that although the 1..,PNs
did assign assistants, they did not exercise independent judgment. in
doing so.° The Board used the test established by the Supreme Court
in Health Care & Retirement Corp. to determine whether the LPNs ex-
ercised independent judgment or whether their authority was merely
routine and clerical in nature."' Specifically, the Board noted that (i)
there were established procedures for dealing with assigning runs and
substituting assistants; (ii) because all the assistants had the same skills,
there was little choice involved in deciding the assignments; and (iii)
the extra duties, lunch breaks and runs were routinely rotated among
the assistants."' The Board reasoned that the LPNs did not exercise
independent judgment, and thus they were not statutory supervisors.°
The Board then determined that the LPNs did not exercise inde-
pendent judgment in responsibly directing the work of the assistants."
The Board distinguished between writing a long-term care plan (the
Aidex) and directing employees to carry out the tasks within it. 65 The
Board reasoned that while designing the Aidex required judgment,
that judgment was based upon the LPNs' technical expertise; i.e., it
was a Function of their position as professional or technical employ-
ees.'''' The Board further reasoned that the daily routines of the assis-
tants were governed by the Aidex, and thus the LPNs did not use
independent judgment in directing the assistants.''' Any judgment that
the LPNs employed while directing the assistants drew on the greater
skill and experience of the LPNs and, thus, was not supervisory. 68
Furthermore, the Board recognized that the LPNs had many other
57 Id.
Id.
" Id. at 809, 15k L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1203.
Id. at 810, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1203.
Nymed, Jar., 320 N.L.R.B. at 810, 151 1...R.R.M. (RNA) at 1203.
u2 Id. at 810-11, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1204.
63 Id. at 810-11, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1203.
61 Id. at 811, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1204.
143 See IVymerf, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. at 811, 811 0.10, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1204, 1204 0.10.
°37 Id. at 811, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1204.
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responsibilities that did not involve the assistants, and thus the LPNs
only incidentally directed the other employees in narrowly circum-
scribed circumstances, in a similar manner to leadmen. 6"
In addition, the Board looked at the LPNs' involvement in disci-
plining the assistants and decided that this responsibility did not ren-
der the LPNs supervisors within the meaning of section 2(11). 7" The
Board concluded that an LPN's responsibility was merely to report
incidents and had no effect on the status of the assistants.'' Further-
more, the Board noted that any report made by the LPNs was reviewed
and independently investigated by the DON prior to any action. 72 In
deciding what action to take the DON did not rely solely on the written
report of the LPN, but used other documentary evidence as well."
Thus, the Board concluded that the LPNs' role in discipline did not
render them supervisors under the Act. 74
The Board next examined the LPNs' role in evaluating the assis-
tants. 75
 The Board decided that the LPNs were not involved in evalu-
ation so as to make them supervisors under the Act. 76 The Board
reasoned that the record showed that the LPNs' evaluations did not
directly result in personnel changes, and that any,personnel changes
which affected the assistants was not based solely on the LPNs' written
evaluation."
Finally, the Board examined the role of the LPNs in transferring
the assistants. 78
 The Board decided that the LPNs' involvement, in
transferring the assistants was not sufficient to make them supervi-
sors. 79
 The Board acknowledged that LPNs had made recommenda-
tions to the DON that assistants be transferred, but the effectiveness
" Id. at 812, 151 1_12.R.M. (BNA) at 1205. "Leachnen" were common at the time the Act was
first written, and thus are mentioned in the legislative history of the Act. See id. at 815, 151
(BNA) at 1208. L.eacnen are highly skilled employees whose primary function is
participation in the production of goods, usually in a factory situation. See id. They incidentally
direct the movements and operations of less skilled, subordinate employees. See id.
70 Id. at 812, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1205.
Nynted, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. at 812, 151 L.R.R.M. (DNA) at 1205. The Board cited to
Pasuivani Health Center, 284 N.L.R.B. 887, 889, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1274, 1276 (1987), in which
the Board decided that the nurses' reportorial role in discipline, where a supervisor indepen-
dently evaluated the report, was too minor a role to be considered supervisory. See id.
72 Id.
73 See id.
74
 Id. at 813, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1206.
7:i
76 Nymed, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. at 813, i51	 (BNA) at 1206.
77 Id.
76 Id.
7° Id.
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of those recommendations was not established." The Board noted that
there was no evidence that showed that any transfers of assistants were
based solely on the LPNs' recommendations and that the DON took
other factors into consideration in making such decisions. 81
 Thus, the
Board held that LPNs were not supervisors under the Act. 82
Board Member Cohen filed a dissenting opinion stating that the
LPNs were supervisors under the Act." He contended that the Board
had reached the conclusion that the nurses were not supervisors by
stretching the language of section 2(11)." He concluded that in this
situation, the nurses employed five of the indicia in 2(11) in such a
way as to make them supervisors."
Board Member Cohen looked first at the assignment of work, in
particular the assignment of runs." He concluded that the LPNs effec-
tively controlled the number and the identities of the patients assigned
to each assistant."' Because this involved considering the personality
and capabilities of the assistant, he reasoned, independent judgment
was necessary." Secondly, Board Member Cohen examined the LPNs'
role in directing the assistants." Concentrating on the LPNs' respon-
sibility for monitoring and directing the assistants in carrying out the
tasks in the Aidex, he rejected the majority's reasoning that the LPNs
were not supervisors because their actions were based on greater skill
and experience in the nature of professional or technical employees.'"
He reasoned that it was exactly the use of individual thought processes,
rather than acting on the order of an outside force or person, which
differentiated a supervisor from an employee.'" Finally, Board Member
80 Id .
81 Nymed, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. at 813, 151 L,R.R,M. (RNA) at 12(16.
82
8.3
	at 814, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1207 (Cohen. Board Member, dissenting). Board
Member Cohen stated that the decision ihe Supreme Court in Health Care & Retirement Corp.
required the Board to determine whether the 1.,1'Ns exercised, or had die power to exercise, one
of the 12 powers in 2(11), and then to determine whether the nurses employed independent
judgment in using the power. See id. (Cohen, Board Member, dissenting).
84 Id. (Cohen, Board Member, dissenting).
85 Id. (Cohen. Board Member, dissenting).
86 Nyrned, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. at 814, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1207 (Cohen, Board Member,
dissenting).
87 Id. (Cohen, Board Member, dissenting).
88 1d. at 815, 151 L.R.R.M. (RNA) at 1207 (Cohen, Board Member, disseming). In deciding
that the assignment of extra duties also rendered the 1_,PNs supervisors, Board Member Cohen
found it unimportant that the assignments Were of a short duration and changed often. See id.
(Cohen, Board Member, dissenting).
89
 Id. at 815, 151 1-R.R.M. (BNA) at 1207-08 (Cohen, Board Member, dissenting).
99
 Id. at 815, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1208 (Cohen, Board Member, dissenting).
Nymed, hre., 320 N.L.R.B. at 815, 151 L.R.R.M. (RNA) at 1208 (Cohen, Board Member,
dissenting).
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Cohen stated that the LPNs played an effective role in disciplining,
evaluating and recommending transfers for assistants.92 He argued that
the DON relied upon the LPNs' reports in disciplining assistants and
thus the LPNs' recommendations were indeed effective." He observed
that the LPNs' evaluations could affect the assistants' positions." Lastly,
concerning transfer recommendations, Board Member Cohen noted
that about six assistants were transferred after LPNs had made such
recommendations and hence the recommendations were effective. 95
Thus, Board Member Cohen concluded that the LPNs were supervi-
sors under the Act."
Nytned, Inc. is important because the Board purported to enunci-
ate the guidelines by which it will analyze future health care supervisor
cases.97
 These guidelines, however, are so vague and imprecise that they
are of little use to the health care industry, and will undoubtedly create
more litigation. More importantly, the guidelines are seriously flawed
as they are contrary to the Board's precedent and Congress's intent in
enacting section 2(11). 3x Filially, these guidelines will rapidly become
obsolete as the health industry evolves and gives more power to front-
line employees."
First, the guidelines are vague and imprecise, particularly where
the Board addresses the LPNs' use of independent judgment in direct-
ing the assistants." As Board Member Cohen argued in his dissent, it
is clear that in this situation the LPNs relied on their own judgment in
designing a care plan and directing its implementation." The Board
has left no clear line between independent and professional judg-
! 12 Id. at 815-16, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1208 (Cohen, Board Member, dissenting).
!Kik/. (Cohen, Board Member, dissenting).
"° 4 Id. at 816, 151 L.R.R.M. (RNA) at 1208 (Cohen, Board Member, dissenting).
95 1d. (Cohen, Board Member, dissenting).
96 Nrted, Inc., 320 N.L.R.11. at 816. 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1208 (Cohen, Board Member,
dissenting).
97 See el. at 809, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1202-03.1n an address to Western Reserve University
on April 22, 1996, Chairman Gould stated that the Board's decision in these two cases provides
considerable guidance, but that the Board had been unable to fashion a generalized rule. See
William B. Could, In the Wake of the Blizzard of '96 and the Government Shutdowns: Part 11 of the
Clinton Board's Decision, DAWN LAB. REP, (RNA), Apr. 22, 1996, at d29.
"See Northcrest Nursing Home, 313 N.L.R.B. 491, 504, 145 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1213, 1229
(1993); 93 CONG. REC. 4715 (1947), reminied in 2 NLRB LEGisLATIvE 1-11sToRr OF THE LABOR-
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 1303 (1985) [hereinafter NLRB LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
99
 See NLRB Review of Supervisory Stains May Exiend Beyond Health Care, DAILY LAB. Rr.r.
(RNA), Oct, 31, 1996, at d3. The American Hospital Association contended in oral argument
that the industry is in the throes of a revolution and is changing how it delivers care. See id.
199 See Nym€d, Inc., 320 N. L. R. B. at 811-12, 151 L.R.R.M. (RNA) at 1204-05.
tot See id. at 815, 151 L.R.R.M. (RNA) at 1207-08 (Cohen, Board Member, dissenting). The
Board stated that this was not supervisory because other staff members looked at the plan. Id.
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ment.'"2
 What is clear is that the Board will minimize any independent
judgment that employees use in order to find them protected under
the Act.
Furthermore, the Board had earlier decided in Northcrest that
LPNs in a very similar position to those in this case had used inde-
pendent judgment in directing other employees.'"'' In Northcrest, the
nurses in question had similar responsibilities to those in Nymed, Inc.,
except: that the Northcrest nurses did not write a long-term care plan.'"
The Board stated that the evidence showed that the nurses in Northcrest
used their own independent judgment in directing the tasks. 105 The
Board, however, was able to use the patient care analysis to protect
the nurses in Northcrest, an analysis since discredited by the Supreme
Court.H"' As this analysis is no longer viable, the Board should follow
its own precedent and find that the nurses in Nymed, Inc. also use
independent judgment and, therefore, are supervisors. 11) 7
Moreover, the Board is ignoring Congress's intent in enacting
section 2(11) by deciding that these LPNs do not use independent
judgment in responsibly directing the assistants."'" As Board Member
Cohen argued persuasively in his dissent, the situation of the nurses is
exactly that described by Senator Flanders when he proposed "respon-
sibly direct" as an addition to the supervisory definition." Senator
Flanders explained that he wanted to include those who determine,
under general orders, what job shall be undertaken next and who shall
do it.' '" The LPNs in Nymed, Inc. were under general orders concerning
at 811-12, 151	 (BNA) at 1204-05 (Cohen, Board Member, dissenting), This line of
reasoning, however, is Hawed as it assumes that the 1..1'Ns (lid not use their independent judgment
in designing the plan, Merely because the Ll'Ns' work is reviewed by superiors does not render
them non-supervisory.
"See id. at 811-12, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1204-05.
See 313 N.L.R.B. at 402, 145 L.R.R.M. (BNA) al 1217. As discussed above, the Board held
that they were still nut nurses by using the patient care analysis. See id. at 509, 145 1...R.R,M. (BNA)
at 1233; sec supra notes I 0-1 7 and accompanying text.
R" Compare Northerest Nursing Home, 313 N.L.R.B. at 502-03, 145 L.R.R.M, (BNA) at 1228
with Nymed, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. at 808, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1200-01.
1()5 Northerest Nursing Home, 313 N.L.R.B. at 504-05, 145	 (BNA) at 1229-30.
"'See id.; see also NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp., 511 U.S. 571, 577, 145 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2321, 2321 (1994).
107
 See Northcrest Nursing Home, 31.3 N.L.R.[3. at 504-05, 145 L,R.R.M. (13NA) at 1229-30. Tile
Supreme Court test mandates the Board to determine if the role the mirses encompasses
front-tine prerogatives. See Health Care & Retirement Corp., 511 U.S. at 583, 146 L.R.R.M. (13NA)
at 2326.
"See 2 NLRB 1..•Gist.A-rives His•oitY, supra now 98, at 1303.
1 '9 See Nymed, lie„ 329 N.1-12.13. at 815, 151 L.R.R.M. (13NA) at 1208 (Cohen, Board Menther,
dissenting).
" 0 Set! 2 NLRB LEGISLATIVK 1"1/STORY, supra 1101.12 418, 1111 1303.
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patient care and they were responsible for applying this general plan
and directing others in executing it."' As this is exactly the situation
that Senator Flanders envisioned, the Board should have applied the
statute as Congress intended and found these LPNs to be supervisors." 2
Finally, as the American Hospital Association stated in its posi-
tion statement, the health care service industry is rapidly changing."'
Nurses now are vested with much more power than their predecessors
and are more accountable for what occurs in the health care facility."'
The Board has left itself with no effective way of dealing with the
evolving nature of health services. The Supreme Court has stated that
Congress intended for the Act to accommodate a pyramidal hierarchy
of management, as was common at the time it was written." 5 The new
type of management, with decentralized power structures and front-
line management empowerment, may make the Act itself obsolete in
its present form. The Board has taken the short-term attitude of trying
to mold the Act to fit its own view, which will become increasingly
difficult. A bolder position would have been for the Board to apply the
statute as it was written and intended, and find that the LPNs were
supervisors. Although this result would have been unpalatable to many,
it might have forced Congress to re-examine the Act. The Board's
quick fix method of ignoring the reality of the situations it examines
will do more harm in the long run, as it will increase litigation and
breed uncertainty in the industry." 6
In summary, the Board in Nymed, Inc. held that LPNs were not
supervisors under the Act." 7 It examined various supervisory indicia
and decided that the LPNs either did not exercise them or did not use
independent judgment in doing so."" The Board did not set out a
definite rule to be followed in deciding such cases in the future but,
rather, gave a set of guidelines to be followed in examining the facts
of each case."9 These guidelines, however, are unclear and the Board
tIt See Nymed. Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. at 808, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1200-01.
1 P2 See 2 NLRB LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra tulle 98, at 1303,
113 ,Sivf Position Stalemelit on behalf of Amicus Curiae American Hospital Association at 1,
Nymed, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 806, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1108 (Feb. 2, 1996) (No. 3-RC-10166).
" See id. at 809.
115 NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672, 680, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2526, 2530 (1080).
116 See 10 LA R. Rm.. WEEK 157 (Feb. 10, 1996). At the moment, however, both unions and
management state that they are happy with the Nyrited decision. See id. The unions were pleased
because the decision recognized professional judgment, and management was pleased because
the decisions would be made on a case by case basis. See id.
117 320 N.L.R.B. at 813, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1206.
IIH Id.
I19 See id. at 809, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1202-03.
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ignored important precedent in establishing them.' 2" Furthermore, the
Board has ignored important changes that are taking place in the
health care industry. 121
 Thus, this decision may lead to increased liti-
gation and less certainty for the industry.
D. *Status of Charge Nurses as "Supervisors" Under the National Labor
Relations Act: Providence Hospital & Alaska Nurses Ass'n 1
The purpose of the National Labor Relations Act (the "Act") is to
protect employees from unfair labor practices by enabling employees
to organize into collective bargaining units. 2 Congress amended the
Act in 1947 so that supervisors were no longer employees for purposes
of the Act's protections. 3
 Section 2(11) of the Act defines supervisor as
one who performs one of twelve listed functions in the interest of the
employer and acts with independent judgment.' Congress intended to
exclude supervisors from the protections of the Act so as to maintain
a balance between employers and unions and to prevent conflicts of
interest on the part of the supervisors.'
Section 2(12) of the Act, however, expressly includes professionals
in the definition of employees who are protected under the Act, 6
Because of this explicit inclusion, the National Labor Relations Board
(the "Board") and the courts have had a difficult lime formulating a
standard that excludes employees who perform supervisory functions,
while not excluding employees who perform these functions in the
12" See id. at 815, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1207-08; Norlherest Nursing Home, 313 N.L.R.B. at
504, 145 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1229.
121
 See. NLRB Review of Supervisory Status May atoll' Beyond Health. Care, Hni IN LAIS. REP.
(RNA), October 31, 19114, at d3.
* By Colleen A. Manning, Stall' Member, BosToN Cor.i.EGE LAw FtErww.
1 320 N,L.R.B. 717, 151 I...R.R.M. (BNA) 1177 (1096).
2 See 29 U.S.G. § 151 (1996),
5 See id. § 152(11) (1096). This section is more commonly referred to a.5 "section 2(11)." See,
e.g., NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp., 511 U.S. 571, 578, 146 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2321, 2324
(1994).
29 U.S.C. § 152(11). Section 2(11) provides:
The term supervisor means any individual having authority, in the interest of the
cm plityer to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign,
reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust
their grievances, or effectively to recommend such ;tenon, if ill connection with the
foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a tucrely routine or clerical nature,
but requires the use of independent judgment.
Id.
5 See, e.g., Health Care, 511 U.S. al 572, 146 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2321; NLRB v. Bell Aerospace
Co., 416 U.S. 267, 281, 85 L.R.R,M. (BNA) 2945, 2950 (1974).
6 29 U.S.G. § 152(12) (1996). This section is more commonly referred to as "section 2(12)."
See Health Care, 511 U.S. at 585, 146 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2327 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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capacity of a professional.' One specific area that has stirred contro-
versy and confusion is the health care industry.8 The issue in the instant
case is whether a charge nurse who performs certain supervisory func-
tions does so strictly as a supervisor, thereby warranting exclusion from
the Act's protections, or as a professional, thereby warranting inclu-
sion."
In 1949, in Ohio Power Co. v. NLRB, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that any employee who responsibly
directs other employees is a supervisor as defined in section 2(11) and
thus, is not entitled to the Act's protections.° In Ohio Power, the
employer refused to bargain with a bargaining unit because the unit
included control operators, whom the employer argued were super-
visors, and according to the Act, employers are not required to bar-
gain with units containing supervisors." The control operators' du-
ties included directing the activities of both assistant control operators
and auxiliary equipment operators, but the control operators had no
authority to hire, discharge or discipline employees. 12 The Sixth Circuit
decided in the employer's favor, stating that, even though the control
operators did not exercise any of the specific powers set forth in the
statute, they nevertheless engaged in supervisory 2tctivities. 13 The court
defined the statutory term "responsible" as being accountable for the
completion of certain duties. 14 The court further stated that responsi-
bility included judgment, skill, ability, capacity and integrity, and can
be implied by the existence of power.'' Using this definition, the court
held that because the control operators in Ohio Power Company had
the duty to responsibly direct a particular unit and the employees
under them, they were supervisors as defined by section 2(11)."
In 1974, in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., the United States Supreme
Court held that Congress intended to exclude from the protections of
7 See, e.g., Health Cam 511 U.S. at 573-78, 146 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2322-27: Bell Amospace,
416 U.S. at 274-89, 85 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2947-53.
See Health Care, 511 U.S. at 574, 146 L.R.R.M, (BNA) at 2322.
9 See Providence Hosp., 320 N.L.R.B. at 717, 115 L.R.R.M. (RNA) at 1180,
1° 176 F.2d 385. 387, 24 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2350, 2352 (6111 Cir. 1949).
" hl. at 385, 24 L.R.R.M, (BNA) at 2351.
12 See id. at 386, 24 1...R.R.M. (BNA) at 2351.
13 Id. at 387, 24 I.. R.R.M. (BNA) at 2352 (quoting Sen. Flanders' statements made on Senate
floor when he proposed phrase "responsibly to direct - for inclusion in statute).
Id.
15 See Ohio Power; 176 F.2d at 387, 24 L.R.R.M. (RNA) at 2352.
lb Id. The court also rejected the Board's reliance on legislative history, stating that where,
as here, the wording of a statute is clear, there is no need to examine the legislative history to
interpret its meaning. Id.
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the Act all employees properly classified as "managerial," not just those
in positions susceptible to conflicts of interest in labor relations.' 7 In
Bell Aerospace, twenty-live buyers in the purchasing and procurement
department at Bell Aerospace's plant petitioned the Board for a rep-
resentation election to determine whether a particular union could be
certified as their bargaining representative. 18 The buyers served as team
chairpersons and had full discretion in selecting prospective vendors,
drafting invitations to bid, evaluating submitted bids, negotiating
prices and terms and preparing purchase orders.'"
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court first determined what
Congress intended when it used the phrase "managerial employees" in
section 2(11). 20
 The Court relied on various factors which pointed
unmistakably to the conclusion that managerial employees are not
covered by the Act. 21
 First, the Court stated that nowhere in the Boards
early decisions, nor in the decisions following the passage of the :1947
version of the Act, did the Board include managerial employees in the
Act's protections. 22
 The Court further stated that Congress's intent to
exclude managerial employees because of their close relationship with
the employer was clear from both the House and Senate Reports which
voiced serious concerns about conflicts of interesL. 2 i In addition, the
Court noted that the courts of appeals had consistently approved the
Board's exclusion of managerial employees and had specifically disap-
proved of the Board's departure from this position. 24 The Court did
not allow the Board to read a more restrictive meaning of "managerial
employees" into the Act. 25
 Thus, although the Court did not actually
decide whether the buyers were managerial employees, it held that the
Board's construction of the phrase was too narrow and that all employ-
ees properly classified as managerial, not just those in positions suscep-
tible to conflicts of interest in labor relations, were excluded from the
protections of the Act. 26
In 1989, in Children's Habilitation Centel; Inc. v. NLRB, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that although
charge nurses at residential facilities performed certain supervisory
17
 416 U.S. at 269, 85 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2945.
18 Id. at 269, 85 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2945-16.
19 See id. at 270, 85 L.R.R.M. (RNA) at 2946.
21 See id. at 275, 85 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2948.
21 Id. at 289, 85 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2953.
22
 Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 276, 285, 85 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2948, 2952.
"Id. at 281, 85 1...R.R.M. (BNA) at 2950.
21 Id. at 288-89, 85
	 (RNA) at 2952-53.
25 See id. at 289, 85 11.,.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2953,
Id. at 289-90, 85 1-R.14.A. (RNA) at 2953.
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functions, they were not supervisors as defined in section 2(11). 27 In
Children's Habilitation Center, five charge nurses in dispute had limited
authority to discipline, but there was no evidence that they had the
authority to discharge or suspenc1. 2" Even when the charge nurse was
the only person in a position of authority on a night shift, the official
supervisor was only a phone call away, thus limiting the nurses' author-
ty. 2"
The court acknowledged that there are legitimate policy consid-
erations for the exclusion of supervisors, such as maintaining a reason-
able balance of power between employer and union, but stated that
those policy reasons were not necessarily compromised by including
these charge nurses in the protections of the AcC" After determining
that the statutory indicia listed in section 2(11) were present, the court
further considered the ratio of supervisory to non-supervisory employ-
ees, as well as the disciplinary authority of the alleged supervisors." As
to the performance of duties that appeared to be supervisory in char-
acter, the court concluded that the charge nurses were merely acting
in accordance with their professional training. 32 Although the Seventh
Circuit recognized that the charge nurses performed certain supervi-
sory functions, such as initialing time cards, it ultimately held that
those duties were too routine to classify the charge nurses as supervi-
sors and, thus, declined to place the charge nurses under the Act's
protections."
In 1993, in Norther-est Nursing Home, the Board held that charge
nurses are supervisors only when they exercise supervisory authority
in the interest of their employer, not when they exercise professional
judgment incidental to patient care." In Northcrest, charge nurses per-
formed various activities such as handing out assignments and prepar-
27 887 F.2d 130, 134, 132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2780, 2783 (7th Cir. 1980).
28 Id. at 133, 132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2782.
29 See id. at 133, 132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2783.
Id. at 131-32, 132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2781.
31 Id. at 132, 132	 (BNA) at 2782. At this facility there were live charge nurses per
55 employees, and the court stated that looking at the ratio alone did not warrant a holding that
the Board erred in excluding charge nurses. Id. at 132-33, 132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2782. Likewise,
the evidence showed that the charge nurses' responsibility for discipline was not so great as to
make serious problems of divided loyalties inevitable. Sy id.
:15 Children:s. IlrrLilihrliort, 887 F.2d at 134, 132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2783. The court stated that
"Supervision exercised in accordance with professional rather than business norms is not super-
vision within the meaning of the supervisor provision, for no issue of divided loyalties is raised
when supervision is required to conform to professional standards rather than to the company's
profit-maximizing objections." Id.
33 See id.
3-1 313 N.L.R.B. 491, 504-05, 145 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1214, 1229 (1993).
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ing shift reports, suggesting that the nurses sometimes used inde-
pendent judgment in the assignment and direction of aides. 3" The
Board first determined that the charge nurses possessed at least one
of the twelve statutory indicia of supervisory authority. 36 Having found
that the nurses performed at least one of the listed supervisory func-
tions, the Board then addressed the question of whether the nurses
exercised this function using their independent judgment in the inter-
est of their employer." To assist in making that determination, the
Board invoked the "patient care" analysis as an aid to determine su-
pervisory status, which ensures that nurses will not be excluded from
the Act's protections simply because of their professional responsibil-
ity. 38 The Board found that although the nurses exercised inde-
pendent judgment, the nurses used their judgment as an extension of
their professional judgment and not in the interest of their employer. 3"
The Board acknowledged that the charge nurses performed certain
non-professional supervisory functions in the interest of the employer,
but stated that because they were exercised in a routine or cleri-
cal manner, those functions were not indicative of supervisory author-
Only two months after the Northerest decision, in 1994, in NLRB
v. Health Care & Retirement Corp., the United States Supreme Court
rejected Northcrest's patient care analysis standard and stated that the
Board created a false dichotomy—between acts taken in connection
with patient care and acts taken in the interest of the employer—and
that such a standard was inconsistent with the Act and the Court's
precedents. 41 Health Care & Retirement Corp. arose out of an allegation
that the employer committed unfair labor practices in disciplining four
licensed practical nurses ("LPNs"). 42 The nurses performed functions
3'''ld. at 501-03, 145 1-R.R.M. (BNA) at 1226-28.
36 Id. at 504, 145 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1229.
47 ht. at 504-05, 145 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1229.
314 See id. at 493, 505, 145 L.R.R.M, (BNA) at 1218, 1229,
39 Northerest, 313 N.L.R.B. at 505. 145 L.R.R.M. (BNA) ;n 1229.
'141 /d. at 505, 145 L.R.R.M. (RNA) at 1230. The Board also discussed other indicators or
supervisory authority and referred to such indicators as "secondary indicia." Id. at 498, 145
L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1224. Two examples of "secondary indicia" are the ratio of supervisors to
non-supervisors and whether an employee is the highest person in charge in a given shift. See id.
The circuit courts are in disagreement about the weight of these two l'actors. See id. at 499, 195
L.R.R.M. (RNA) at 1224-25. The Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits place considerable weight
on them, and the Seventh Circuit has called the ratio a "guiding light." See id. (quoting Children's
Habilitation, 887 F.2d at 132, 132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2782).
4t
 Health Cam, 511 U.S. at 576-77, 146 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2323-24.
-11 Id. at 574-75, 146 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2323.
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such as ensuring adequate staffing, monitoring aides' work and disci-
plining aides."
The Supreme Court ultimately rejected the patient care analysis,
stating that it was inconsistent with the Act and the Court's precedents;
however, the Court declined to determine the status of the disputed
employees." The Court stated that a nursing home's business is patient
care and, therefore, nurses attend to the needs of patients in the
employer's interest:15
 The Court noted that any act performed within
the scope of employment or for the employer's authorized business
would be in the interest of the employer under an ordinary meaning
of the phrase, and that there is no indication that Congress intended
a different construction of the phrase. 46 The Court acknowledged that
the Board was troubled because of the inherent ambiguities in the
language of section 2(1 1 ) and that the patient care analysis assists the
Board in resolving these cases; the Court stated, however, that an
ambiguity in one portion of a statute does not give the Board license
to distort other provisions of the statute. 47
 Thus, the Supreme Court
rejected the patient care analysis and held that this test for determining
the supervisory status of nurses was inconsistent with the Act and
subsequent case precedent. 48
During the Survey year, in Providence Hospital fe Alaska Nurses
Ass'n, the Board concluded that the charge nurses in dispute did not
exercise independent judgment in the performance of their duties as
required to warrant exclusion from the protections of the Act. 49 Provi-
dence Hospital addressed the impact of the Supreme Court's rejection
of the patient care analysis, and in compliance with that decision, the
Board returned to the traditional analysis for determining supervisory
status in the health care industry. 5(I In Providence Hospital, certain reg-
' 3 See id.
14 Id. at 578-80, 1 46 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2323-25. In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg feared that
the ramifications of this decision could be flu-reaching and could have the effect of excluding
all professional employees from protections of the Act. Id. at 597-98, 146 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2332
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
' 15 Id. at 577-78, 146 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2324.
16 Health Care, 511 U.S. at 578, 146 L.R.R.M. (13NA) at 2324.
47 Id. at 579-80, 146 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2324-25.
' 18
 Id. at 584, 146 L,R,R.M. (BNA) at 2326.
19 320 N.L.R.B. 717, 717, 151 L.R.R.M. (RNA) 1177, 1180 (1995). Despite the Board's deci-
sion to certify the nurses' union as the exclusive collective-bargaining unit, the employer contin-
ued to refuse to bargain with them, arguing that the inclusion of the supervisory and managerial
employees tainted the election. Providence Dosp. & Alaska Nurses Ass'n, 321 N.L.R.B. No. 100
1, 1 (July 10, 1996). On a motion for summary judgment, the Board ordered the employer to
cease and desist from refusing to bargain. See id.
r"' 320 N.L.R.B. at 725, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1188.
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istered nurses ("RNs") petitioned to determine whether they could be
included in a bargaining unit and thus be eligible to vote in the
election."' The issue in this case was the status of RNs who occasionally
worked as charge nurses. 52 No disputed RN served as a permanent
charge nurse, thus the question before the Board was whether their
duties while serving as charge nurses were sufficient to classify them as
supervisors."
The employer alleged that the charge nurses performed two sepa-
rate functions listed in the Act—assigning and responsibly directing. 54
As far as the RNs' assigning duties, the charge nurses had no authority
in making the monthly schedules, but in unusual situations, they some-
times needed to make staffing changes during their shift.' 5 There was
no evidence that the charge nurses could require an employee to
work.56 With respect to responsibly directing the nurses, charge nurses
coordinated patient care within their respective areas and prepared
end-of-shift reports. 57 A charge nurse could intervene in disputes be-
tween staff members or discuss problems with them, but there was no
indication that charge nurses formally counseled the staff me.mbers. 5 "
In beginning its analysis, the Board stated that if an employee
performed any of the twelve statutory indicia, the Board would next
determine if the employee satisfied the other requirements. 5" The
Board noted that when Congress enacted section 2(1 1 ), it intended to
distinguish between true supervisors who perform genuine manage-
ment duties and straw bosses, leadmen and set-up men who are pro-
tected by the Act even though they perform minor supervisory duties."°
The employer in this case argued that the RN charge nurses used
independent judgment to responsibly direct and assign employees, and
thus, the Board should classify them as supervisors under section 2(11)
and exclude them from the Act's protections."'
51 /d. at 717-18, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1180.
52 See id. The Board also addressed the supervisory shuns of various home health care leaders
and other similar nursing positions. See id.
53 See id. at 718, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1180.
54 See id. at 725, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1187,
r'5 See Providence Hosp., 320 N.L.R.B. at 727, 151 L.R.R.M. (11NA) at 1189.
r43 See id. at 732, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1193.
57 See id.
w See id. at 719, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1.182.
59 Id. at 725, 151	 (BNA) at 1 tn.
114 ' Providence Hosp., 320 N.L.R.11, at 725, 151 1,„R.R.M. (11NA) (it 1187 *wing NLRB v. Bell
Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 280-81, 85 1_,,R,R,M, (BNA) 2945, 2950 (1074) (quoting S. REP. No.
105, at 4 (1947))).
See id. As for the term "assignment," the Board !telt! Ilia( whatever :loth( why the RN charge
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The Board first determined whether the RN charge nurses did in
fact have the authority to responsibly direct other employees. 62 The
Board noted that they must first determine whether the exercise of any
statutory indicia was of a merely routine or clerical nature or whether
it required the use of independent judgment on the part of the em-
ployee in dispute. 63
 The Board noted the difficulty of this analysis when
the employee's authority arises from his or her professional knowledge
versus when the authority arises from actual supervisory functions."'
The Board then acknowledged that since the decision in Ohio
Power, many courts had attempted to set parameters on the "responsi-
bly to direct" indicia. 65
 For example, the Board noted that the Sixth
Circuit in Ohio Power coined a test which provided that for an employee
to qualify as a supervisor, the employee needed to be answerable for
the discharge of a duty or obligation!'" The Board chose to use the
traditional approach—examining whether the employee exercised in-
dependent judgment—in determining whether or not an employee
responsibly directed. 67
The Board noted a distinction between supervisors who share
management's power and non-supervisory employees whose direction
of other employees stems from their professional judgment and ski11. 68
Applying the general standards and guiding principles utilized in its
traditional analysis of statutory supervisory functions, the Board held
that the evidence did not establish that charge nurses' assignments
were anything more than routine clerical tasks. 69 With respect to the
statutory indicia "responsibly to direct," the Board acknowledged that
the charge nurses have responsibilities as team leaders, but neverthe-
less affirmed the Regional Director's decision that their direction of
employees was merely routine or clerical and did not require the use
of independent judgment within the meaning of section 2(1 1 ). 7° The
RN charge nurses did not satisfy either of the two alleged supervisory
indicia; thus, the Board held that the charge nurses were not supervi-
nurses had to assign other staff members was not authority that required the use of independent
judgment. Id. at 727, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1189.
62
 Id. at 727, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1189.
63 Id. at 728, 151 L.R.R.M. (RNA} at 1189.
64 Id. at 728, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1190.
65 See Providence Hosp., 320 N.L.R.B. at 728, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1190,
sb See id. at 728, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1189 (quoting Ohio Power Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d
385, 387, 24 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2350, 2352 (6th Cir. 1949)).
67
 Id. at 729, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1190.
68 Id. at 729, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1191.
6" Id. at 731, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1193.
70 Providence Hosp., 320 N.L.R.B. at 733, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1194.
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sors within the meaning of the Act and should therefore be included
in the petitioned-for unit and eligible to vote in the election.'"
In his dissenting opinion, Board Member Cohen rejected the
majority's contention that the individuals who performed the two
functions of a supervisor, assigning employees and responsibly direct-
ing employees, were not supervisors because they did not use inde-
pendent judgment in performing these functions. 72 To reach this con-
clusion, Board Member Cohen relied on legislative history, stating that
the language "responsibly to direct" was added to section 2(111) in
order to distinguish between straw bosses, leadmen, set-up men and
other minor supervisory employees." Aside from the differences in
statutory interpretation, the dissent also disagreed with the majority's
determination that the RN charge nurses exercised only routine func-
tions in assigning employees." Board Member Cohen argued that the
charge nurses, and the other positions analyzed in this decision, used
their independent judgment in performing the two supervisory func-
tions and therefore were not entitled to the protections of the Act."
In determining the supervisory status of employees in the health
care field, the Board abandoned its patient care analysis, which some
may consider "pro-employee" because it categorically denied supervi-
sory status to anyone who performed functions in the interest of the
patient, for the traditional analysis, which requires a fact-specific in-
quiry thereby opening the door to more "pro-employer" results." Al-
though the traditional approach has the potential effect of making
outcomes uncertain and encouraging litigation, the Supreme Court
was correct when it rejected the patient care analysis, and contrary to
what people feared, the Court's rejection did not result in a "pro-em-
ployer" analysis." Rather, the traditional fact-specific approach is a
71
 Id. The Board continued to apply the same standards and guiding principles with respect
to "assignment" and "direction" to other employees and concluded that they did not exercise
their duties pursuant to independent judgment but, rather, in a routine and clerical manner, Id.
at 733-36, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1194-96.
72 Id. at 736, 15I L.R.R.M. (1INA) at 1197 (Cohen, Board Member, dissenting).
73 1d. (Cohen, Board Member, dissenting).
74 See id. at 737, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1197 (Cohen, Board Member, dissenting). Board
Member Cohen argued that the RN charge nurses used subjective judgment in assigning the
employees and such subjective judgment required the use of independent analysis and decision
making. Id. (Cohen, Board Member, dissenting).
75
 Providence Hasp., 320 N.L,R.B. at 737-38, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1198 (Cohen, Board
Member, dissenting).
76 Sea id. at 726-27, 151 L.R.R.M (BNA) at 1188.
77 See NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp., 511 U.S. 571, 576-78, 146	 (BNA)
2321, 2323-24 (1994).
344	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 38:301
better test because it is consistent with Congress's intent and ade-
quately serves the purposes of both section 2(1 1 ) and 2( 1 2). 78
Since the Sixth Circuit's decision in Ohio Power, the Board and the
courts have attempted to develop a standard that will solve the problem
of improperly excluding those who perform supervisory functions in
their capacity as professionals while properly excluding those who are
truly supervisors and not merely straw bosses. 79 The Board's early
decisions merely excluded any employee in a managerial capacity
without much inquiry into the specifics of the employee's duties and
professional capacity. 811
 Believing that this type of analysis excluded too
many employees from the protections of the Act, the Board began to
use the patient care analysis, which restricted the definition of super-
visor. 81 The Supreme Court rejected. that analysis because patient care
is the business of a nursing home; thus, distinguishing between acts
done in the interest of the patient and acts done in the interest of the
employer was a distinction without a difference. 82 The Supreme Court
held that the Board should use the same traditional analysis used in
other industries, i.e., a determination that one of the twelve statutory
indicia of a supervisor is present and that the employee performs those
functions in the interest of the employer with independent judgment.83
One reason the Board adopted the patient care analysis was to
avoid the problem of having to distinguish between supervisors and
professionals. 8't Since the Court rejected the analysis, the Board is once
again faced with the difficulty of explaining the difference between the
exercise of professional responsibility and the exercise of statutory
supervisory authority." In addition to the difficulty the Board may have
in making these determinations using the traditional analysis, their
decisions also have the potential of being inconsistent because they will
be decided on a case by case basis. 86 Therefore, how the particular
charge nurses' duties are categorized may significantly influence the
outcome. Now, the Board merely looks to see if the disputed employee
78 See e.g., Providence Hosp., 320 N.L.R.B. at 725-27, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1186-88.
" See, e.g., Health Carr, 511 U.S. at 582-84, 146 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at '23'26—'27; Bell Aerospace,
416 U.S. at 289, 85 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2945; Northcrest Nursing Home, 313 N.L.R.B. 491, 403,
145 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1214, 1218-19 (1993).
° Sea Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 280, 85 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2953; Ohio Power, 176 F.2t1 at 387,
24 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2352.
81 See Northerest, 313 N.L.R.B. at 493, 145 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1219,
82 See Health Care, 511 U.S. at 577-78, 146 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2324.
" See id. at 583-84, 146 L.R.R.M. (RNA) at 2326.
84 See Providence HoAp., 320 N.L.R.B. at 726-27, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1187-88.
" See id. at 727, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1188.
88 See id.
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performs one of the twelve listed functions and, if so, asks whether the
function was performed in the interest of the employer and with
independent judgment.87
 Those terms may be analyzed differently
depending on how the Board wishes to come out in a particular case.
Although criticism of such a seemingly arbitrary factual determi-
nation is surely justified, a more. categorical test, such as the patient
care analysis, also deserves the same degree of criticism. The patient
care analysis is potentially imperfect in that it wholly ignores the fact.
that hospitals are businesses and the patients are essentially custom-
ers." The patient care analysis assisted the Board in keeping profes-
sionals included under the Act's protection, but it ignored Congress's
intention to expressly exclude supervisors."
The fear after Health Care & Retirement was that all professionals
would be excluded from the Act because the term "supervisor" would
be read too broadly." The decision in Providence Hospital proves that
fear to be unfounded where, even without the "pro-employee" patient
care analysis, the Board still found in favor of the charge nurses. 9 ' In
Providence Hospital, the Board examined the facts and determined that.
the RN charge nurses did not satisfy any of the statutory indicia of a
supervisor. 92
 Because the traditional analysis is primarily a factual analy-
sis, outcomes may be hard to predict.
While a case by case analysis may be a practitioner's nightmare, it
is the most fair and statutorily consistent way to determine these cases.
If necessary, the Board could implement specific guiding principles to
assist employers and employees." A case by case analysis based entirely
on the specific facts of each case serves both the purposes of section
2 (1 1 ), which excludes supervisors, and section 2(12), which specifically
includes professionals, provided that the Board's decisions are rela-
tively consistent and not arbitrary manipulations of facts. 94
In conclusion, the Board in Providence Hospital invoked its tradi-
tional analysis to determine whether RN charge nurses were supervi-
87 See id.
88 See Health Care, 511 U.S. at 577-78, 146 L.R.R.M, (BNA) at 2324.
89 See id.
90 See id. at 585-86, 1441 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2327 (Ginsburg,,(., dissenting).
91 See 320 N.L.R.B. at. 733, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1194,
` 2 Ser id.
93 For example, the Board conk( use the secondary indicia articulated in Children's Halri litrt-
liort and therefore, in making determinations, the Board would need to examine the ratio of
supervisory employees to non-supervisory employees as well as to examine who has the discipli-
nary authority in a given shift. See Children's Habilitation Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 130,
132, 132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2780, 2782 (7th Cir. 1989).
" See, e.g., Providence Hasp., 320 N.L.R.B. at 725-27, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1186-88.
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sors for purposes of inclusion in the Act's protections.'' This type of
analysis requires a factual determination of whether the disputed em-
ployee performs at least one of the twelve statutory indicia listed in
section 2(11) of the Act, and whether the employee performs his or
her duties in the interest of the employer using independent jtidg-
ment.9' Although some may consider the traditional approach too ad
hoc, potentially producing inconsistent results, the approach is prob-
ably the most fair and consistent with the statute. Requiring the Board
to look carefully at the particular duties of a health care worker will
help to ensure that the decisions will be consistent with Congress's
intention of excluding only those employees who are too closely re-
lated to the employer, so as to create a conflict of interest, without
unfairly excluding professionals who do not create such a concern.°
95 Id. at 727, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1188.
943 Id.
97 See, e.g., Health Care, 511 U.S. at 577-78, 146 L.R.R.M at 2324; Providence Hasp., 320
N.L.R.B. at 725-27, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1186-88.
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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
I. TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
A. *Non-Assistance Provisions of Settlement Agreements Deemed
Unenforceable: Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v. Astra USA, Inc. 1
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ol' 1964 ("Tide VII") prohibits
employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex or national origin. 2
 The statute charges the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") with investigating
allegations of discrimination and enforcing Title VII." Although the
EEOC's authority is predicated upon the filing of a charge, the EEOC
does not merely act on behalf of private citizens; it also acts to vindicate
the public interest in preventing discrimination in the workplace.' At
the same time, other public policy interests strongly favor private set-
tlement of employment discrimination disputes and allow employees
to release employers of liability from past unlawful practices or actions. 5
Yet, private settlement can interfere with the EEOC's ability to en-
force anti-discrimination laws by preventing disclosure of discrimina-
tory practices to the EEOC." After weighing these divergent public
interest and policy goals, the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit has ruled that employers may not enforce settlement
agreements that prevent employees from communicating with the
EEOC or cooperating with an EEOC investigation.? The court reserved
its opinion, however, on the question of whether or not non-filing
agreements are unenforceable as a matter of public policy!'
* By Andrew" Simons, Staff Member, BosroN COLLEGE CAW REVIEW.
94 F.3d 738, 71 Fair Etnpl. Prac• Gas. (RNA) 1267 (1st Cir. 1996).
a42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988). Title VII states, in relevant part:
It Shill I be an onlawful employment practice fur an entpktyer---
(1) to Ilia or refnse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise In discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such inclividnars race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin • • •
Id. § 2000e-2(a) (1).
3 Id. § 2000c-5.
4 See Astra, 94 F.3d at 744, 746, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 1271, 1272-73.
" See, e.g., United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus•, Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 846-47, 853, 11 Fair
Empl, Prac. Gas. (RNA) 167, 182-83, 187 (5th Cir. 1975).
6
 See, e.g., Agra, 94 Rid at 744, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 1271.
7 Id. at 744-45, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (ANA) at 1271.
8 Id. at 746 n.7, 71 Fair Empl. Prime. Cas. (RNA) at 1273 n.7.
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In 1975, in United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, Inc., the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that settle-
ment agreements releasing employers from Title VII claims arising
from antecedent discriminatory events are valid. 9 In Allegheny-Ludlum,
the EEOC and the Secretary of Labor brought an action against nine
steel companies alleging widespread hiring and job assignment dis-
crimination based upon race, sex and national origin. 14 The parties
negotiated consent agreements which included provisions for restitu-
tional back pay." To receive such back pay, however, employees were
required to execute a comprehensive release of all Title VII and related
claitns. 12 The court reasoned that an employee's informed and volun-
tary release of a disputed employment discrimination claim in return
for valuable consideration does not violate public policy." The court
also recognized that public policy strongly favors the settlement of
employment discrimination claims.''' The court further reasoned that
such disputes would not be resolved without litigation unless defen-
dants could obtain binding, negotiated settlements." Additionally, the
court reasoned that the release only applied to claims arising from
discriminatory practices that were causally rooted in acts or practices
that antedated the execution of the release agreements. 16 Thus, the
Ninth Circuit held that settlement agreements releasing employers
from Title VII claims arising from antecedent discriminatory events are
valid."
In 1986, in Rogers v. General Electric Co., the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that employees could waive non-
prospective Title VII claims. 18 In Rogers, the plaintiff filed a sex discrimi-
nation charge with the EEOC five weeks after executing a release of
9 517 F.2d at 853, 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (RNA) at 187.
1 " Id. at 834, 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 171-72.
11 See id. at 851-52, 1.1 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 186.
12 See id. at 852, 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 186-87,
13 1d. at 860, 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 193.
"Allegheny-Ludlum, 517 F.2d at 846-48, II Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 182-83.
15 Id. at 858-59, 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 191-92. The court noted that it could not
"conceive of how any employment discrimination dispute could ever be resolved outside ... the
courtroom, if defendants were forbidden to obtain binding negotiated settlements." Id.
See id. at 853, 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (RNA) at 187. The court noted, however, that the
release provisions would be unlawful if they applied to prospective rights. Id. at 856, 11 Fair Empl.
Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 190.
17 Id. at 853, II Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 187.
18 781 F.2d 452, 456, 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 1581, 1583 (5th Cir. 1986). Non-pro-
spective Title VII claims are those claims arising from discriminatory practices which antedate
the execution of the release. See id. at 454, 39 Fair Empl. Prat. Cas. (BNA) at 1582. In dicta, the
court noted that waivers of prospective or future discrimination claims would be invalid. Id.
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all Title VII charges against the company. 19
 The EEOC, relying upon
the release, dismissed the plaintiff's claim. 24 The plaintiff then filed
suit. 21
 In affirming summary judgment against the plaintiff, the Fifth
Circuit noted that a general release of Title VII claims does not violate
public policy, provided that the release does not waive prospective
claims and is entered into both knowingly and voluntarily. 22
 More-
over, the court reasoned that the release waived only those Title VII
claims arising "on or before" the effective date of the release. 23 The
court further reasoned that the plaintiff had knowingly and voluntarily
waived her rights arising under Title VII. 24
 Thus, the Fifth Circuit held
that employees may enter into settlement agreements which waive
non-prospective Title VII claims against their employers. 25
In 1987, in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Goodyear
Aerospace Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that the EEOC has a right of action independent of an employee's
private action rights. 2" In Goodyear, an employee filed a race discrimi-
nation charge with the EEOC alleging a failure to promote her in
retaliation for filing a previous charge with the EEOC and seeking
restitutional back pay. 27
 The EEOC filed suit after the company rejected
the EEOC's offered consent decree. 28 In the interim, however, the
employee entered into a settlement agreement with the company:29
Subsequently, the district court granted summary judgment for the
company on grounds of moonless.'" The Ninth Circuit remanded
the case.'l The court reasoned that by seeking injunctive relief the
EEOC acts in the public interest." The court further reasoned that the
EEOC's interest in determining the legality of specific conduct and in
Ili Id. at 454, 39 Fair Empl. Prac, Gas. (BNA) at 1582.
2(1 s„ id.
See id.
22 id.
23 Rogers, 781 F.2d at 455, 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1583. The court also noted that
an otherwise valid release that waives prospective Title VII rights would be invalid as violative or
public policy. Id. at 959, 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1582.
2'1 Id, at 455-55, 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas, (BNA) at 1583.
25 Id.
26
 813 E2d 1539, 1542, 43 Fair Etnpl. Prac, Gas. (BNA) 875, 877 (9th Gil.. 1987).
27
 Id. at 1541, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 877.
28 See id.
29
 See id. at 1541-42, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 877.
1 t See id. at 1542, 93 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas, (BNA) at 877.
H Goodyear, 813 E2c1 at 1545, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (RNA) at 879. The court determined
that the EEOC would be entitled to art injunctitm Jr it can prove Goodyear's liability for discrimi-
nation and retaliatioli and if Goodyear fails to prove that the violation will not likely recur. Id.
22
 Id. at 1543, 43 Fair F,mpl. Pine. Gas. (BNA) at 878.
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deterring future violations is distinct from the employee's interest in a
personal remedy." The court concluded that although the settlement
agreement mooted the issue of back pay, it did not moot the EEOC's
right of action to seek injunctive relief to protect employees as a class
and to deter future discrimination or retaliation.'" Thus, the Ninth
Circuit held that the EEOC has a right of action that is independent
from an employee's private action rights."
In 1987, in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Cosmair,
Inc., L'Oreal Hair Care Division, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that a waiver of the right to file a charge with
the EEOC violates public policy. 3" In Cosmair, a fifty-three-year-old em-
ployee entered into an agreement with Cosmair, waiving any claims
against Cosmair arising from his eighteen years of employment in
return for severance benefits." Cosmair stopped paying the severance
benefits, however, after the employee filed a charge with the EEOC;
Cosmair claimed that the employee breached the release agreement
by filing the charge." The EEOC subsequently sought a preliminary
injunction requiring Cosmair to pay the employee's severance benefits
and preventing Cosmair from retaliating against other employees who
file charges with the EEOC or assist the EEOC in its investigation." In
granting the injunction, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that enforcing waiv-
ers of the right to file charges could impede EEOC enforcement of
civil rights laws because the EEOC depends on the filing of charges to
notify it of possible discrimination. 40 The court further reasoned that
an EEOC investigation not only serves the individual who filed the
charge but also vindicates the public interest in preventing discrimina-
tion in the workplace.'" Moreover, the court reasoned that the public
interest in EEOC enforcement of anti-discrimination laws outweighs
the public policy interest in encouraging private dispute resolution. 42
The court concluded that an employer and employee cannot agree to
deny the EEOC the information it needs to advance the public inter-
33 Id. at 1542, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 877.
34 Id. at 1543, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 878.
' Id. at 1542, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 877.
16 821 F.2d 1085, 1090, 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) 569, 573 (5th Cir. 1987).
" Id. at 1087, 44 Fair Empl. I'rac. Cas. (RNA) at 570-71.
"See id. at 1087, 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 571.
"See id. at 1087-88, 44 Fair Ernpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 571.
1) 1d. at 1090, 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 573.
41 Cosmair, 821 F.2d at 1090, 44 Fair Eo)]. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 573.
12 M.
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est..13
 Thus, the Fifth Circuit held that a waiver of the right to file a
charge is unenforceable because it violates public policy.' { ''
In 1996, in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Astra USA,
Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that
non-assistance agreements violate'public policy.`{' In so doing, the court
upheld an injunction preventing Astra from entering into or enforcing
non-assistance agreements.'"' The First Circuit also held, however, that
the district court erred in granting an injunction preventing Astra from
enforcing the non-filing agreements.' 7
 More importantly, the court
explicitly reserved judgment as to the validity of non-filing agreements,
holding only that the EEOC made no showing that it would be irrepa-
rably harmed in the absence of an injunction preventing Astra from
enforcing the non-filing agreements. 48
In Astra, the EEOC sought to enjoin Astra from entering into
or enforcing non-assistance and non-filing provisions included in set-
tlement agreements regarding sexual harassment charges brought.
against Astra.'w The EEOC first learned of the provisions when a former
employee who had entered into such an agreement told an EEOC
investigator that she had relevant information but could not disclose
it because of a confidential settlement agreement she entered into with
Astra.5" In addition, of the ninety Astra employees that the EEOC
contacted and asked for information, only twenty-six responded.''
13 Id,
15 See 94 F.3d 738, 745, 7 1 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) 1267, 1271 (1st Cir. 1996). Addition-
ally, in deciding an issue of first impression, the culllq held that the EEOC must meet a traditional
four-part test, including a showing of irreparable barn, to obtain injunctive relief. Id. at 743, 71
Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (13NA) at 12711.
46 Id. at 747, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1274, The details of various non-assistance
agreements vary but all contain versions of the following provisions: 1) the settling employee
agrees not to assist others who Zile charges with the EEOC; and 2) the settling employee agrees
to a confidentiality regime under which she is barred from discussing the incidents that gave rise
to her claim and From disclosing the terms of her settlement. See id. at 741, 71 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas, (DNA) at. 1269. Although the non-assistance provisions have two aspects—barring assistance
to both the EEOC and fellow employees—the EEOC only challenged the aspect that purports to
prevent settling employees from communicating with the EEOC. See id. at 741 n.2, 71 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cwt. (DNA) at 1269 n.2. Consequently, the court abstained from addressing the aspect
purporting to limit assistance to fellow employees. See id.
17 Id. at 746, 71 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1273. The non-filing agreements prevented
settlors from filing new charges with the EEOC. See id. at 745-46, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA)
at 1272.
48 See id, at 746 & n.7, 71 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 1272 & n.7.
13
 Id. at 740-41, 71 Fair Erni)]. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 1268.
See Astra, 94 F.3d at 741, 71 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 1268.
r'l See id.
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Upon Astra's refusal to rescind the non-assistance and non-filing
agreements, the EEOC sought preliminary injunctive relief pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (2) to prevent Astra from enforcing the agree-
ments. 52 The trial court granted the request for a preliminary injunc-
tion without holding an evidentiary hearing and enjoined Astra "from
entering into or enforcing provisions of any Settlement Agreements
which prohibit current or former employees from filing charges with
the EEOC and/or assisting the Commission in its investigation of any
charges. "53
On appeal, the First Circuit applied a traditional four-part test to
both the non-assistance and non-filing provisions to determine if the
district court made an error of law or abused its discretion in granting
the EEOC's request for a preliminary injunction. 54 First, the court
considered the non-assistance agreements ,in light of Astra's argument
that the district court issued the injunction without a satisfactory show-
ing of irreparable harm.55 In so doing, the First Circuit implicitly
reasoned that if the non-assistance agreements violate public policy,
then the likelihood of success on the merits is great and a lesser
showing of irreparable harm will suffice to obtain a preliminary injunc-
tion!'" Accordingly, the court addressed whether or not the non-assis-
tance agreements violated public policy before reaching the issue of
irreparable harm. 57
In considering whether the non-assistance agreements violated
public policy, the First Circuit weighed the impact that non-assistance
provisions would have on the enforcement of Title VII against the
impact that prohibiting such agreements; would have on the willing-
ness of the parties to enter into settlement agreenients. 58 The court
concluded that the non-assistance agreements severely curtailed the
EEOC's ability to enforce Title VII by impeding the EEOC's ability to
52 See id. at 742, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (11NA) at 1269.
53 See id. (quoting EEOC v. Astra U.S.A., Inc., 929 F. Supp. 512, 521, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas.
(BNA) 1259, 1267 (D. Mass:1996)).
5.4 Id. at 742-43, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1269-70. The traditional four-part test for
issuing injunctive relief requires the moving party to show: 1) a substantial likelihood of success
on the merits; 2) a significant risk of irreparable harm if the injunction is withheld; 3) a favorable
balance of hardships; and 4) that granting the injunction will not negatively affect the public
interest. See id. at 742, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1269.
r'r' Astra, 94 F.3d at 742, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1269.
See id, at 744, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1271, The court recognized an interplay
between the first and second elements of the four-part test: if the likelihood of success on the
merits is great, a less compelling showing of irreparable harm will suffice. Id, at 743-44, 71 Fair
Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1270-71.
57 See id. at 743-44, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1270-71.
58 Id. at 744-45, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1271.
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investigate charges of discrimination. 59
 In addition, the court reasoned
that the EEOC acts not only on behalf of private parties, but also on
behalf of the public by preventing discrimination in the workplace.°
Because an employee's right to communicate with the EEOC must be
preserved to safeguard the public interest, the court reasoned that an
employer cannot purchase an employee's right to speak freely to the
EEOC, nor can an employee sell his or her right to speak freely to the
EEOC.''' Thus, the First Circuit: held that any agreement that materially
interferes with communication between an employee and the EEOC
harms the public interest."'
The First Circuit completed the balancing test by acknowledging
that the strong public policy in favor of encouraging voluntary settle-
ment of employment discrimination claims supported enforcement of
non-assistance agreements.'' The court ultimately concluded, however,
that an injunction preventing the enforcement of non-assistance agree-
ments would not create a significant disincentive to settlement." The
court reasoned that granting the injunction in this case would not
promote further litigation between Astra and the settling employees or
disturb the finality of their settlements."' Thus, after weighing the
significant public interest in maintaining open channels of communi-
cation between employees and the EEOC against the minimal adverse
impact that encouraging communication would have on settlement,
the First Circuit held that non-assistance agreements violate public
policy."'"
By so holding, the First Circuit determined that, in this case, a
lesser showing of irreparable harm would suffice to obtain a prelimi-
nary injunction.° The court rejected Astra's contention that no evi-
dence of irreparable harm existed because the EEOC could obtain all
the information it needed through its power to subpoena Astra em-
ployees."8
 Relying on the affidavit of an EEOC investigator and its own
"Id. at 744, 71 Fair Empl, Prac. Gas. (RNA) at 1271.
Astra, 99 F.3d at 744, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1271.
111 Id. at 744 n.5, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (111'9A) at 1271 n.5. Employees may, however, waive
their right to recover damages in either their own lawsuits or in lawsuits brought by the EEOC.
See id.
62 Id. ;11 749, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1271.
ca Id,
64
 id,
63 Astra, 94 F.3d at 744, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1271.
66
 Id. at 744-45, 71 Fair Empl, Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1271.
67 1d. at 744, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1271.
6H Id. at 745, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (RNA) at 1271-72. The court explicitly rejected any
construct which would limit an employee's freedom to speak at will to the EEOC. Id. at 745, 71
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conclusion that the non-assistance agreements' chilling effect impeded
the EEOC's ability to investigate charges of discrimination and enforce
anti-discrimination laws, the First Circuit agreed with the district court
that the risk of irreparable harm warranted a preliminary injunction."•
Thus, the First Circuit upheld the injunction barring the enforcement
of the non-assistance agreements." In addition, the court held that the
injunction effectively precluded Astra from enforcing the confidential-
ity provisions and preventing employees from divulging any relevant.
information to the EEOC. 71
After finding that an injunction was warranted with respect to the
non-assistance agreements, the First Circuit held that the injunction
against enforcement of the non-filing agreements was not warranted. 72
The court determined that the EEOC did not show that it would be
irreparably harmed in the absence of injunctive relief." The court
reasoned that once a charge is brought it serves as a "jurisdictional
springboard," enabling the EEOC to investigate both the specific acts
of alleged discrimination as well as the circumstances surrounding the
complaint. 74 Because in this case the EEOC was actively investigating
three separate charges against Astra, two of which alleged class-wide
sexual harassment in the workplace, the court reasoned that the EEOC
already had the authority to investigate Astra to the fullest extent
possible." Consequently, the non-filing agreements did not impair
the EEOC's ability to investigate Astra." In addition, the injunction
preventing Astra from enforcing the non-assistance or confidentiality
agreements ensured that all Astra employees could cooperate freely
with the investigation." Thus, the First Circuit held that the district
court erred in enjoining the enforcement of the non-filing agreements
because the EEOC did not make a showing of irreparable harm. 78
The First Circuit's holding in Astra is significant for three reasons.
First, the court's holding that non-assistance agreements are void as
against public policy has practical ramifications: it changes the calculus
Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (RNA) at 1272. The court also dismissed Astra's claim that the settlement
agreements do not actually bar communication with the EEOC. Id.
69 /d. at 744, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 1272.
7"Astra, 94 F.3d at 747, 71 Fair Erupt. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 1274.
71 Id. at 745 n.6, 71 Fair Empl. Prat:. Cas. (BNA) at 1272 n.6.
72 /d. at 746, 71 Fair Erupt. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1273.
7 :1 Id. at 746, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1272.
711 M. at 746, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1273.
75 Astra, 94 F.3d at 746, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1273.
75
 See id.
77 See id.
7s
 Id.
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of settlement negotiations for employers.```-' Second, it will force employ-
ers to examine the language of their standard settlement and release
agreements to ensure that they conform with the court's holding.
Third, the court questioned the validity of non-filing agreements, al-
though it declined to squarely decide the issue, which may further
affect future settlement negotiations because employers can no longer
assume non-filing provisions are enforceable. 86
Although it reached an equitable result in holding that non-assis-
tance agreements are void as against public policy, the court did not
adequately balance the competing public policies." The court failed
to sufficiently weigh the impact that prohibiting non-assistance agree-
ments would have on the strong public policy of encouraging settle-
ment in employment discrimination cases. 82 Specifically, the court
failed to consider the detrimental effect that prohibiting non-assistance
provisions will have on future negotiations between employers and
employees."
By holding that non-assistance agreements are unenforceable, the
court changed the cost-benefit analysis for employers in reaching a
settlement, making settlement less likely. A settlement agreement with-
out a non-assistance provision is not worth as much to an employer as
a settlement agreement which includes provisions that effectively si-
lence claimants. Employers are now less able to prevent the EEOC
from gathering information and investigating allegations of discrimi-
nation against them.
In its analysis, the court only considered the effect of prohibit-
ing non-assistance agreements with respect to settlements already
reached." While the injunction against Astra will not promote further
litigation because the employees have already settled, Astra would not
necessarily have agreed to compensate settlors with cash payments
between $20,000 and $100,000 without the non-assistance agreements
and confidentiality provisions. 85 Consequently, if employers are unwill-
ing to pay as much for a settlement without the non-assistance provi-
sions, the bargaining range within which a settlement can be reached
is reduced!' This limitation, in turn, may actually discourage settle-
"See id. at 744-45. 71 Fair Empl.	 Gas. (RNA) at 1271.
8° See Mira, 94 F.3d at 746 ti.7, 71 Fair Empl, [intr. Gas. (BNA) at 1273 n.7.
81 See id. at 744, 71 Fair Empl. Prat. Gas, (BNA) at 1271.
ss See id.
83 See id.
" Id.
" See Astra, 929 F. Stipp. at 515, 71 Fair Empl. Frac, Gas. (BNA) at 1261.
81 ' Employees will still want to be compensated in full for the alleged violation of their rights.
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ment and create more litigation, thereby undermining the public
policy of encouraging settlements'
On the other hand, the effect of prohibiting non-assistance agree-
ments on settlement negotiations may be negligible because the alter-
native to settlement—litigation—is still too costly. Employers will be
forced to accept less favorable settlement terms for their money and
consequently will be less able to thwart an EEOC investigation. 88 Thus,
prohibiting non-assistance agreements may in fact raise the overall cost
of discrimination for the employer, thereby further deterring discrimi-
nation in the workplace. Regardless of the ultimate result, the court
correctly determined that the legitimate policy of encouraging settle-
ment does not trump the public interest in ensuring a discrimination-
free workplace. 89
In practical terms employers should examine the language of their
standard settlement and release agreements. Employers should avoid
language that expressly prohibits employees from either cooperating
with an EEOC investigation or communicating with the EEOC regard-
ing alleged incidents giving rise to the agreement. 9" Furthermore,
waivers should be prefaced with a phrase such as "to the extent per-
mitted by law."
In addition, the court reserved judgment as to the validity of
non-filing agreements, further obscuring the cost-benefit analysis for
employers.'" By leaving the question open after admitting that it is a
"close" question, the court suggested that it may determine in the
future that non-filing agreements violate :public policy and are not
Employers will presumably be unwilling to pay as much to settle the dispute because they cannot
foreclose the possibility of paying additional costs as a result of an EEOC investigation.
" 7 See, supra, note 86 and accompanying text. Previously, for example, if an employee's
settlement range was $20,000—$40,000 and the employer's range, with the agreements, was
$10,000430,000, the bargaining range was $20,000—$30,000. Without the agreements, however,
the employee's settlement range presumably has not changed but the employer may now only
be willing to settle for $10,000, precluding settlement.
"Nevertheless, employers may decide to include the non assistance and confidentiality
provisions in the hopes that settlors will abide by them even though the provisions are unenforce-
able.
49 See Astra, 04 F.3d at 744-45, 71 Fair Ernpl. Prat:. Cas. (DNA) at 1271.
9° See id.
91 See id. at 746 n.7, 71 Fair Emit]. Prae. Cas. (BNA) at 1273 n.7. The court acknowledged,
without deciding, the competing public policy consideratiOns for and against non-filing agree-
merits: that a charge is sometimes a prerequisite to an EEOC action in the public interest but
that private settlement will be hindered by employers seeking finality if they cannot keep employ-
ees who settle from filing charges. See id, In so doing, the court erased any presumption that
non-filing agreements are enforceable. See id.
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enforceable." 2 Consequently, in the wake of Astra, employers can no
longer rely on non-filing agreements being enforced by courts."
Moreover, it is unlikely that the court will find that non-filing
agreements are enforceable."' The same reasoning that tipped the
balance in favor of abrogating non-assistance agreements will probably
be applicable to non-filing agreements."' An employee's right to file
charges must be protected to safeguard the public interest in ensuring
a discrimination-free workplace." 6
 Although the court recognized that
prohibiting non-filing agreements would adversely impact the policy
of encouraging settlement, an effective non-filing agreement could
completely obstruct the EEOC's ability to investigate discriminatory
practices. 97 Given the Astra court's extreme deference to the EEOC's
need to investigate charges of discrimination without any impedi-
ments, the court will likely prevent an employer from enforcing an
agreement that effectively bars the EEOC from enforcing anti-discrimi-
nation laws. 98 Thus, any waiver of a right to file charges with the EEOC
that is worth enforcing will, in all likelihood, be held to violate public
policy." Consequently, in light of the fact that non-assistance agree-
ments are no longer enforceable and that the enforceability of non-
92 See id.
93 se,
94 See Astra, 94 F.3d at 746 n.7, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1273 n.7. In Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Cosmait; Inc., L'Oreal flair Catr Division, the Fifth Circuit
held that non-filing agreements were void as against public policy. See 821 E2d 1085, 1090, 44
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 659, 573 (5th Cir. 1987). The First Circuit implicitly endorsed the
reasoning of the Cosmair court by adopting its reasoning with respect to the non-assistance
agreements. SP P. Astra, 94 F,3d at 744-45, 71 Fair Dupl. Cas, (BNA) at 1271-72.
See Astra, 94 F.5c1 at 744, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1271.
96 See id.; Cmsmair, 821 F.241 at 1090, 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 573. The right to lile
a cha rge is separate and distinct from the right to recover damages, which may he bargained
away. Astra, 94 F.3d at 744 n.5, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1271 n.5.
97 See Astra, 94 F.3d at 746 ti.7, 71 Fair Empl. Prac, Cas. (RNA) at 1273 11.7. The EEOC's
authority is predicated volt a charge being filed; absent a charge, the EEOC is powerless to
investigate discrimination in the workplace. See id. at 746, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at
1272-73.
98 See id, at 744, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (13NA) at 1271. Moreover, as the value of a non-filing
agreement increases, the likelihood that the agreement offends public policy increases propor-
tionately. For example, if employer is being investigated by the EEOC, as Astra was, the value
or further non-filing agreements is minimal and the agreement would be enforceable as it was
in Astra. See id. at 746-47, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1273. If a company is not being
investigated, however, the value of the non-filing agreement increases significantly because it will
prevent. the EEOC from investigating the company. See id. at 746-47, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas,
(BNA) at 1272-73. Under the reasoning of Astra, such interference with the EEOC's ability to
enforce anti-discrimination laws will most likely he found to violate public policy. See id. at 74445,
71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1271-72.
99 See id. at 744-45, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1271; Costnait; 821 F.2d at 1090, 44
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 573.
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filing provisions remains an open question, employers must reconsider
settlement strategies as well as the overall cost of discrimination.
In summary, the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Astra USA, Inc.
held that non-assistance agreements are unenforceable because they
violate public policy. 100 Although the court declined to decide if non-
filing agreements also violate public policy, the court questioned their
validity.m Moreover, the reasoning of the court indicates that if a
non-filing agreement interferes with the EEOC's ability to investigate
violations of Title VII, it too will be unenforceable. 1 °2 Thus, the First
Circuit has further discouraged discrimination in the workplace by
facilitating the EEOC's ability to investigate charges and limiting an
employer's ability to suppress the disclosure of discriminatory prac-
tices.
B. *Mandatory Arbitration and Statutory Rights Under
a Collective Bargaining Agreement: Austin v.
Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc.'
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title
VII") to ensure equality of employment opportunities and protection
from discrimination. 2
 In 1990, Congress, responding to the lack of
legal recourse for individuals who experience discrimination specifi-
cally on the basis of disabilities, enacted the Equal Opportunities for
Disabled Act, popularly referred to as the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 ("ADA") . 3
 The powers, remedies and procedures available
under the ADA are identical to those available under Title VII.'' The
procedures under Title VII include a provision for consideration of
°SI Astra, 94 F.3d at 744-45, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1271. Furthermore, the court
held that the injunction against the non-assistance agreements prevented Astra from entOrcing
the confidentiality agreements. See id. at 745 n.6, 71 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1272 11.6.
16 I See id. at 746 n.7, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1273 n.7,
"See id. at 744-45, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (RNA) at 1271.
* By Katherine L. Keeler, Staff Member, BOSTON C01.1,EGE LAW REVIEW.
L
 78 F.3d 875, 5 A.D. Cases, (BNA) 488 (4th Cir. 1996).
2 See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 30, 44, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 81,
84 (1974). Title VII provides in pertinent part: "It shall he an unlawful employment practice for
an employer ... to discriminate against any individual because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex or national origin , ..." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1988).
3
 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (4) (1090). Specifically, the ADA provides: "No covered entity shall
discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability, because of the disability of such
individual, in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment." Id. § 12112(a).
4 See id. § 12117(a). The statute provides in pertinent part: "The powers, remedies and
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employment-discrimination claims in several forums, including arbitra-
tion and the courts, and a provision that submission to one forum does
not preclude subsequent submission to another.' The United States
Supreme Court has interpreted Title VII and the ADA as manifesting
Congress's intent to make its policy against discrimination of the high-
est priority.''
In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"),
which allows federal district courts to stay proceedings when a claim
can be referred to arbitration and to compel arbitration when one
party has not complied with an arbitration agreement.? Even when the
FAA is not applied, the Supreme Court has established a federal pol-
icy favoring arbitration of labor disputes arising under Collective Bar-
gaining Agreements ("CBAs")." When faced with a determination of
whether to compel arbitration of a particular Title VII or ADA claim,
courts must consider the federal policies of opposing discrimination
and favoring arbitration.`'
In 1974, in Alexander v. Gardner
-Denver Co., the United States
Supreme Court held that an arbitrator's resolution of a grievance filed
under an existing CBA, that an employee was dismissed without just
cause, did not dispose of that employee's subsequent Title VII claim
based on the same factual occurrence.'" In Alexander, where a CBA was
in force between the company and the employee's union, an employee
filed a statutory claim alleging that his employer fired him because of
procedures set forth in sections 705, 706, 707, 709 and 710 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8 and 2000e-9) shall be the powers, remedies and
procedures this title provides to the Commission ... ." Id.
5 See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 47-48, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 85 (citing 42 U.S.C.
2000e-5(b), (c), (1) (1988)).
5 See id. at 47, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 85.
7 SPIT Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24, 55 Fair Empl. 	 Cas.
(BNA) 1116, 1119 (1991); see also 9 U.S.C.,§§ 3-4 (1994). The FAA provides in pertinent part:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transac-
tion involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out
of such contract or transaction ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
" See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 46 ti.6, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 85 n.6. The Court cited
the Steelworkers Trilogy to support the proposition that federal policy favors arbitration in labor
disputes. Id. (citing United Steelworkers v, Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83
(1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960)); see also
Austin, 78 F.3d at 879, 5 A.D. Cases (RNA) at 491 (relying on well-recognized policy of federal
labor law favoring arbitration of labor disputes).
9 See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 59-60, 7 Fair Env!, Prac. Cat. (BNA) at 90; see also Austin, 78
F.3d at 887, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 496-97 (1 -iall, J., dissenting).
10 4]5 U.S. at 50, 59-60, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 86, 89-90.
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his race in violation of Title VII." The employee's union filed a con-
tractual grievance alleging dismissal without just cause prior to the
employee's filing of his Title VII claim.'" An arbitrator found for the
employer in the grievance action." The district court then held that
because the employee's union had already submitted his claim to the
arbitration process, the arbiu -al decision precluded him from bringing
subsequent Title VII claims.' 4
 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit affirmed per curium."
On appeal, the Supreme Court interpreted the legislative history
and procedures of Title VII as indicative of Congress's intent that Title
VII supplement, not replace, other legal safeguards relating to employ-
ment discrimination.'" The Court stated that no inconsistency would
result from enforcing both contractual and statutory rights in their
respectively appropriate forums.' 7
 Additionally, the Court dismissed
the argument that the employee waived his statutory cause of action
under Title VII, asserting that a union may not waive an employee's
Title VII rights prospectively because Title VII concerns individual,
rather than collective, rights." Submission of a grievance to arbitration
did not constitute a waiver, the Court determined, because resorting
to the arbitral forum is an existing contractual right and no additional
concession may be exacted as the price for enforcing that right.'" The
Court held, accordingly, that the arbitrator's resolution of the union's
contractual grievance did not dispose of the employee's statutory right
to pursue the Title VII claim in court.'"
In 1991, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the United
States Supreme Court held that an employee's claims under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA") could be subject
to compulsory arbitration, and finally adjudicated, by virtue of an
arbitration agreement associated with the employee's terms of employ-
ment."' In Gilmer; an employee filed a claim alleging that his employer
fired him because of his age in violation of the ADEA. 22 In response,
Id. at 43, 7 Fair Emp1. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 83.
12 See id. at 39, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 82.
13
 See id. at 42, 7 Fair F.mpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 83.
14
 See M.
13 See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 42, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 83.
1 " Id. at 48-49, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 85-86.
17 M. at 49-51, 7 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 86.
to Id. at 51, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 86-87.
19 Id. at 52, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 87.
29 Alexander, 415 U.S. at 59-60, 7 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 90.
21 500 U.S. at 23, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1118.
22 Id. at 23-24, 55 Fair Etnpl. l'rac. Cas. (BNA) at 1119.
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the employer filed a motion to compel arbitration of the ADEA claim
pursuant to the arbitration clause in the employee's securities registra-
tion form for the New York Stock Exchange." The Court stated that
statutory claims may be subject to a compulsory arbitration agreement,
enforceable pursuant to the FAA, unless Congress intended to pre-
clude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights in question. 24
The Court placed the burden on the employee to show Congress's
intention to preclude such a waiver." The Court reasoned that the
employee did not meet his burden.'" The Court stated further that
parties retain the same substantive rights afforded by the statute by
agreeing to an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.27
 Moreover, the
Court rejected the assertion that various aspects of the arbitration
process weaken the protections afforded in the substantive law: 28 Fi-
nally, the Court distinguished Alexander on the grounds that the em-
ployee in that case agreed only to arbitrate contractual rights under a
CRA whereas the employee in Gilmer agreed to arbitrate statutory
rights under the security registration form:2° The Court therefore held
the ADEA claim subject to final resolution through compulsory arbi-
tration in accordance with the arbitration agreement because the em-
ployee failed to show that Congress intended to preclude arbitration
of ADEA claims."
In 1991, in Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit: followed the reasoning used by
the Supreme Court. in Gilmer and held that an employee's Title VII
claims were subject to her agreement. to arbitrate.' In Willis, the em-
ployee executed a securities registration form which provided that any
disputes would be resolved through arbitration." In addition to claims
of state anti-discrimination and contract law violations, the employee
in Willis alleged sexual harassment and sexual discrimination under
Title VII.'" Her employer moved to compel arbitration based upon the
23 See id, at 24, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1119.
2.1 Id. in 26. 115 Fair Dupl. Prat:, Cas. (BNA) at 1120.
25
 Id. The Court stated that if Congress intended to preclude arbitration, this intent would
be discoverable in the text or the ADEA, its legislative history or there would be an "inherent
conflict" between arbitration and the underlying principles of the ADEA.
26 Gila" 500 U.S. at 26-33, 55 Fair Empl. Pun:, Gas. (BNA) at 1120-23.
27 Id. at 26, 55 Fair awl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1120.
28 Id. at 30-31, 55 Fair Empl. Prat. Gas. (BNA) at 1121-22.
29 1d, at 34, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1123 (citing Alexander, 415 U.S. at 49-50, 7
Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (RNA) at 81).
"Id. at 35, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1123,
31 See 948 F.2d 305, 312, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (13NA) 386, 392 (6th Cir. 1991).
92 Id. at 306, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cat. (BNA) at 387.
33 Id.
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terms of a securities registration form executed by the employee)' The
Sixth Circuit analogized Title VII to the ADEA and applied the Gilmer
analysis,s5
 The Sixth Circuit rejected the argument that Title VII pre-
cludes an arbitral forum from adjudicating these claims even if' the
parties contractually agree to submit all statutory claims to arbitra-
tion.36
 The court therefore held enforceable the arbitration clause of
the securities registration form, compelling the employee to arbitrate
her Title VII action for sex discrimination. 37
In 1992, in Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an employee
failed to show that Congress intended to preclude arbitration of Title
claims. 38 In Mago, an employee alleged sexual harassment and
gender discrimination in her Title VII action.'"' The employer moved
to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration under the terms of the
employee's private employment application. 40
 The Ninth Circuit found
that Title VII and the ADEA have similar aims and provisions.'" The
court then applied the Gilmer reasoning and concluded that because
the employee did not meet her burden of proving that Congress
intended to preclude arbitration of Title VII claims, the arbitration
agreement was enforceable: 12 The court thus held that the arbitration
clause of the employment application was enforceable and forced the
employee to arbitrate her Title VII claims. 43
During the Survey year, in Austin v. Owens -Brockway Glass Con-
tainer, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held enforceable a CBA's arbitration provisions which precluded the
employee from suing her employer prior to submitting any ADA or
Title VII claims to the arbitration process. 44 In Austin, the employee
sued Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc. ("Owens-Brockway"), alleg-
ing violations of Title VII and the ADA when the employer dismissed
her rather than re-assign her to a light-work detail, as recommended
by her doctor, or to another position, as it did her male co-1,vorker. 4'
54 See id.
55 See id. at 307, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 387-88.
31' Willis, 948 F.2d at 309-10, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 389-90.
57 Id. at 306, 310, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 387, 390.
55 956 F.2d 932, 935, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 178, 180 (9th Cir. 1992).
39 Id. at 934, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 179.
44)
 See id,
41 See id, at 935, 58 Fair FAIT]. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 180:
42 Id.
45 Mago, 956 F.2d at 935, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 180.
44 78 F.3c1, 875, 877, 885-86, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) 488, 489, 496 (4th Cir. 1996).
45
 Id. at 877-78, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 489.
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Owens-Brockway filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the court
lacked jurisdiction.' "' Relying on the reasoning applied by the Supreme
Court in Gilmer and distinguishing the holding of Alexander, the
Fourth Circuit found the voluntary CBA provisions, which specifically
listed gender and disability discrimination as claims subject: to arbitra-
tion, consistent with the text, legislative history and purposes of Title
VII and the ADA. 47
 The Fourth Circuit therefore enforced the provi-
sions because the employee failed to meet her burden in establishing
that Congress intended to preclude arbitration of claims under Title
VII and the ADA. 48
 The Fourth Circuit consequently upheld the district
court's order to dismiss the claims because the employee failed to
submit them to the arbitration process prior to filing a suit.°
In Austin, the terms of the plaintiff's employment were governed
by a CBA negotiated by her union'" The employee worked for Owens-
Brockway as an equipment cleaner/oiler-greaser until she became dis-
abled in a work- related injuryP Her doctor certified her for light-duty
work but, rather than provide her with an appropriate work assign-
ment, Owens-Brockway placed her on medical leave, providing her
with worker's compensation benefits. 52 While the employee was on
leave, Owens-Brockway eliminated the cleaner/oiler-greaser job clas-
sification . 55
 Owens-Brockway subsequently dismissed the employee,
while re-assigning a male employee who had worked with her to an-
other position in the plant. 54
The employee filed suit, alleging that Owens-Brockway violated
the ADA and Title VII by refusing to offer her light-duty work and
terminating her employment while simply re-assigning her male co-
worker.55
 Owens-Brockway filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the
employee's failure to file her claims under the CBA's mandatory griev-
ance-arbitration procedure precluded her from pursuing them in
court. 5" Owens-Brockway offered affidavits in support of its motion; as
4(1 See id. a1.878, 5 A.D. Cases (IINA) at 480. The employer argued that the claims were subject
to mandatory arbitration based on the terms of the CBA. See id.
77 1d. at 880-82, 885-86. 5 A.D. Cases (RNA) at 402-93, 496.
18 /d, at 882. 886, 5 A.D. Cases (RNA) at 403, 496.
Austin, 78 F.3(1 at 885-86, 5 A.D. Cases (RNA) at 496.
51) hl. at 878, 5 A.D. Cases (RNA) at 489-90.
51 See id. at 877, 5 A.D. Cases (RNA) at 489.
r' 2
 See id.
55 See id.
54 See Austin, 78 F.3d at 877-78, 5 A.D. Casts (RNA) at. 489.
55
 See id.
5 ' 1 See id. at 878, 5 A.D. Cases (RNA) at 489. Owens-Brockway also tiled a motion to dismiss
6n• lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the employee had Btiled to file her claim with
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a result, the district court treated it as a summary judgment motion. 57
The district court granted the motion for summary judgment, holding
that, under Gilmer, the employee could not sue Owens-Brockway be-
fore submitting her claims to the mandatory arbitration process. 58
Relying on the Supreme Court's analysis in Gilmer, the Fourth
Circuit considered the enforceability of the CBA provisions requiring
arbitration of statutory claims.`''' The court began by emphasizing its
reliance on the "well recognized policy of federal law favoring arbitra-
tion of labor disputes."°The court then examined the text of the CBA
and noted that the language specifically provided that claims of gender
and disability discrimination are subject to the grievance procedure. [''
Based on this language, the court concluded that the employee con-
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and had not obtained a right to sue
letter, both prerequisites to filing AIM and Tide VII claims. See id.
57 See id. at 878, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 489-90.
See id. at 878, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 490. The court found that a significant factual dispute
existed regarding the employee's actions with the EEOC and thus declined to grant summary
. lodgment based on her failure to file her claim or obtain a right to sue letter. See id. The court
concluded, however, that because both =dolls essentially challenged the couresjurisdict ion over
the case, it only had to decide one of them in fiwor of Owens•Brockway in order to dismiss the
claims. See id. at 878 n.1, 5 A.D. Cases (RNA) at 490 n.1.
See Austin, 78 F.3(4 at 879, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 491. Before the Fourth Circuit discussed
the enforceability of the arbitration agreement, it addressed whether the employee had standing
under the CBA to arbitrate her dispute and whether arbitration tinder this agreement was
permissive or obligatory. Id. at 878-79, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 490-91. The court first concluded
ilmt the CRA was in effect at the time oldie alleged discrimination, thereby granting the employee
standing to assert her rights under this contract. See id. at 878-79, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 490.111
the alternative, the court stated, even if the plaintiff was a terminated employee, she could have
asserted any rights she had under the CBA (Nell after the CBA's termination. See id. at 878, 5
A.D. Cases (RNA) at 490; see also id. at 878-79, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 490 (citing Nolde Bros.,
Inc. v. Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, 430 U.S. 243, 255, 294 L.R.R.M.
(RNA) 2753, 2757 (1977)). The court then interpreted the language of the agreement to suggest
that the arbitration provision in the CBA was obligatory and not permissive. Id. at 879, 5 A.D.
Cases (BNA) at 490-91. The employee argued that the phrase "may he referred to arbitration"
makes arbitration permissive, but the court, following the construction of a similar phrase
Eighth Circuit decision, opined that the purpose of the word "may" only gave an aggrieved party
the choice between arbitration or abandonment of the claim. Id. at 879, 5 A.D. Cases (RNA) at
490 (citing Bonito' v. Congress of lintel). Unions Local 14, 331 F.2d 355, 359 (8th Cir. 1964)).
141 1d. at 879, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at. 491 (citing Adkins v. Times-World Corp., 771 F.2d 829,
831, 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2216, 2217 (4th Cir. 1985)). The court relied on the Steelworkers Toilogy
ftw further support of this policy favoring arbitration in labor disputes. Id. The court ;its() stated
that it was not relying on the FAA applied in Gilmer because, in the Fourth Circuit, the FAA is
not applicable to labor disputes arising from a CBA. Id. (citing Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar
Workers Local Union 392, 10 F.3d 1064, 1067, 144 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2817, 2819-20 (4th Cir.
1993)).
61 M. at 879-80, 5 A.D. Cases (RNA) at 491. Pertinent sections of the CBA included:
Article 38 — Fair Employment Practice and Equal Opportunities
I. The Company and the Union will comply with 'all laws preventing discrimina-
tion against any employee because of . , sex, ... handicap 	 .
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tractually agreed to submit her discrimination claims to the grievance
procedure.e2 The court rejected the notion that arbitration is an inap-
propriate forum for resolution of statutory rights, the Supreme Court's
principal concern in Alexander.`` Rather, the court recognized the
reasoning in Gilmer that the arbitration of statutory claims does not
constitute relinquishment of any rights under the statutes.'''' Arbitra-
tion, the court stated, simply provides another equally appropriate
forum in which to resolve disputes!" The court, therefore, decided to
enforce the agreement against the contracting party, unless Congress
intended to preclude arbitration for ADA and Title VII claims.' 41
The Fourth Circuit first examined the text of the ADA and Title
VII, concluding that Congress expressed a preference for arbitration.°
The Fourth Circuit then surveyed the legislative history of both acts
and determined that Congress generally supported voluntary agree-
ments to arbitrate statutory claims." 8
 Finally, guided by the reasoning
applied in the Gilmer Court's examination of the ADEA, the Fourth
Circuit identified no inherent conflict between arbitration and the
underlying purposes of the ADA or Title VII.''`'
2. This Contract sledl be administered in accordance with the applicable provi-
sions of the Americans with Disabilities Act ....
3. Any disputes under this Article as with all other Articles of this Contract shall
be subject to the grievance procedure.
M.
62 hi. at 880, 5 A.D. Cases (RNA) at 491.
63
 Id. (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415  U.S. 36, 56, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA)
81, 89 (11)74)).
m AUSith, 78 F.lid at 880, 5 Al).. 	 Cases (BNA) at 491.
Id. (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26, 55 Fair Finpl, Prat:.
Gas. (RNA) 1116, 1121 (1991)).
66 Id. at 880-81, 5 Al).,
	 Cases (13NA) at 492.
See id. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, amending Title VII, provides: "Where appropriate mid
to the extent autlunized by Law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including ...
arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under the Act or provisions of Federal law
amended by this title." Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081 (1991),
The ADA states identical language: "Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law,
the use ()I' alternative means of dispute resolution, including . arbitration. is encouraged to
resolve disputes arising under this Act." 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (1990).
f6 See Austin, 78 F.3d at 881-82, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) ;II 492-93. The court acknowledged that
the legislative history was less clear regarding Congress's intent as there were some reports that
included language like "permissible when voluntary." M. at 881, 5 A.D. Cases (ANA) at 492. To
mitigate this, the court relied on Davis v. Lukhant, which supports the Fourth Circuit principle
that, even if the provisions of the legislative history are contrary to the statute, the statute must.
prevail. M. at 882, 5 A.D. Cases (RNA) at 493 (citing Davis v. Lukhard, 788 F.2d 973, 981 (411t
Cir. 1986).
'9 Id. at 882, 5 A.D. Cases (RNA) at 4911 (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28, 55 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (RNA) at 1120 (which held that an arbitral fltrurn will allow the statute to continue to serve
both its remedial and deterrent functions).
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To support its decision to enforce the mandatory arbitration
agreement, the Fourth Circuit relied on other circuit court decisions
that enforced arbitration agreements based on the reasoning in Gil-
mer" The Fourth Circuit stated that although these cases did not
involve CBAs, the employees in these cases had made agreements to
arbitrate employment disputes. 7 ' The court decided that as long as an
agreement. is voluntary, it is valid and should be enforced. 72 Finally, the
Fourth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court, as well as the circuit's
own case law, required that an employee follow the grievance proce-
dure established by the CBA before filing suit in federal court."
In summary, the Fourth Circuit upheld the CBA mandatory arbi-
tration provisions as enforceable. 74 The court acknowledged that the
CBA provisions encompassed the types of claims the employee raised
and concluded that the text, legislative history and purpose of Title
VII and the ADA were consistent with the voluntary agreemen L. 75 Con-
cluding that Congress did not intend to preclude arbitration of claims
under Title VII and the ADA, the Fourth; Circuit upheld the district
court's decision to dismiss the claims. 7"
In dissent, Judge Hall argued that Alexander, rather than Gilmer,
continues to govern in the context of CBAs. 77 Judge Hall maintained
that, under Alexander, an employee is not limited to arbitration but
could pursue a contractual remedy, a statutory remedy or both." Judge
7° See id. at 882-85, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 493-95 (citing, inter alia, Benefits Communication
Corp. v. Klieforth, 642 A.2d 1299, 1304-05, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 122, 126-27 (D.C.
1994) (enforcing anticipatory agreement in securities registration application to arbitrate em-
ployment disputes); Bender v. A/C Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698, 699-701, 59 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1231, 1231-33 (11th Cir. 1092) (holding that plaintiff's Title VII claim was
subject to compulsory arbitration agreement in securities regulations form under FAA); Willis v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 306, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) '386, 389 (6th Cir.
1991); Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932, 933-35, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 178, 178-80 (9th Cir. 1991)).
71 Id. at 885, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 495. In four of the five cases the agreement was based
on securities regulation forms and in one case it was based on an employment application. See
id.
72 See id.
AUSiin, 78 F.3d at 885, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 495-96 (citing Republic Steel Corp. v.
Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965); Adkins v. Times-World Corp., 771 F.2d 829, 832, 120 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2216, 2219 (4th Cir. 1985)).
71 Id. at 885-86, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 496.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 886, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 496. The court remanded the case so the district court
could amend its order dismissing the case without prejudice to the merits of the claim, thereby
enabling the employee to pursue her claims in arbitration. See id.
77 Id. at 887, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 497 (Hall, J., dissenting).
78 A itSthi, 78 F.3d at 887, 5 A.D. Cases (RNA) at 497 (Hall, J., dissenting).
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Hall therefore contended that the court should reverse the district
court's decision, requiring that the claims be considered de novo. 7'
Judge Hall emphasized that in Alexander the Court distinguished
between an employee's individual statutory rights and any contractual
rights the employee may have under a CBA." judge Hall contended
that the very fact that the cases cited by the majority did not involve
CBAs distinguished this case from the others.8 ' The dissent reasoned
that, unlike situations in which an individual employee agrees in a
securities regulation form or an employment application to waive his
or her own rights regarding statutory claims, the present case involved
a labor union's decision to prospectively waive a member's individual
right to choose a judicial forum for his or her statutory claims. 82 judge
Hall distinguished the power of a union to waive the statutory rights
of a collective of employees from the power of an individual to waive
his or her own Title VII and ADA claims." The individual statutory
claims, judge Hall asserted, do not concern the majoritarian process
and the union's waiver of these rights defeats the congressional pur-
pose behind Title VII and the ADA.84
Judge Hall contended that a CBA provision in which a union
purports to waive an employee's right to pursue Title VII and ADA
claims in court is clearly unenforceable under Alexander." Judge Hall
stated further that Alexander remains precedent in cases involving
CBAs in several federal courts, and that the majority's holding creates
a split among the circuits. 86
 The dissent therefore concluded that the
employee should be permitted to pursue her Title VII and ADA claims
79 Id. (Hall, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 886, 5 Al)., 	 Cases (DNA) at 496-97 (Hall, J., dissenting) (citing Alexander in which
unanimous Supreme Court held that person may sue under Title VII notwithstanding that he
has submitted his claims to arbitration under CBA and lost),
/II Id. at 886, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 496 (Hall, J., dissenting).
82
 Id, (Hall, J., dissenting).
83
 Austin, 78 F.3d at 886, 5 A.D. Cases (DNA) at 496 (Hall, J., dissenting).
84
 14. at 886-87, 5 A.D. Cases (DNA) at 496 (Hall,,f., dissenting).
85 14. at 887, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 497 (Hall, J., dissenting). He reasoned that allowing In
employee to pursue arbitration for contractual claims and litigation for statutory claims would
most effectively accommodate both the federal policy ()I' favoring arbitration and the federal
policy against discriminatory employment practices. id. at 887, 5 A.D. Cases (DNA) at 496-97
(Hall, J., dissenting).
86
 Id. at 887, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 497 (Hall, J., dissenting). The dissent illustrated that the
Court in Gilmer distinguished its holding from the principles established in Alexander and did
not in fact overrule it. See id. Justice Hall highlighted the language in Gilmer acknowledging that
a CBA was not at issue arid that, therefore, the issue of tension between collective representation
and individual statutory rights was not present. See id. (citing Tran v. Tran, 54 F.3d 115, 116-118,
149 L.R.R.M, (BNA) 2350, 2351-52 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that former employee was nut
required to seek arbitration before presenting merits of his Fair Labor Standards Act claims)).
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in court independent from the requirement to arbitrate any contrac-
tual claims she may raise. 87
Although the Supreme Court in Gilmer distinguished a mandatory
arbitration clause in a securities registration form from one found in
a CBA, the Fourth Circuit in Austin appears to extend the applica-
tion of the Gilmer rationale to the latter situation.88 In its analysis, the
court in Austin refrained from considering the possible differences
among securities registration forms, private employment applications
and CBAs.Ra Rather, the Fourth Circuit held that as long as the agree-
ment to arbitrate statutory rights is voluntary, it is valid and the parties
should be bound to it." Furthermore, the only attention given by the
majority to the Alexander decision was to refute its position that arbi-
tration is not an appropriate forum for the resolution of Title VII
statutory rights.'' Using this analysis, the Austin court appears to essen-
tially disregarded the Supreme Court's conclusion in Alexander that
unions do not have the power to waive prospectively an individual's
statutory rights under Title VII. 92 The dissent alone raises the issue of
whether there remains a distinct. analysis, generated by Alexander, that
requires different treatment of statutory rights encompassed in a CBA
or whether the courts should more broadly apply the holdings and
policies of Gilmer"
The dissent criticized the majority for not recognizing that, be-
cause Austin. involves an arbitration provision in a CBA, the court
should apply the reasoning of Alexander rather than that of Gilmer."
The dissent supported this position by citing federal case law that
Id. (Hall, J., dissenting).
" See Austin, 78 F.3{1 at 885-86, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 495-96; see also Gilmer; 500 U.S. at
35, 55 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 1123. In Gilmer, the Supreme Court listed several important
distinctions between that case and Alexander, including that the arbitration in A/exam-ter occurred
in the context. of a CBA and that there was concern about tension between collective repre-
sentation and individual statutory rights. ./78 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
at 1123.
89 See Austin, 78 F.3d at 885, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 495. The court in Austin noted that in
each of the cases it cited, including this case, the employee who brought the discrimination claims
had made an agreement to arbitrate employment disputes. Id.
•" See id.
I See id. at 880, 5 A.D. Cases (RNA) at 491. The court's only other reference to Alexander
occu•red when it jtistified its reasoning that the legislative, history generally supports arbitration
of the statutory claims. See id. at 882, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 493.
92 See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 51-52, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 86-87.
•13 See. Austin, 78 F.3d at 880. 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 491; see also id. at 885-87, 5 A.D. Cases
(RNA) at 496-97 (Hall, J., dissenting) (stating that Alexander court determined that employee's
statutory rights were independent of the contractual rights found under CBA and that hoth rights
should be permitted to be enforced in their respectively appropriate forums).
See id. at 886-87, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 496-97 (Hall, J.. dissenting).
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recognized that Alexander, rather than Gilmer, continues to govern
arbitration provisions in CBAs." 5
 The dissent concluded that as a result
of the majority's position, there may now he a split in the circuits
regarding compulsory arbitration of statutory rights pursuant. to an
agreement in a CLIA."6
In general, courts appear to rely consistently on the federal policy,
established by cases such as the Steelworker Trilogy and the FAA, sup-
porting the enforcement of arbitration agreements.''? Furthermore, in
Willis and Mago, courts held employees bound to securities regula-
tions forms and employment applications that require arbitration of
employment discrimination claims if they are entered into voluntar-
ily.98 The Austin dissent nevertheless raises the issue of whether the
distinctions between an employee's ability to have access to the courts
under a CBA, compared to either an individual employment applica-
tion or securities form, remain significant enough to keep the analy-
sis of Alexander alive in light of the court's broad interpretation of
95
 See id. at H87, 5 All Cases (BNA) at 497 (Hall, j., dissenting) (citing 'Fran v. Tram, 54 F.3d
115, 117, 118 (2d Cir. 1995) where the court recognized that Alexander, rather than Gilmer,
governs in the context of collective bargaining agreements).
96 See id. (14all, j., dissenting) (stating that, because 'lion was decided by Second Circuit,
majority's holding created split among circuits); see also Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., Inc., DAILY
REP. (BNA), Mar. 25, 1997, at d22. In Pryner, die United Stales Court of Appeals Ibr the
Seventh Circuit. faced a similar issue; whether a CBA can compel an employee to arbitrate a
VII or ADA claim. See DAILY Luis. REP. (BNA), Mar. 25, 1997, at c122. Unlike the Fourth Circuit
in Austin, the Seventh Circuit held that, though an individual employee had the right to consent
to arbitrate his or her federal anti-discrimination claims, the union cannot give this consent for
the employee by signing a GRA that consigns the enlOrcement of statutory rights to the union-
controlled grievance and arbitration process. Compare id., with Austin, 78 F.3d at 886, 5 A.D. Cases
(BNA) at 496, By affirming the lower court's denial of the employer's motion to stay the suit
pending arbitration, the court rejected the employer's argument that there was no conflict of
interest. between the employer and employee in completing arbitrathin. Myna, DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA), Mar. 25, 1997, at d22. Because the union controls whether arbitration is invoked, the
court refused to leave the enforcement of the individual employee's star tinily rights exclusively
to the union's discretion. See id. The court also recognized the split in the circuits regarding this
issue and questioned whether, in light of the Gilmer duciskin, the Supreme Court may need to
determine whether Alexander still compelled a decision in favor of the employee. Id.
97 See Austin, 78 F.3d at 879-81, 5 A,D. Cases (BNA) at 491-92; see also id. at 887, 5 A.D. Cases
(BNA) at 496-97 I. dissenting); Maga 956 F.2d at ¶135, 58 Fair hip]. Prac. Gas. (RNA) at
180.
98
 See Austin, 78 F.311 at 884-85, 5 A.D. Gases (BNA) at 495 (citing Willis, 948 F.2d, at 312, 57
Fair Erupt. Prac. Casa (BNA) at 392; Maga, 956 F.2d at 935, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at
180); see also Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1305, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (11NA) 933,
936 (9th Cir. [994). In Prudential, two women employees sued for violation of Title VII. See 42
F.3d at 1305, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 936. Although they had signed a securities form
which included a provision to compel arbitration, the court held that the agreementdid not bind
the employees because they did not knowingly agree and therefore had not entered into the
Elgreernelli voluntarily.
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Gilmer."" Consequently, as the dissent in Austin suggests, the issue of
whether the federal policy that supports the protection of individual
employees from discrimination will continue to be equated with an
individual's access to the federal court, must be examined."' The
majority in Austin extended the reasoning in Gilmer to apply to statu-
tory claims under a CBA, raised prior to arbitration.' 01 The question
remains whether the plaintiff could still bring her claims to court after
completing arbitration, similar to Alexander, or whether, as in Gilmer,
arbitration would be her final adjudicatory process.w 2 If other circuit
courts fo llow the approach taken by the majority in Austin, and it is
interpreted to further diminish the difference between CBAs and other
employment agreements, the Supreme Court may need to step in to
clarify its position regarding the Alexander and Gilmer analyses.
In summary, the Fourth Circuit in Austin held enforceable a vol-
untary agreement within a CBA to arbitrate ADA and Title VII statu-
tory claims and that, therefore, an employee cannot sue her employer
in federal court before pursuing arbitration of her discrimination
claims." The court applied the rationale used by the Supreme Court
in Gilmer which provides that once parties have contracted to arbitrate
a statutory matter, the parties should be held to that agreement, unless
Congress intended to preclude arbitration." This decision appears to
de-emphasize the distinction, explicated by Gilmer; between agree-
ments to arbitrate statutory rights under a CBA and other employment
agreements."Th Based on the competing federal policies to protect in-
dividual employees from discrimination and to encourage arbitration
of employment disputes, the Supreme Court may need to intervene to
clarify the remaining significance, if any, of the Alexander case in light
of the lower courts' expanded interpretation of Gilmer.
99 See Austin, 78 F.3d at 886-87, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 496-97 (Hall, J., dissenting): See also
Pryner, DAILY LAB. REP. (11NA), Mar. 25, 1997, at d22.
1°4) See Austin, 78 F.3d at 887, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 496-97 (Hall, J., dissenting); see also
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1120 (stating that rights are not
relinquished by requiring employee to use arbitration in place of courts).
1 ° 1 See Austin, 78 F.3d at 885, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 495 (finding that employee cannot sue
employer without first going through grievance proceclurt:).
lw Compare Alexander, 415 U.S. at 59, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 90 (holding that
employee can pursue fully both his remedy under grievance-arbitration clause of CM and his
cause under Title VII) with Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 1118 (holding
that employee can be hehl to compulsory arbitratitm pursuant to arbitration agreement in
securities registration application).
1 °3 Austin, 78 F.3d at 885-86, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 496.
1 ° 1
 See id. at 880-81, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 492.
1 °5
 See id. at 885. 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 495; id. at 887, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 497 (Hall, J.,
dissenting).
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C. *Two-Pronged Thst for Determining the Validity of Affirmative Action
Plans Under Title VII: Taxman v. Board of Education'
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") prohibits
discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex
or national origin. 2
 In creating the prohibition against racial discrimi-
nation in Title VII, Congress opened employment opportunities in
areas which traditionally had been closed to minority employees' The
United States Supreme Court has found that voluntary affirmative
action plans that take race into consideration do not necessarily violate
Title VII's prohibition against racial discrimination:1
 In determining
whether the application of an affirmative action plan violates Title VII,
the Court has considered whether the purpose of the plan mirrors the
purpose of Title VII and whether the plan unnecessarily trammels the
rights of nonminority employees.'
In 1976, in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., the
United States Supreme Court held that Title VII prohibits discrimina-
tion against white employees to the same extent that it prohibits dis-
crimination against black employees.'' In McDonald, a transportation
company discharged two white employees for misappropriating cargo
but did not discharge a black employee who was charged with the same
offense.' The white employees claimed that the employer had discrimi-
nated on the basis of race in violation of Title V11. 8 The Court reasoned
that Title VII's provision prohibiting the discharge of any individual
because of his or her race was not limited to any particular race and
By Amy B. Rensko, Staff Member, BOSTON Cottawai Lem REVIEW.
1 91 F.3f1 1547, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 848 (3d Cir. 1996).
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994). The statute states in relevant part:
II. shall be an unlawful employment. practice 9w an employer— (1) to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin,
Id,
3 See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202-03, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1,
5-6 (1979),
Id. at 207-98, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 7.
See, e.g., Johnson v, Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 627-30, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 411, 416-18 (1987); Weber, 443 U.S. at 208, 20 Fair Empl. Prue. Cas. (BNA) at 7.
6
 427 U.S. 273, 280, 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1577, 1580 (1976).
7 Id. at 276, 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1578.
"See id.
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therefore applied to white employees." The Court determined that
although an employer may discharge employees for crimes or other
misconduct, an employer violates Title VII if it retains an employee of
one race while discharging employees of another race when all have
committed the same offense.'" The Court in McDonald thus held that
under Title VII an employer may not use race as a factor when deciding
whether to discharge employees for misconduct, and that this prohi-
bition against racial discrimination applies equally to employees of all
races. "
In 1979, in United Steelworkers v. Weber, the United States Supreme
Court held that an affirmative action plan, which reserved for black
employees fifty percent of the openings in an in-house training pro-
gram, did not violate Title VII beCause the purpose of the plan mir-
rored the purpose of the statute and the plan did not unnecessarily
trammel the interests of the white employees. 12 In Weber, a white em-
ployee, whose employer denied him admission to an in-house craft
training program while admitting less senior black employees, chal-
lenged the legality under Title VII of an affirmative action plan that
reserved fifty percent of the program openings for black employees."
The employer designed the affirmative action plan to eliminate racial
imbalances in the craft-work forces of defendant's plant by setting goals
for black workers and establishing an in-house craft training program
to assist in meeting the goals. t4
Responding to the argument that Title VII prohibited all race-
conscious affirmative action plans, the Court examined Title V1I's
legislative history and concluded that Congress did not intend to
prohibit entirely voluntary affirmative action efforts as a means of
opening employment opportunities to black workers in occupa-
tions that traditionally have been closed to them." In addition, the
Court examined the language and legislative history of section 2000e-
" Id. at 278-80, 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1579-80.
10 1d. at 283-84, 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1581. In addition, the Court concluded
that, under Title V11, a union may not use the race of employees whom it represents as a factor
when negotiating with an employer for retention of employees. Id. at 284-85, 12 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) at 1581.
11 McDonald, 427 U.S. at 283-84, 12 Fair Empl. Prat:. Cas. (BNA) at 1581.
12 443 U.S. at 208-09, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 7-8.
13 /d. at 198-99, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 3-4',
14 See id. at 197-98, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 3. As a result of a history of excluding
black workers from craft unions, black employees constituted only 1.83% of craft-workers at the
plant prior to the affirmative action plan even though the entire workforce was approximately
39% black. See id. at 198-99, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 3-4.
IS M. at 201-04, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 5-6.
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2(j)' 6 of Title VII and concluded that although Title VII does not
require affirmative efforts to correct racial imbalances, it does not
prohibit the use of all voluntary affirmative actions to correct racial
imbalances.' 7 The Court reasoned that because the affirmative action
plan and Title VII were both designed to end patterns of racial segre-
gation and to open employment for blacks in areas that traditionally
have been closed to them, the plan mirrored the purposes of Title
VII. 18 The Court also reasoned that because the affirmative action plan
did not require that the employer discharge white employees for re-
placement with black employees, did not create an absolute bar to the
advancement of white employees and was a temporary measure for the
purposes of eliminating a manifest racial imbalance as opposed to
maintaining racial balance, the plan did not unnecessarily trammel the
interests of white employees.''' The Court thus held that the voluntary
affirmative action plan was permissible under Title VII because the
plan mirrored the purposes of the statute and did not unnecessarily
trammel the interests of white employees.°)
In 1987, in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, the United States
Supreme Court applied its reasoning from Weber and held that where
an employer considered the sex of its employees as one factor when
deciding which employee to promote, the employer's actions were
permissible because the promotion decision was made pursuant to a
voluntary affirmative action plan that conformed to Title A male
employee, who had applied for promotion to road dispatcher but was
rejected in favor of a female applicant, alleged that his employer
"'See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1994). Section 2000e-2(j) of Title VII provides:
Nothing contained in the subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer,
employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management. committee
subject to the subchapter to grant preferenthill treatment to any individual or to any
group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual
err group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total
number or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
employed by any employer, referred or classified for employment by any employ-
ment agency or labor organization, admitted to membership or classified by any
labor organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other
training program, in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons
of such race, color, religion, sex, or na tional origin in any Clunmunity, State, section,
or other area, or in the available work force in any community, State, section, or
other area.
Id.
L7 Weber, 443 U.S. at 204-06, 20 Fair Einpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 5-6.
19 Id. at 208, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 7.
19 Id.
2" Id. at 208-09, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cat. (BNA) at 7-8.
21 480 U.S. at 041-42, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 422.
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denied his promotion on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII. 22 The
employer included sex as a factor in the promotion decision to in-
crease the number of women in traditionally segregated job classifica-
tions and promoted the qualified female applicant."
Applying the Weber analysis, the Court first examined whether
consideration of sex was 'justified by the existence of a 'manifest
imbalance' that reflected underrepresentation of women in 'tradition-
ally segregated job categories."2. ' The Court reasoned that it was not
unreasonable to take the sex of the applicant into consideration given
the obvious imbalance in the job classification and the goal of elimi-
nating those imbalances. 2' The Court reasoned that the application of
the affirmative action plan satisfied the first part of the Weber analysis.'"
Applying the second prong of the Weber analysis, the Court next
considered whether the affirmative action plan unnecessarily tram-
meled the rights of the male employees. 27
 The Court reasoned that the
employer did not unnecessarily trammel the rights of the male employ-
ees because I) the plan did not set aside positions for women but
merely considered sex as one factor in the decision; 2) the plaintiff
had no absolute entitlement to the position and was competing with
the other qualified applicants; and 3) the plan was intended to attain,
rather than maintain, a balanced workforce. 28 The Court thus held in
Johnson that the consideration of sex as one factor in a promotion
decision made pursuant to an affirmative action plan that met the
Weber requirements was permissible under Title VII:"
During the Survey year, in Taxman v. Board of Education, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit en bane held that
a decision to lay off one of two equally qualified teachers was a violation
of Title VII because race was considered as a factor and the decision
was based on a non-remedial affirmative action plan." The Third
Circuit reasoned that because the sole purpose of the school board's
affirmative action plan was to obtain an educational benefit from the
22 See id. at 623-25, 43 Fair Ernpl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 415-16.
23 See id.
24 Id. at 630, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (TINA) at 418.
25
 Id. at 637, 43 Fair Erupt. Prac. Cas. (TINA) at 420-21.
2Volinson, 480 U.S. at 637, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 420-21.
27 Id. at 637-38, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 421.
28 Id. at 637-39, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 421.
29 Id. at 641-42, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 422.
3°91 F.3d 1547, 1550, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 848, 850 (3d Cir. 1996). The Third
Circuit also held that Taxman was entitled to summary judgment based on her New jersey Law
Against Discrimination claim because the legal analysis was essentially the same as for the Title
VII claim. Id. at 1565, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 862. Although the Third Circuit awarded
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presence of a racially diverse faculty, the plan did not attempt to
remedy a manifest imbalance in the racial composition of the faculty. 31
The court further reasoned that because the plan lacked goals and
standards, did not exist for the purpose of attaining a racial balance,
and imposed a substantial and costly burden on particular individuals,
the plan unnecessarily trammeled nonminority interests." The Third
Circuit thus held that the layoff decision made in accordance with the
affirmative action plan violated Title VII because the plan failed to
satisfy either prong of the Weber test."
The Board of Education of the Township of Piscataway, New Jersey
("Board") developed and adopted an affirmative action plan that ap-
plied to all employment decisions including layoffs.'" The stated pur-
pose of the plan was to provide for equal educational and employ-
ment opportunities and to attract minority personnel who would be
considered along with other qualified candidates. 33 The affirmative
action plan would take effect when candidates appeared to have equal
qualifications." The plan did not have a remedial purpose and, at all
relevant times, African-American teachers were not underrepresented
on the faculty."
In 1989, the Board needed to layoff one of two teachers, Sharon
Taxman or Debra Williams, who were equally junior members of Pis-
cataway High School's Business Department. 38
 Both were judged to
have equal ability and qualifications; however, Taxman was white and
Williams was African -American." In previous layoff decisions where
employees were of equal seniority and possessed equal qualifications,
the Board had randomly selected which employee to layoff.'° In this
case, the Board decided to invoke the affirmative action plan and chose
to layoff Taxman and to retain Williams.'" The Board's President ex-
Taxman 100% backpay damages, the Third Circuit refused to award Taxman punitive damages
because there was no evidence that Ihe Board acted willfully, wantonly or outrageously. Id. at
1565-67, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 862-64.
m See id. at 1563, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 861.
32 Id. at 1564, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 861-62.
33 Id. at 1563-65, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 861-62.
34 See id. at 1550, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 850.
35 See Taxman, 9! 17.3d at 1550, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 850.
35 See id.
" See id. at 1550, 71 Fair Ernpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 850-51. The percentage of black
employees in the relevant job category was greater than the percentage of black workers in the
available workforce. See id. at 1551, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 851.
9i1 See id. at 1551, 71 Fair Ernpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 851.
a See id. Williams was also the only African-American member of the Business Department.
See id.
45 See Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1551, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 851.
41 See id.
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plained that the application of the plan intended to create a culturally
diverse faculty that would provide an educational advantage to the
student population.°
After Taxman filed a charge of employment discrimination with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the United States
filed suit against the Board in the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey alleging racial discrimination under Title VII,
and Taxman intervened.° The district court granted partial summary
judgment to the United States and Taxman on the issue of liability for
racial discrimination, and a trial proceeded to determine damages. 44
The Board appealed to the Third Circuit, contending that summary
judgment as to liability was granted in error.°
The Third Circuit noted that not all voluntary race-conscious
affirmative action plans violate Title VII's prohibition against racial
discrimination and that the analytic framework established in Weber
and refined in Johnson must be applied to determine the validity of the
plan.'''' The Third Circuit first examined the first prong of the Weber-
test to decide whether the Board's purpose of promoting racial diver-
sity mirrored the purposes of Title VII. 47
 The Third Circuit reasoned
that the plan did not further Title Vii's goals of ending discrimination
in employment and remedying underrepresentation of minorities due
to discrimination.°
The Third Circuit reasoned that applying the affirmative action
plan for the purpose of obtaining educational benefit from a racially
diverse faculty did not mirror the goals of Title VII because the plan
was not adopted to remedy past discrimination or a manifest racial im-
balance in employment.° The Board argued that the purpose of pro-
moting racial diversity was included in Title VII when it was amended
in 1972 to include private and public academic institutions, and that
Fourteenth Amendment case law supported the validity of using the
plan to achieve racial diversity. 54 In examining the legislative history of
the 1972 amendment to Title VII, the Third Circuit noted that Con-
42 See id. at 1551-52, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 851-52.
'13 See id. at 1552, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 852. The statute of limitations had run
for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. See id. at 1552 n.5, 71 Fair Empl. Prat:. Cas. (BNA) at 852 n.5. The
plaintiff, therefore, did not include a Fourteenth Amendthent Equal Protection claim. See id.
44 See id. at 1552, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (RNA) at 852.
45 See Thxman, 91 F.3d at 1552, 71 Fair Empl. Prue. Cas. (BNA) at 852.
tai
	 at 1553, 1556, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 853, 855.
47 Id. at 1556-57, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 855-56.
" Id. at 1563, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 861.
.19 Id.
5" See Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1558-59, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 857-58.
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gress did not include the promotion of racial diversity in schools as a
purpose of the amendment but merely intended to extend existing
Title VII coverage to schools. 5 ' The court also rejected the Board's
argument that racial diversity as an affirmative action goal, which the
Board argued had been accepted in equal protection case law, also
applied to Title VI1. 55 The Third Circuit instead concluded that. Title
VIPs prohibitions on employers did not extend as far as the Constitu-
tion.53 The Board's argument was not valid, the court reasoned, be-
cause the argument was based on a misinterpretation of United States
Supreme Court case law.'" The Third Circuit concluded that the
Johnson Court had not held that an affirmative action purpose that
satisfies the Constitution must also satisfy Title VII. 55 The Third Circuit
further reasoned that even if equal protection standards could be
imported into a Title VII analysis, the case law did not support the
promotion of racial diversity as a goal.'" The Third Circuit therefore
concluded that the affirmative action plan failed the first prong of the
Weber test because a non-remedial purpose, such as the promotion of
racial diversity for educational benefit, did not mirror the purposes of
Title VII.57
The Third Circuit next applied the reasoning of Weber and Johnson
to examine whether the application of the affirmative action plan
unnecessarily trammeled nonminority interests." The Third Circuit
concluded that the Board's plan did not set standards by which to
evaluate progress toward achieving the plan's purpose or to assure that
the Board did not apply the plan contrary to its purpose. 59 The Third
Circuit also concluded that the plan was not a temporary measure to
attain a racial balance; rather, the plan maintained an existing racial
balance in the school's faculty.6° Finally, the Third Circuit reasoned that
the harm imposed on Taxman by the loss of her job was too substantial
and costly to justify the application of the plan in this instance because
Taxman, a tenured employee, bore the entire burden of the plan's
application."' Because the plan did not contain goals and standards,
51 See id. at 1558-59, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 857.
52 Id. at 1559-60, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 858.
M See id. at 1560, 71 Fair Em pi. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 858.
54 Id. at 1559-62, 71 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 857-60.
55 Taxman, 91 F.3d at. 1559-60, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 858.
56 Id. at 1560, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 858.
57 Id. at 1563, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 861.
51/ Id. at 1564, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 861.
59 Id.
Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1564, 71 Fair Empl. Prac, Gas, (BNA) at 861-62.
r'l Id. at 1564, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 862.
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sought to maintain racial diversity and imposed substantial harm and
severe costs on Taxman, the Third Circuit reasoned that Taxman's
interests were unnecessarily trammeled under the second prong of the
Weber test."' Because the Third Circuit concluded that neither prong
of the Weber test was satisfied, the court held that the Board's plan and
the application of the plan to the Taxman layoff decision violated Title
VII. 63
ChiefJudge Sloviter's dissent, however, stated that the significance
of Weber and Johnson was not the purported establishment of a test,
but was that the United States Supreme Court upheld affirmative ac-
tion plans that deviated from the literal interpretation of Title VII."
Chief Judge Sloviter reasoned that although the Court in Weber and
Johnson upheld plans that sought to remedy racial imbalances, it did
not follow that affirmative action plans that pursued other purposes,
such as racial diversity, could not comply with Title VII. 65 Chief Judge
Sloviter emphasized that the Court did not intend for the standards it
applied in Weber and Johnson to uphold affirmative action plans to be
used to establish boundaries between permissible and impermissible
plans.
Chief Judge Sloviter criticized the majority for elevating the lan-
guage of Weber that the plan "mirror the purposes of Title VII" to a
litmus test contrary to the intentions of the Weber Court."' Chief Judge
Sloviter stated that the Court in Weber did not intend to create a test
where an affirmative action plan is valid only if Title VII's text or leg-
islative history matches the articulated purposes of the plan. 68 Rather,
Chief Judge Sloviter reasoned that creating a racially diverse faculty is
consistent with the goals of Title VII because Congress intended Title
VII to be forward-looking legislation with the broad goal of eliminating
the causes of discrimination." Chief Judge Sloviter further found that
the Supreme Court, in other contexts, had recognized racial diversity
in the classroom as important to eliminating attitudes that can lead to
62 Id. at 1569-65, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 861-62.
65 1d. at 1550, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 850.
m Id. at 1570. 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 866 (Sloviter, C.j., dissenting). In addition
to Chief judge Sloviter, judges Scirica, Lewis and McKee wrote separate dissenting opinions. See
id. at 1576-79, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 872-74 (Solviter, C.", dissenting) (Scirica, j.,
dissenting) (Lewis, j., dissenting) (McKee, J., dissenting).
65 Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1570, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 866-67 (Sloviter, CT, dissent-
ing),
'gild. at 1570, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 867 (Sloviter, C.j., dissenting).
137 Id. at 1571, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 867 (Sloviter, CT, dissenting).
68 Id. (Sloviter, CT, dissenting).
69 Id. at 1571, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 867-68 (Sloviter, Cj., dissenting).
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future discrimination." Chief Judge Sloviter therefore reasoned that
obtaining educational benefits from a racially diverse faculty was con-
sistent with the goals of Title VII and disagreed with the majority's
reasoning that affirmative action plans cannot take race into consid-
eration other than in remedying past discrimination. 7 '
Contrary to the majority, Chief Judge Sloviter concluded that
applying the affirmative action plan to the layoff decision was not
overly intrusive of Taxman's rights. 72
 Because Taxman would have had
a fifty percent chance of being laid off had the Board not invoked the
plan, Chief Judge Sloviter reasoned that Taxman did not have a "le-
gitimate and firmly rooted expectation" that she would not be laid off."
Chief Judge Sloviter also criticized the majority's narrow reading of
Weber and Johnson in finding that a plan must be explicitly temporary
to be valid because, to Chief Judge Sloviter, the significant considera-
tion is the impact on other employees and not whether the plan is in
effect for a specified number of years. 74
 Chief Judge Sloviter further
reasoned that the plan's impact on nonminorities was minimal because
it was discretionary and had been applied only once during twenty
years.• Because Chief Judge Sloviter could not conclude that faculty
diversity was an impermissible purpose of the plan and did not con-
clude that the Board's decision under the plan was overly intrusive of
Taxman's rights, she would have reversed the grant of summary judg-
ment for Taxman and directed the lower court to grant summary
judgment to the Board."
The Third Circuit in Taxman elevated the analyses in Weber and
Johnson to the level of a two-pronged test." The two requirements
are that an affirmative action plan 1) mirror the purposes of Title VII
and 2) not unnecessarily trammel nonminority interests." Although
Johnson applied the analysis from Weber to determine that an affirma-
tive action plan was valid under Title VII, the Court in Johnson did not
7° Taxman, 91 E3d at 1571-72, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 867-68 (Sloviter, Cj.,
dissenting).
71 Id. at 1572, 1574, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 868, 870 (Sloviter, CA., dissenting).
72 Id. at 1576, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cos. (BNA) at 871 (Sloviter; Cj., dissenting).
73 Id. at 1574, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 870 (Sloviter, Ci., dissenting).
7 '1 Id. at 1575, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 871 (Sloviter, Ci., dissenting), Sloviter
pointed out that the plait at issue in Johnson contained no end date and that the Court in Johnson
indicated that only particularly burdensome plans need be explicitly temporary. Id. at 1575, 71
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 870.
75 Taxman, 91 E3d at 1575, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 871 (Sloviter, Cj., dissenting).
76 Id. at 1576, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 871 (Simnel ., CJ,, dissenting).
77
 See id. at 1563-65, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 861,
78 See id.
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explicitly establish the Weber factors as a legal test or create outer
boundaries for permissible affirmative action plans!'"
'Taxman is significant because it rejects the possibility that a pur-
pose other than the remedy of past discrimination or a manifest racial
imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories could be consis-
tent with the purposes of Title VII." The Third Circuit narrowly ap-
proached the decision of whether the plan was consistent with the
purposes of Title VII by examining only whether a plan with a goal
of promoting faculty diversity for education's sake had a remedial
purpose.8 ' The Third Circuit stated that the primary goals of Title VII
were to end discrimination and to remedy minority underrepresenta-
tion caused by discrimination." In her dissent, however, Chief Judge
Sloviter concluded that an affirmative action plan with a forward-look-
ing purpose could mirror the purposes of Title VIE.TM 3 The presence of
a diverse faculty could result in the development of student attitudes
that could help end future discrimination in employment in a broader
context than Piscataway High School." ,
The Third Circuit chose the safer route, however, by refusing to
recognize any opening left by the Supreme Court to find additional
reasons in Title VII to take race into account when making employ-
ment decisions and by elevating the language of Weber and Johnson to
the level of a test." The Johnson Court framed its inquiry such that it
examined only whether the plan met the goal of remedying a manifest
racial imbalance in order to satisfy the first requirement of the Weber
analysis." Because the Johnson Court only looked at a remedial affir-
mative action program, Johnson does not provide support for the con-
clusion that a non-remedial goal of an affirmative action plan can
mirror the purposes of Title VII." Not; however, does Johnson support
the conclusion that goals other than the goal of remedying a manifest
racial imbalance do not mirror the purposes of Title V11. 88 In Taxman,
the Third Circuit chose not to expand the 'Supreme Court's analysis of
711 johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 642, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 411,
422-23 (1987) (Stevens, j., concurring); see. Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1570, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(RNA) at 866-67 (Sloviter, CJ., dissenting).
8° See 91 F.3d at 1563, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 861.
81 See id. at 1557-58, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 856-57.
8' Id. at 1557, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 856.
83 1d. at 1571, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 867 (Sloviter, Cd„ dissenting).
81 See id. at 1571-72, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 867-68 (Sloviter,	 dissenting).
85 See Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1563-65, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 861-62.
86 See 480 U.S. at 631-37,43 Fair Empl, Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 418-21.
87 See id.
88 See id.
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which goals mirror the purposes of Title VII and, instead, chose to
limit valid affirmative action plans to those adopted by employers to
remedy past discrimination or to correct a manifest imbalance in the
employment of minorities."
In sum, Taxman v. Board of Education established that an affirma-
tive action plan must have a goal that mirrors the purposes of Title VII
and must not unnecessarily trammel the interests of nonminorities to
be valid under Title VII." The Third Circuit clearly established the
analysis introduced in Weber as refined by fohnson as a two-pronged test
for determining whether an affirmative action plan is valid under Title
VI[."' In addition, Taxman is significant because it rejected the possi-
bility that a non-remedial goal of an affirmative action plan, such as
obtaining educational benefit from a diverse faculty, can be consistent
with the purposes of Title VH. 92
 In recognizing only remedial measures,
the Third Circuit has therefore forbidden the application of affirma-
tive action plans that take forward-looking approaches to ending dis-
crimination in employment."
H. AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT Act.
A. *Rejecting the Requirement That ADEA Plaintiffs Demonstrate
Replacement from Outside Protected Class: O'Connor v.
Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.'
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") protects
workers aged forty and older from discrimination on the basis of age.2
Plaintiffs under the ADEA can prove age discrimination under ordi-
nary principles of proof, by establishing by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that age was the determining factor in the adverse employment
decision, or under the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting scheme of
proof.' The various circuits have generally agreed that an ADEA plain-
tiff must establish, as part of her prima facie case under McDonnell
89 See 'human, 91 F.3d at 1563, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at. 861.
91) Id. at 1556, 1564, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 855, 861,
In See id, at 1563, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 851.
'2 See id,
I' 3 See id. at 1563, 1567, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 861, 864.
* By Stephen E. Gruendel, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE. LAW REVIEW.
116 S. Ct. 1307, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) 486 (1906).
2 29 U.S.C.	 623(a)(1), 631(a) (1994).
3 See O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 56 F.3(1 542, 545, 67 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1859,1862 (4th Cir. 1995), revel, 116 S. Ct. 1307, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (liNA) 486
(1906); Kralinan v. Illinois Dep't of Veterans' Affairs, 23 F.3d 150, 153, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
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Douglas, that she was in the protected class of individuals forty and
older, that she was qualified for the position, and that she suffered an
adverse employment action. 4 The circuits have split, however, on the
question of whether an age discrimination plaintiff must demonstrate
that the employer replaced her with someone outside the protected
class. 5 The Supreme Court resolved the circuit split in O'Connor v.
Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., holding that an ADEA plaintiff is not
required to demonstrate that her replacement ("the replacement") was
someone outside the protected class. 6 Rejecting that requirement, the
Court suggested the alternative requirement that the replacement be
substantially younger than the plaintiff.?
In 1988, in Freeman v. Package Machinery Co., the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that a plaintiff does not have
to show that his employer replaced him witli a younger person, or with
someone outside the protected age group, to establish a prima facie
case under the ADEA. 8 The plaintiff in Freeman had worked for his
employer for more than twenty-five years until the company discharged
him in 1980. 9
 The company replaced the sixty-year-old plaintiff with a
forty-eight-year-old man and the plaintiff brought suit for age discrimi-
nation under the ADEA, prevailing at trial." )
(BNA) 1645, 1646 (7th Cir. 1994). Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff bears the initial burden
of proving by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of illegal discrimination.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 965, 969
(1973); see Texas 1)ep't of Community Affairs V. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53, 25 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 113, 115 (1981). Establishing a prima facie case creates a presumption of
unlawful discrimination, and the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 254, 25 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 115, 116 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 5 Fair Empl.
Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 969). If the plaintiff meets her initial burden and the defendant remains
silent, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 25 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 116.
See, e.g., O'Connor, 56 F.3d at 546, 67 Fair Ernpl. Pose. Cas. (BNA) at 1862 (requiring
plaintiff to prove: (1) he was in protected age group; (2) he was discharged or demoted; and (3)
at time of discharge or demotion, he was performing his job at a level that met his employer's
legitimate expectations); Rinehart v. Gity of Independence, 35 F.3d 1263, 1264, 65 Fair Empl.
Prac. Gas. (BNA) 1548, 1551 (8th Cir. 1994) (requiring plaintiff to show: (1) he was within
protected age group; (2) he was performing his job at a level that met Isis employer's legitimate
expectations; and (3) he was discharged); LaPointe v. United Autoworkers Local 600, 8 F.3d 376,
379, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 262, 264 (6th Cir. 1993) (requiring plaintiff to demonstrate
that (1) she was a member of protected class; (2) that she was subjected to adverse employment
action; and (3) that she was qualified For particular position).
5 See infra notes 8-56 and accompanying text.
" See 116 S. Gt. at 1310, 70 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 489.
7 See id.
8 865 F.2d 1331, 1335, 49 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 1139, 1142 (1st Cir. 1988).
9 M. at 1334, 49 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1141.
10 See id. at 1333, 1334, 49 Fair Empl, Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1140, 1141.
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On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed, holding inter alia that the
plaintiff had established a prima facie case under the ADEA even
though the employer replaced him with someone from within the pro-
tected age group." In addition, the court stated that a plaintiff could
conceivably prevail even without demonstrating that the employer re-
placed her with someone younger. 12
 Although recognizing that a plain-
tiff might not ultimately prevail in an ADEA suit where the defendant
did not replace the plaintiff with a younger individual, the court
expressly disclaimed any such requirement as part of a prima facie
case." The court thus concluded that a plaintiff does not have to show
replacement either by a younger person or by someone outside the
protected age group as part of a prima facie case under the ADEA. 14
In 1994, in Kralman v. Illinois Department of Veterans' Affairs, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the
fact that an employee's replacement was also a member of the pro-
tected class did not preclude a showing of age discrimination under
the ADEA." In Kralman, the Department of Veterans' Affairs ("the
Department") employed the plaintiff as a Veterans' Service Officer for
eight years until it closed the office due to lack of funding) The
Department reopened the office two years later but selected a forty-six-
year-old woman for the position rather than reinstating the seventy-
one-year-old plaintiff.' 7
 When the plaintiff brought suit under the
ADEA, the district court granted summary judgment for the defen-
dant, stating that the plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case
because the Department had ultimately hired a person who was also
in the protected age class."
It Id. at 1335 & n.2, 49 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1142 & n.2. The court examined the
holding in Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1013, '10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 29, 36 (1st
Cir. 1979), which rejected the requirement of replacement by a member outside the protected
class, and conflicting dictum from Deo v. Look, 810 F.2d 12, 14 11.1, 42 Fair Empl. Prac. Cat. (BNA)
1399, 1400 n.1 (1st Cir. 1987). Id. The court determined than the Dom dictum rested on a
misreading of Loeb. Id.
12 Id. at 1335, 49 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 1142. In Loeb, the court explained that
replacement by someone older would not suggest age discrimination but would not disprove it
conclusively. 600 F.2d at 1013 11.9, 20 Fair Empl. Prac, Cat. (BNA) at 36 it.9, The olcler replace-
ment could have been hired, for example, to ward off a threatened discrinnnation Snit. Id.
15 Freeman, 865 F.2d. at 1335, 49 Fair Empl. Prue. Cas. (BNA) at 1142.
14 hi
15 23 F.3d at 155, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1648.
IC
 Id. at 152, 64 Fair Empl. l'rac. Cas. (BNA) at 1645.
17 Id. at 152, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1646.
See id. The district court based this decision on three recent cases in the Seventh Circuit,
Oxman, v. WLS-TV, 846 F.2(1 448, 455, 46 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1392, 1397 (7th Cir. 1988),
Konowitz v. Schnadig Coup., 965 F.2d 230, 232, 61 Fair Empl. Prac, Cas, (RNA) 1291, 1293 (7th
Cir. 1992), and Grady v. Liberty National Bank & Trust Co., 993 F.2(1 132, 134-35, 61 Fair Emir].
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The Seventh Circuit disagreed, explaining that it is considered
"hornbook law" that an AREA action can be based on discrimination
between older and younger members of the protected class.''' The
court reasoned that an "overwhelming majority" of other circuits have
recognized that age discrimination can occur even if the employer
ultimately hires another individual in the protected class. 20 In addition,
the court noted that an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") regulation stated that "it is unlawful . . . for an employer to
discriminate in hiring or in any other way by giving preference because
of age between individuals 40 and over. "21 Although recognizing that
some circumstances may exist where the age differential between the
plaintiff and the favored employee is not sufficient to create a reason-
able inference of age discrimination, the court reasoned that the
seventy-one-year-old plaintiff in Kralman was of an entirely different
generation than the forty-six-year-old woman who the defendant ulti-
mately hired for the position. 22 The Seventh Circuit thus reversed the
lower court on this point, concluding that an ADEA plaintiff could
prevail even where the plaintiff's replacement was also a member of
the protected class."
Similarly, in 1994, in Rinehart v. City of Independence, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that a plaintiff may
prevail in an age discrimination action even when replaced by an
individual within the protected class." In Rinehart, the sixty-seven-year-
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1193, 1194 (7th Cir. 1993). See id. at 154, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at
1647. The district court reasoned that these cases demonstrated a Seventh Circuit "trend" requir-
ing a plaintiff to show that persons outside the protected class were treated more favorably to
establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. See id.
19 Id. at 155, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1648. The Kralman court found the district
court's reliance on Oxman, Konowitz and Grady understandable but not persuasive for two
reasons. Id. at 154, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1647; see supra note 17. First, the court
noted that none of the cases dealt with an analogous fact situation where both the plaintiff and
his or her replacement were in the protected class. Kralman, 23 E.3d at 154, 64 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) at 1647. Second, and more significantly, the court reasoned that the opinions merely
suggested one way of establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination, rather than foreclosing
other ways to do so. See id. at 154, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1647-48.
20 Kralnum, 23 F.3d at 155, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1648.
2 ' Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2(a) (1991)). The court cited three Seventh Circuit decisions,
Mayan v. Peabody Coal Co., 7 F.3d 570, 572 (7th Cir. 1993), La Montagne v. American Convenience
Products, Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1411 n.4, 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cos. (BNA) 913, 919 n.4 (7th Cir.
1984) and Hamilton v. Caterpillar, Inc., 966 F.2d 1226, 1228, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 504,
505 (71.11 Cir. 1992), where the court had relied on the regulation and had explained that an
employer is not insulated from liability for age discrimination when he chooses among people
in the protected class." Id.
22 Id. at 155-56, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (11NA) at 1648-49.
23 Id. at 155, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 1648,
21 35 F.3d at 1266, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1551.
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old plaintiff had been employed as the city's chief of police for twelve
years before being fired. 25 When a forty-eight-year-old woman replaced
him, he sued under the ADEA. 2" The district court granted summary
judgment for the city because the plaintiff could not demonstrate that
the defendant replaced him with someone outside the protected class
or that age constituted a factor in the termination decision. 27
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit explained that a plaintiff need only
demonstrate replacement by a younger person—rather than someone
outside the protected age group—to make out a prima facie case of
age discrimination.'" Although recognizing that replacement by a per-
son outside the protected class may be probative of the ultimate issue
of intent to discriminate, the court concluded that such evidence is
not a per se requirement for a plaintiff to prevail. 29
 In addition, the
court recognized the substantial similarity between the prima facie case
requirements under Title VII and those under the ADEA." Reasoning
that, under Eighth Circuit precedent, Title VII does not require proof
that a person outside the protected class replaced the plaintiff, the
court concluded that the ADEA should not require such proof either."'
The court therefore held that a plaintiff need not demonstrate replace-
ment by someone outside the protected class to prevail under the
ADEA."2
In contrast, in 1993, in LaPointe v. United Automotive Local 600,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that
an ADEA plaintiff whose replacement was within the protected age
group of forty years and over could not establish a prima facie case
of age discrimination." In LaPointe, the fifty-one-year-old plaintiff
served as a health and safety representative for the defendant, United
Autoworkers Local 600." The plaintiff argued that he quit this posi-
tion after becoming the target of ridicule and harassment." 5 When
the union ultimately filled his position eighteen months later with a
forty-four-year-old, the plaintiff alleged that the union had construc-
tively discharged him because of his age and brought an ADEA ac-
25 /d. at 1264, 65 Fair Empl. Prat:. Gas. (BNA) at 1549.
26 Sff id. at 1264, 1265, 65 Fair Empl. Prat:. Cas. (BNA) at 1549, 1550.
27 See id. at 1265, 65 Fair Ettipl. Prac. Gas. (13NA) at 1550.
28 Id.
29 Rinehart, 35 F.3d at 1266, 65 Fair Empt. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1551.
Id.
31 Id. at 1266, 65 Fair Etnpl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 1550-51.
m
.
 at 1266, 65 Fair Ettipl. Prac. Cas. (13NA) at 1551.
9;1
	 8 F.3(1 at 379, 63 Fair Empl. Prat:. Gas. (BNA) at 264.
3 '1 Id. at 377, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (13NA) at 263.
35 See id.
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tion." The district court granted summary judgment against the plain-
tiff, in part because he could not establish that he was replaced by an
individual outside the protected class.a 7
The Sixth Circuit agreed with the district court and held that the
plaintiff could not prevail in this case because his replacement came
from within the protected class." While noting that several other juris-
dictions do not require plaintiffs to show replacement by someone
outside the protected class, the court adhered to Sixth Circuit prece-
dent under which a plaintiff must demonstrate that the replacement
was outside the protected class." In addition, the court cited Sixth
Circuit authority that held that a plaintiff under Title VII must show
that he was replaced by a person outside the protected class.'" Without
further analysis, the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed its precedent, concluding
that an ADEA plaintiff must demonstrate replacement by someone
outside the protected class to prevail in a claim of age discrimination.'"
During the Survey year, in O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers
Corp., the United States Supreme Court resolved the circuit split,
holding that an ADEA plaintiff need not demonstrate replacement by
a person outside the protected class. 42 In O'Connor, the defendant
replaced the fifty-six-year-old plaintiff with a forty-year-old employee
when it restructured its operations. 45 The district court granted sum-
mary judgment against the plaintiff because his replacement came
from within the protected class." Concluding that the ADEA prohibits
'6 See id. at 377-78, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 263.
37 See id. at 378, 379, 63 Fair Elm)]. Pme. Cas. (BNA) at 263, 264.
3" LaPointe, 8 F.3d at 379, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cat. (RNA) at 264.
13 Id. The court cited Gagne v. Northwestern Nall InSuranre Co., 881 F.2d 309, 313, 50 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 601, 603 (lith Cir. 1989), for the elements of a prima facie case of age
discrimination, including replacement by a person outside the protected class. Id. 'nu, Gagne
court, however, had provided no additional analysis on the issue, citing Chappell v. GTE Products
Corp., 803 F.2d 261, 265-66, 42 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 23, 26 (6th Cir. 1987) and Wilkins
v. Eaton Corp., 790 F.26 515, 520, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cat. (BNA) 1349, 1352 (6th Cir. 1986) as
its authority 11w the elements of a prima facie case. See 881 F.2d at 313, 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 603. In both Chappell and Wilkins, however, the Sixth Circuit indicated that the fourth
element of a prima facie case is replacement by a younger person. See Chappell, 803 F.2d at 265-66,
42 Fair Empl. Prac. Cat. (RNA) at 26; Wilkins, 790 F.2d at 520, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas, (BNA)
at 1352. In addition, Sixth Circuit authority exists contrary to Gagne which the court in LaPointe
did not address in its opinion. See Barnes v. Gencorp, Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 1466, 152 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1990) ("An employer violates the ADEA when preference is
given to a younger employee even if the younger employee is within the protected class of persons
age 40-and-over.").
'I* LaPointe, 8 F.3d at 379, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 264 (citing Ang v. Procter &
Gamble, Co., 932 F.2d, 540, 548, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 1666, 1673 (6th Cir. 1991)).
.1 1 Id.
1`2 116 S. Ct. 1307, 1310, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 486, 489 (1996).
13 See 56 F.3d at 544, 67 Fair Empl. Prue. Gas. (DNA) at 1861.
"O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers, 829 F. Supp. 155, 158, 160, 62 Fair Empl. Prac.
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discrimination on the basis of age and not class membership, the
Supreme Court reasoned that the fact that a replacement is substan-
tially younger than the plaintiff is a far more reliable indicator of age
discrimination than the fact that the replacement. was from outside the
protected class."
In O'Connor, plaintiffiames O'Connor ("O'Connor") had worked
for defendant. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corporation ("Consoli-
dated") since 1978. 4' Consolidated operated cafeterias and vending
machines in industrial plants as a division of its parent company,
Canteen Corporation ("Can teen"). 47
 In 1989, O'Connor became the
district manager for a region serving much of southern and western
North Carolina:18 Canteen and Consolidated also operated two other
regions until 1990, when they decided to restructure their operations
and created one single territory with only two districts. 49 The compa-
nies combined O'Connor's old district into the newly created Southern
District, placing it under the supervision of a forty-year-old employee."
As a result of the reorganization, Consolidated terminated the fifty-six-
year-old O'Connor. 5 t He asserted that Consolidated had discharged
him because of his age and brought suit under the ADEA. 52
The district court explained that an ADEA plaintiff can establish
the substantive elements of age discrimination either by ordinary prin-
ciples of proof or through the McDonnell Douglas proof scheme." The
fourth element of a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas
scheme, the court continued, requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that
the defendant hired a replacement with comparable or lesser qualifica-
tions who was outside the protected class. 54
 Because O'Connor's re-
placement, age forty at the time of the unfavorable action, was within
Gas. (BNA) 1089, 1092, 1093 (W.D.N.C. 1993), afp, 56 F.3d 542,157 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1859 (1995),	 1 1(5 S. Ct. 1307, 70 Fair hulk Prac. Cas. (BNA) 486 (1996).
45 O'Connor, 116 S. Ct. at 1310, 70 Fair Empl, Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 489.
46 Id. at 1309, 70 Fair Empl, Prac. Gas. (RNA) at 488,
' 17
 See O'Connor, 829 F. Stipp. at 156, 62 Fair Empl. Prac, Gas. (BNA) at 1090, 1091.
41/ Sire
49 See O'Connor, 56 F.3d at 543, 544, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1860.
See id. at 544, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1861. The companies placed the newly
formed Northern District under the supervision of a thirty-live-year-old employee. See id.
Si See id,
17' 2
 See id. at 545,157 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1861.
53 0 1(10,111t00 1, 829 F. Stipp, at 157, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) ;IA 1091.
Id.T1u: court. explained that this fourth clement of a prima facie case ()Cage discrimination,
replacement by a person outside the protected class, is less applicable in reduction-in-kit -co cases
where a company has down-sized its operations and, as is result, has tired or laid off employees.
Id. In such reduction-in-Li:wee cases, the adversely affected employee cannot point to a replace-
ment with whom the discharged employee would logically compare himself. See id. In these
situations, the McDonnell Douglas scheme is modified, and the plaintiff must produce sonic
evidence that the employer did not treat age neutrally in taking the adverse employment actio n.
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the protected class, the district court found that O'Connor failed to
establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. 55 On appeal the
Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that a plaintiff is required to demon-
strate that his replacement was outside the protected class.'"
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that replacement by some-
one outside of the protected class is not a proper element of a prima
facie case of age discrimination. 57 Writing for a unanimous Court,
Justice Scalia first stated that a logical connection must exist between
each element of the prima facie case and the illegal discrimination for
which it establishes a mandatory, rebuttable presumption under the
McDonnell Douglas scheme.'" The Court reasoned that the element of
replacement by someone outside the protected class fails this require-
ment.59
The Court noted that the ADEA does not ban discrimination
against employees because they are forty or older."° Instead, the Court
stated, the ADEA bans discrimination against employees because of
their age but limits the protected class to those age forty or older.l't
The Court reasoned, therefore, that the fact that an employer replaced
See id. Here, the two companies' restructuring oloperations might ordinarily fall into the category
of a reduction-in-force, thereby requiring the modified test that the employer did not treat age
neutrally in its decision. See id. at 156-57, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1091. The court
reasoned, however, that the forty-year-old employee took over what had basically been O'Connor's
former district, essentially replacing him. Id. at 157-58, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at
1091-92. Therefiwe, the court determined that the fourth element was applicable in this case
and applied its standard test. See id. The Court of Appeals upheld the lower court but also
concluded that the plaintiff could not prevail even tinder the modified version of the McDonnell
Douglas scheme applicable to reduction-in-force cases. O'Connor, 56 F.3d at 546-547, 67 Fair
Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1862-63. The Supreme Court expressly limited its review of the case
to the Fourth Circuit's treatment of it as a non-reduction-in-force case. O'Connor, 116 S. Ct. at
1309 n.1, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 488 n.l.
55 O'Connor, 829 F. Supp. at 158, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1092.
55 O'Connor, 56 F.3d at 546, 67 Fair Ernpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1862. judge Butzner, writing
separately, concurred that Fourth Circuit precedent required an ADEA plaintiff to demonstrate
that lie or she was replaced by someone outside the protected age group. See id. at 550, 67 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1866 (Butzner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge
Butzner stated, however, that "[fluch an absolute requirement ... has no justification in law or
policy." Id. Because the McDonnell Douglas scheme was not intended to he "rigid, mechanistic or
ritualistic," Judge Bowser reasoned, the age of a replacement employee should be a relevant, but
not dispositive, factor in deciding whether the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of age
discrimination. Id.
57 O'Connor, 116 S. Ct. at 1310, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 989. Because neither party
contested the application of the 141rDonnell Douglas scheme of Title VII to the ADEA context, the
Court. assumed that it was appropriate. 14. at 1310, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cuts. (BNA) at 488.
Id.; see also supra note 3.
O 'Connor, 116 S. Ct. at 1310, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 489.
60 1d.
61 Id.
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one person in the protected class with another person in the protected
class is irrelevant provided the employer replaced him because of his
age."' Under this reasoning, the Court concluded, there can be no
greater inference of age discrimination, as opposed to "forty or over"
discrimination, when an employer replaces a forty-year-old with a
thirty-nine-year-old than when he replaces a fifty-six-year-old with a
forty-year-old.°
By eliminating the forty and older cut-off, the Court acknow-
ledged, a plaintiff could potentially establish a prima facie case on the
basis of very thin evidence—for example, the replacement of a sixty-
eight-year-old by a sixty-five-year-old." The Court reasoned, however,
that the proper solution to this problem lies not in making an "utterly
irrelevant factor" an element of the prima facie case.''`' Rather, the
Court concluded that a prima facie case requires evidence that would
allow an inference that the employment decision was based on an
illegal discriminatory criterion. 66
 Such an inference in an age discrimi-
nation context, the Court explained, cannot be drawn from the re-
placement of one worker with another insignificantly younger.° Be-
cause the ADEA prohibits discrimination on the basis of age and not
class membership, the Court reasoned that the fact that a replacement
is substantially younger than the plaintiff is a far more reliable indica-
tor of age discrimination than the fact that the plaintiff was replaced
by someone outside the protected class. 68
 The Supreme Court thus
held that replacement by someone outside the protected class is not a
proper element of a prima facie case under the AREA and instead
suggested the alternative requirement that the replacement be substan-
tially younger than the adversely affected employee. 69
The Supreme Court's decision in O'Connor correctly resolves the
circuit split on this issue and adopts an approach that comports with
the legislative intent of the ADEA. 7" The statutory language adopted
by Congress prohibits discrimination against "any individual . . . be-
cause of such individual's age."7 ' While limiting its protection to indi-
viduals over forty, the act says nothing about the age of the replace-
62 Id.
63 Id.
64
 O'Connor, 116 S. Ct. at 1310, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 489.
r's Id.
641 Id. (citing Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977)).
47 Id. (emphasis added).
68 Id.
1.'9 O'Connor, 116 S. Ct. at 1310, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 489,
7° See infra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
71 29 U.S.C. 4 623(a) (1) (1094).
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ment. 72 Further, Senator Davits, one of the sponsors of the ADEA,
explained that "if two individuals ages 52 and 42 apply for the same
job and the employer selected the man age 42 . . . because he is
younger than the man age 52, then he will have violated the act." 73
Lastly, a regulation promulgated by the EEOC, which as the primary
agency charged with implementing the ADEA is entitled to great def-
erence, expressly states that it is unlawful in situations where the act
applies "for an employer to discriminate in hiring or in any other way
by giving preference because of age between individuals forty and
over."74 The Court's decision in O'Connor supports these clarifications
of the legislative intent behind the ADEA by recognizing that age
discrimination can occur even where the favored employee is over
forty. 75
Prior to the Court's ruling, employers in the Fourth and Sixth
Circuits could potentially avoid liability under the ADEA merely by
replacing older workers with those that were at least forty years old. 76
Such actions would essentially subvert the congressional purpose of the
act. 77
 By rejecting the requirement of replacement from outside the
protected class, the Supreme Court's decision in O'Connor prevents
this inequitable and unintended result. 78 Furthermore, by suggesting
the alternative requirement of replacement by someone substantially
younger, the Court eliminates the possibility of baseless claims, such as
a claim based on the replacement of a sixty-eight-year-old by a sixty-
five-year-old. 79
Practitioners should be aware that this alternative requirement,
although phrased by the Court as a suggestion rather than a rule, will
likely become the required fourth element of a prima facie case in
all the circuits. 8° This "substantially younger" standard, while not the
72 See id. § 631(a); Brief Amid Curiae of the American Association of Retired Persons and
the National Employment Lawyers Association in Support of Petitioner at 16, O'Connor v.
Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 116 S. Ct. 1307 (1996) (No. 95-354) [hereinafter "Brier].
75 Brief, supra note 72, at 16-17 (citing 113 CLING. REC. 31,255 (1967)).
74 See Kralman v. Illinois Dep't of Veterans' Affairs, 23 F.3d 150, 155, 64 Fair Etnpl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1645, 1648 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)).
75 See. O'Connor, 116 S. Ct. at 1310, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 489.
7b See O'Connor, 56 F.3d at 546, (17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1862 (requiring plaintiffs
to demonstrate replacement by someone outside protected class); LaPointe v. United Autowork-
ers Local 600, 8 F.3d 376, 379, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 262. 264 (6th Cir. 1993) (same).
77 See Brief, supra note 72, at 18.
78 See O'Connor, 116 S. Ct. at 1310, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 489; Brief, .supra note
72, at 18.
79 See O'Connor, 116 S. Ct. at 1310. 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 489.
80
 See Denisi v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., 99 F.3d 860, 864 (7th Cir. 1996) ("An ADEA
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bright line urged by supporters of the Fourth Circuit rule, is nonethe-
less a workable standard which many circuits have either already em-
ployed or at the very least considered. 8 ' For example, the Kralman
court addressed the issue when it recognized there might be some
circumstances where the age differential between the plaintiff and the
favored employee are not sufficient to create a reasonable inference
of age discrimination. 82 Similarly, the Rinehart court specifically. sug-
gested that district courts might require the plaintiff to show replace-
ment by a person "sufficiently younger to permit an inference of age
discrimination."83
 Even the court in Loeb, on which the First Circuit
relied in Freeman in establishing its more relaxed standard, noted that
the probative value of evidence concerning the plaintiff's replacement
would depend on the plaintiff's own age and the age differential
between the plaintiff and her replacement." Thus, the Court's decision
should not dramatically affect the kinds of age discrimination claims
which now prevail in most circuits.85
In sum, the Supreme Court held in O'Connor that an age discrimi-
nation plaintiff is not required to demonstrate replacement by a per-
son outside the protected class of individuals forty and older to prevail
under the ADEA. 86
 Instead, the Court suggested the alternative re-
quirement that the replacement be substantially younger than the
plaintiff. 87
 Practitioners should be aware that this alternative standard
will likely become the required fourth element of a prima facie case
of age discrimination.' The Court's decision, however, should not
dramatically affect the types of age discrimination claims which prevail
in most circuits because many courts have already employed the sug-
gested standard, either expressly or in effect." It will, however, elimi-
plaintiff can show that be was replaced by someone 'substantially younger,' even if that replace-
ment is not outside the protected class.").
81 See infra notes 82-89 and accompanying text,
82 See 23 F.3d at 156, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1648-49; see also supra notes 15-23
and accompanying text.
88 See Rinehart v, City of Independence, 35 F.3d 1263, 1269, 65 Fair Ernpl. Prac. Cas. (MA)
1548, 1553 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 777, 65 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (RNA) 828, 835 (3d Cir. 1994)); see also supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
"Freeman v. Package Machinery Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1335 & n.2, 49 Fair Dupl. Prac. Gas.
(BNA) 1139, 1142 & n.2 (1st Cir. MS); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1013 11.9, 20 rail'
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 29, 36 11.9 (1st Cir. 1979); see also supra notes 8-14 and accompanying
text.
85 See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
82 O'Connor, 116 S. Ct. at 1310, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 489.
87 See id.
88 See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
82 See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
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nate baseless claims and re-align the prima facie case requirements in
the Fourth and Sixth Circuits with the intended protections of the
ADEA. 9°
III. EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT
A. *ERISA Section 502(a) (3) Authorizes a Private Cause of Action:
Varity Corp. v. Howe'
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA")
sets forth the civil remedies available to participants and beneficiaries
for ERISA or employee benefit plan violations. 2 Specifically, section 502
of ERISA identifies nine types of civil actions that may be brought by
various parties." While the federal courts agree that section 502 allows
a participant or a beneficiary to bring a civil action, the courts have
differed as to whether a participant or a beneficiary can recover indi-
vidually or whether recovery inures only to the plan.`'
In 1985, in Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, the
United States Supreme Court held that ERISA section 409(a), which
outlines the liability for a breach of fiduciary duty, did not authorize a
private cause of action under its remedial provision, section 502(a) (2),
for extracontractual damages caused by the improper and untimely
processing of a benefits claim. 5 The plaintiff in Russell sought compen-
satory and punitive damages for injuries sustained when the adminis-
9" See supra notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
* By Jessica S. Horrocks, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
I
 116 S. Ct. 1065, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2761 (1996).
2 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994). ERISA is found at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994). This note
cites to the 1994 edition of the U.S.C., rather than to the editions cited by the courts that decided
the cases discussed, because there have not been any amendments to ERISA that alter the
reasoning presented. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1132.
5 1d. § 1132(a).
-I See Vitrify, 116 S. Ct. at 1069, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2763-64; Ma.ssachusetts
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 140, 6 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1733, 1736 (1985);
see also 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) .
473 U.S. at 140, 148, 6 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1736, 174{}. ERISA section 409(a)
provides:
(a) Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any or the
responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this title shall be
personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from
each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which
have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be
subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropri-
ate, including removal of such fiduciary ....
March 1997]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 393
trator of her employee benefits plan breached its fiduciary duty by
wrongfully delaying payment of her benefits claim."
The Court reasoned that the text of section 409(a), when react in
the context of the statutorily defined duties of a fiduciary and rights
of a beneficiary, indicates Congress's intent that recovery from a vio-
lation of section 409(a) inure to the benefit of the plan as a whole, not
to an individual participant.' Because of the emphasis section 409(a)
places on "the plan," the Court concluded that Congress was actually
concerned with protecting the entire plan, not with the rights of indi-
vidual beneficiaries. 8
 Similarly, the Court reasoned that the duties of a
fiduciary described in the subsections of the statute stressed obligations
with respect to the plan as a whole, such as the management, admini-
stration and investment of fund assets.• Finally, although the Court
acknowledged that section 502(a) (1) (B) authorizes a beneficiary to
bring an action to enforce his or her rights under the terms of a plan,
it reasoned that nothing in that section or in section 502(a) (2) sup-
ported a private cause of action for extracontractual relief.'° Thus, the
Court held that a fiduciary breach, namely, an improper delay in
processing a claim for benefits, does not give rise to a private cause of
action for compensatory or punitive relief under section 502(a) (2). 11
In 1995, in McLeod v. Oregon Lithoprini Inc., the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied the rule in Russell to
another ERISA provision, holding that section 502(a) (3), which states
that a participant or beneficiary may obtain equitable relief for ER1SA
or plan violations, does not permit an individual to recover for a breach
of fiduciary duty.' 2 The plaintiff in McLeod sought compensatory dam-
29 U.S.C. 1109(a) (emphasis added). ERISA section 502(a) (2) allows a civil suit to he brought
by "the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary fiw appropriate relief under section
1409] of this title." Id. § 1132(a) (2) .
473 U.S. at 136-37, 6 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1734.
7
 Id. at 140, 6 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1736.
8 Id. at 140, 142, 6 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) al 1736-37.
9 Id. at 142-43, 6 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1737.
111 1d. at 144, 6 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1738. Section 502(a) (I) (B) states that a civil
action may be brought by Cm participant or a beneficiary "to recover benefits clue to him under
the terms of his plan, to enfo rce his rights under the terms of the plait, or to clarify his rights to
future benefits under the terms of the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1 I 32 (a) (1) (B).
II See Russell, 473 U.S. at 140, 144, 0 Employee Benefits Cas. (liNA) at 1736, 1738.
12 46 F.3d 956, 959-60, 18 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2851, 2854-55 (9th Cir. 1995), cert.
granted, 116 S. Ct. 1346, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2920 (1996) (judgment vacated and
case remanded to Ninth Circuit for further consideration in light of Varity, 116 S. Ct. 1065, 19
Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2761). Section 502(a)(3) states that an action may be brought:
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which
violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain
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ages, alleging that her ERISA plan administrator breached its fidu-
ciary duty by failing to notify her before she was diagnosed with cancer
that she could apply for cancer insurance." The court reasoned that
the Supreme Court in Russell implied that recovery from the viola-
tion of any of ERISA's provisions relating to fiduciary duties must inure
to the plan and not to individual participants." Thus, the court pre-
cluded the plaintiff from receiving compensatory relief under section
502(a) (3). 15
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit took a
different approach to ERISA section 502 (a) (3) in 1993, holding in
Bixler v. Central Pennsylvania Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund that the
"other appropriate equitable relief" clause of section 502(a) (3) allows
a private cause of action for a breach of a fiduciary duty.' 6 The plaintiff
in Bixler, whose deceased husband had participated in an employee
welfare benefit plan, sought to recover her husband's medical ex-
penses and death benefits.' 7 She claimed that her husband's employer
and the Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund ("Fund"), which jointly
administered the plan, wrongfully denied her husband medical cover-
age and misled her to believe that continuing coverage under the
Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act ("COBRA") was unavail-
able." The court reasoned that the Supreme Court's holding in Russell
was narrowly limited to sections 409(a) and 502 (a) (2) and therefore
did not apply to section 502(a) (3).'' The court further reasoned that
the language of section 502 (a) (3) and the fundamental purposes of
ERISA—to enforce fiduciary obligations and to promote the best in-
terests of participants—supported a private cause of action. 2° Hence,
the Third Circuit held that a plaintiff may bring an action for indi-
vidual recovery against an ERISA plan administrator under section
502 (a) (3) . 21
other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce
any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (3).
34 46 E3d at 957, 18 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2852.
14 Id. at 959, 18 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2854.
Id. at 960, 18 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2855.
See 12 E3d 1292, 1293-94, 17 Employee Benefits Cas. (RNA) 1934, 1935 (3d Cir. 1993);
see also 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (3).
17 12 [3d at 1294, 1296, 17 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1935, 1937.
18 See id. at 1294, 1296 & n.4, 17 Employee Benefits Cas. (RNA) at 1935, 1937 & n.4: see also
29 U.S.C. , 1161-68.
is Rixler, 12 F.3d at 1298, 17 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 1940.
24) /d. at 1299, 17 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1940-41.
11 /d. at 1299-1300, 17 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 1941.
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During the Survey year, in Varity Carp. V. Howe, the United States
Supreme Court resolved the conflict in the circuit courts regarding
section 502(a) (3) by holding that section 502(a) (3) authorizes plan
beneficiaries who are harmed by breaches of fiduciary obligations to
sue for individual relief. 22
 In reaching this decision, the Court first
decided two preliminary issues." First, the Court held that the Varity
Corporation ("Varity") was acting in its capacity as an ERISA fiduciary
when it misled its employees. 24
 Second, the Court held that by mislead-
ing the employees, Varity violated the fiduciary obligations that ERISA
imposes upon plan administrators."
The respondents in Varity were employees of Massey-Ferguson,
Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Varity, and they participated in
Massey-Ferguson's ERISA-protected employee welfare benefit plan." In
the mid-1980s, Massey-Ferguson was losing money.27 To remedy Massey-
Ferguson's poor financial health, Varity developed a plan that called
for the transfer of Massey-Ferguson's ailing divisions to Massey Com-
bines, a newly created Varity subsidiary." If Massey Combines failed, as
Varity expected, then all of Massey Combines' debts would be elimi-
nated, including its obligation to pay medical and other non-pension
benefits to employees of Massey-Ferguson's money-losing divisions. 2"
Rather than exercise its right to terminate the employees' benefits
immediately, Varity tried to convince the failing divisions' employees
to transfer their employment to Massey Combines, thereby releasing
Massey-Ferguson from its promise to provide benefits:4°
Varity held a special meeting to persuade Massey-Ferguson em-
ployees to accept the change of employment:" At the meeting, the
employees received infbrmation about Massey Combines' viability and
about the security of their benefits. 32
 Varity assured the employees that
22 116 S. Ct. 1065, 1008, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (RNA) 2761, 2762 (1996).
23 Id.
Id.
25 Id. The Court did not review the lower courts' findings that Vanity did in fact mislead the
employees. See id.
25 Id.
27
	 Vaeity, 116 S. Ct. at 1068, 19 Employee Benefits Gas. (RNA) at 2762.
See id.
2" See id. at 1068. 1069, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (RNA) at 2762, 2763,
" See id. at 1068-69, 19 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 2762-63.
11 See id. at 1069, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2763.
:12 See Vitrify, 116 S. Ct. at 1069, 1071-72, 19 Employee Benefits Gas. (RNA) at 2763, 2765-67.
The employees watched a video message from the new president of Massey Combines. See id.
They also received four documents: a Comparison of the benefits offered by the two subsidiaries;
a question-and-answer sheet discussing, in part, benefits; a transcript of the video; and a cover
letter with an acceptance form. See id.
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if they transferred to Massey Combines, they would continue to receive
benefits."
As a result of this meeting, about 1500 Massey-Ferguson employees
agreed to transfer employment. 34 Two years later, Massey Combines
went into receivership and its employees lost their non-pension bene-
fits. 35 The employees sued to recover the benefits Massey-Ferguson
would have paid them had they not transferred to Massey Combines. 36
In analyzing the employees' claim in varity, the Court addressed
three issues." The first issue was whether Varity was acting as a plan
administrator when it induced the employees to switch employers. 38
Because the Court held that Varity was acting as an administrator, the
Court then addressed the issue of whether Varity violated any of its
fiduciary obligations to the employees:39 The final issue was whether
section 502(a) (3) of ERISA authorized a private cause of action for a
breach of fiduciary duty:'''
As to the first. issue, the Court held that Varity was acting as an
administrator when it. misled employees at the special meeting." Ap-
plying section 3(21)(A) of ERISA, the Court reasoned that Varity's
conduct at the meeting constituted an exercise of discretionary author-
ity regarding the plan's management or administration because Van-
ity's intention was to convey the message that the employees' benefits
were secure:1' The Court further reasoned that Varity's acts were plan-
related, and thus Varity acted as a fiduciary, because Varity offered the
employees information to help them decide whether to remain with
the plan. 43
 Finally, the Court concluded that Varity acted as a fiduciary
because people within the company who had the authority to commu-
nicate as plan fiduciaries with beneficiaries offered the information to
the employees:"
33 See id. at 1072, tO Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2767.
31 See id. at 1069, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2763.
:o See id.
36
 See id.
37 116 S. Ct. at 1068. 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2762.
38 See id.
sr Id.
See id.
' 11 Id. at 1072, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2767.
42 Van'ty, 116 S. Ct. at 1071, 1072, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2765, 2767. In relevant
part, section 3(21) (A) says that a person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent that
he or she exercises any discretionary control respecting management of the plan or has any
discretionary authority in the administration of the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (A) (1994).
13 Wilily, 116 S. Ct. at 1073, 19 Employee Benefits Gas. (INA) at 2767.
Id.
March 1997]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 397
As to the second issue, the Court held that Varity had violated
its fiduciary obligations. 45
 The Court applied section 404(a), which
charges a fiduciary with the duty to act "solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries," and reasoned that Varity did not act in
the sole interest of the employees.'"' Instead, Varity sought to save
money at the employees' expenseJ 7
Finally, the Supreme Court turned to the major issue in the case,
holding that section 502(a) (3) permits a private cause of action for a
breach of a fiduciary duty. 48
 The Court used a four-part analysis in
coming to this concIusion. 4" First, the Court reasoned that. Russell did
not control the outcome of the case because the Russell Court limited
its holding, which denied a private cause . of action, to section 409. 5"
The plaintiff in Russell sued under ERISA section 502(a) (2), which is
different from the section at issue in Varity. 51
 In addition, the Court
noted that another remedial provision was available to the plaintiff in
Russell.52
 The Court explained that she could have properly sued under
section 502(a) (.1), which provides for specific relief for the wrongful
denial of benefits." The individual employees in lint, however, could
not have sued under section 502(a) (1) because, given that they were
no longer members of the Massey-Ferguson plan, there were no bene-
fits due to them." Thus, there was no other remedial provision that
would have provided the employees in Varity relief. 55
In the second part of the Court's analysis, it considered the plain
language of section 502(a) (3). 5" The Court reasoned that the "appro-
priate equitable relief" clause of section 502(a) (3) was broad enough
to include individual relief for the breach of a fiduciary obligation. 57
In addition, the Court reasoned that section 502(a) (3) seeks to redress
"any act or practice which violates any provision of this title," and thus
45
 Id. at 1074, 19 Employee Benefits Gas. (RNA) at 2769.
46 M.; see 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1).
47 See Varity. 116 S. Ct. at 1074, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (RNA) at 2769.
46
 Id. at 1075, 1076, 19 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 2769-70, 2771,
' 19 hl. at 1076-78, 19 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 2771-.72.
5{1 1d. at 1076, 19 Employee Benefits Gas. (IINA) at 2771 (citing generally to Massachusetts
Mut. Life his. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 6 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1733 (1985)).
51 See id.; supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text. Vality addresses section 502(a) (3), which,
unlike section 502(a) (2), does not reference section 409. See id.
52
 VerIty, 116 S. Ct. in 1076, 19 Employee Benefits Gas. (RNA) at 2771.
53 See id.
51 See 61, at 1079, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (RNA) at 2774.
53
 See id,
54'14. at 1076, 19 Employee Benefits Gas. (liNA) at 2771,
57 limity, 116 S. Ct. at 1076, 19 Employee Benefits Gas. (RNA) at 2771; see 29 U.S.G.
§ 1132(a)(3) (1994).
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Congress did not intend for sections 409 and 502(a) (2) to be the only
subsections that addressed liability for breaches of fiduciary duties."
Last, the Court noted that a 1989 amendment to section 502 uses the
amount a court orders a fiduciary to pay "to a plan or its participants
and beneficiaries" to calculate a certain civil penalty under section
502(a) (5)."9 Because section 502(a) (5) is nearly identical to section
502(a) (3), the Court decided that Congress must have intended sec-
tion 502(a) (3) to allow for individual recovery as wel1. 60
The third step in the Court's analysis considered the statute's
overall structure."' The Court reasoned that the remedies in section
409, which are referenced by section 502(a) (2), do not limit the reme-
dies available under section 502(a) (3)." 2 The Court further reasoned
that section 409 reflects congressional concern about plan asset man-
agement, but was not intended to be the exclusive set of remedies for
a fiduciary breach." According to the Supreme Court, fiduciaries have
more duties under ERISA than just asset management, and therefore
Congress included section 502(a) (3) as a "catchall" remedial section
to provide remedies for other kinds of fiduciary breaches."
In the fourth part of its inquiry, the VarityCourt examined ERISA's
basic purpose."" ERISA section 2(b) says that the statute seeks "to
protect . . . the interests of participants ... and . . . beneficiaries .. .
by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for
fiduciaries . . . and ... providing for appropriate remedies . . . and
ready access to the Federal courts.""" The Court reasoned that given
this stated purpose, Congress did not intend to deny a remedy to
individuals when their employers breached their fiduciary duties. 67
Justice Thomas, in an opinion joined by Justices O'Connor and
Scalia, dissented in Varity.68 They argued that Congress intended to
allow suits for breach of fiduciary duty exclusively under sections 409
Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1076, 19 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 2771 (emphasis added); see
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (3).
59 Varity, 116 S. CA. at 1076-77, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) a( 2771; see 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(/)(2)(11).
Vraily, 116 S. Ct. at 1076-77, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2771; see 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(/)(2)(B).
Varily, 116 S. Ct. at 1077, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2771.
62 M, at 1077, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2771-72.
65 Id. at 1077, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2772.
61 Id, at 1077-78, 19 Employee Benefits Cwt. (RNA) at 2772.
65 Id, at 1078, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2772.
66 See Vast, 116 S. Ct. at 1078, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2772 (quoting 29 U.S.C.
§ 1001(b) (1994)).
67 M. at 1078, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2773; see 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
68 116 S. Ct. at 1079, 19 Employee Benefits Gas. (RNA) at 2774 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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and 502(a) (2), and to authorize relief only on behalf of the plan.'''
Because section 502(a) (2) specifically deals with breaches of fidu-
ciary duties by referencing section 409, the dissent argued that sec-
tion 502(a) (3) must not address fiduciary breaches because it does
not reference section 409. 71' According to the dissent, by holding that
section 502(a) (3) does address fiduciary breaches, the majority vio-
lated the rule of statutory construction that courts should not interpret
statutes in such a way as to render language superfluous."' In addition,
given the completeness of' the statute, the dissent noted that if Con-
gress had intended for individual relief they would have made their
intention clear in sections 409 and 502(a) (2)72
Finally, the dissent accused the majority of not following Russell as
precedent." The dissent wrote that the Russell Court's holding that
there was no private cause of action is not limited to sections 409 and
502(a) (2) because it was based on a contextual reading of the entire
statute. 74 The emphasis in section 409 on "the plan," the dissent noted,
was important to the Russell Court in determining that Congress in-
tended for relief to inure to the plan and not to individual plaintiffs."
The Varity dissent argued that the Court should have similarly con-
cluded that Congress did not intend to provide for individual relief
under section 502(a) (3) because section 404, under which the Varity
employees sued, also stresses "the plan."'" The dissent pointed out that
the Russell Court even cited section 404 to support its conclusion that
Congress was primarily concerned with plan rights, and not with indi-
vidual rights, when drafting ERISA."
The dissenters also asserted that Varity did not act as a fiduciary
and thus did not breach any fiduciary duty.'" According to the dissent,
Varity's executives did not act as plan administrators, but rather as
employers, because all they (lid at the special meeting was make rep-
resentations about Massey Combines' financial prospects and the im-
I") Id. at 1079, 1081, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) ai 2774, 2779 (Thomas, J., dissenting),
7° Id. at 1081-82, 19 Employee Benefits Gas, (BNA) at 2776 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
71 Id. at 1082, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2777 (Thomas, .1., dissenting).
72 Id. at 1081-82, 19 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 2776 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1082, 19 Employee Benefits Cas, (BNA) at 2777 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
71 1d. at 1083, 19 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 2777-78 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see.
Russell, 473 U.S. at 140, 148, 6 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 1736, 1740.
75
 See. Vanity, t 16 S. Ct. at 1083, 19 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 2778 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
76 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
77 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Russell, 473 U.S. at 142-43 & n.10, 6 Employee Benefits
Gas. (RNA) at 1737-38 &
78 Id. at 1084, 1088, 19 Employee Benefits Gas, (RNA) at 2779, 2783 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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pact of an ordinary business transaction on the security of the employ-
ees' benefits.'" In fact, the dissent argued that these are the types of
representations employers regularly make in the course of running a
business.8° Just because the performance of the company did not live
up to the predictions made, the dissent argued, non-fiduciary repre-
sentations should not be transformed into fiduciary representations. 81
The Court's decision in Vanity, though perhaps well-reasoned, may
have the practical effect of raising the cost of employee welfare benefit
plans, thus discouraging employers from offering them. 82 Before Varity,
a plan participant could sue individually for a wrongful denial of
benefits, but courts allowed a plan administrator some discretion in
his or her determination that a plan participant was ineligible for
certain benefits." After Varity, a plan participant may sue individually
for a breach of fiduciary duty, allowing him or her to hold the plan
administrator to a more rigid level of conduct. 84 Because the partici-
pant might convert his or her "denial of benefits" claim into a claim
for "breach of fiduciary duty," the plan administrator will tend to pay
these benefits instead of preserving plan assets."-`' Thus, the administra-
tor will lose his or her discretion to deny questionable and expensive
benefits and, as a result, the cost of the plan will increase. 88
The Vitrity Court sought to appease this concern by stressing that
a fiduciary obligation does not favor granting a requested benefit over
denying it. 87 In addition, a participant's characterization of a "denial
of benefits" claim as a "breach of fiduciary duty" claim does not mean
that the courts must apply the more rigid standard.88 Finally, because
section 502(a) (3) authorizes appropriate equitable relief, the courts
can exercise their discretion in determining what relief, if any, is
appropriate."
The Court did not, however, articulate a standard to be applied
by the lower courts in determining when a claim for a breach of
fiduciary duty should really be evaluated as a claim for denial of
79 Id. at 1088, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2783 (Thomas,,]., dissenting).
H0 tinily, 116 S. Ct. at 1088, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (RNA) at 2783 (Thomas. J., dissenting).
81 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
82 See id. at 1078. 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2773; id. at 1090-91, 19 Employee
Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2786 (Thomas, J„ dissenting).
83 ,5ee a at 1078, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2773.
8.1 See id.
85 See Vint, 116 S. Ct. at 1078, 19 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 2773.
8'1 See id.
87 See id.
See id. at 1079. 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2773.
"See id. at 1079, 19 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 2773-74.
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benefits.'" It also did not provide the courts with any guidelines as to
what constitutes appropriate equitable relief."' The resolution of these
issues is likely to at least heighten litigation costs borne by employers
and may therefore reduce the amount of plan benefits available to
employees."'
In summary, Varity resolved the conflict among the circuit courts
as to whether ERISA section 502(a) (3) authorizes a private cause of
action." The Supreme Court held that section 502(a) (3) allows plan
beneficiaries who are harmed by breaches of fiduciary obligations to
sue for individual relief.'" The Court, however, provided little guidance
as to how the lower courts should balance the need to protect partici-
pants' benefits with the need for sensible plan administration."
B. *No ERISA Violation for Payment. of Increased Retirement Benefits
in Exchange for Early Retirement and Waiver of Employment
Claims: Lockheed Corp. v. Spinkl
Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 ("ERISA") in part to protect employee benefits from employer
mishandling.' Congress enacted section 406 of ERISA to bar a fiduciary
of a pension plan from engaging in any transaction that is likely to
injure the plan. 3 Specifically, section 406 prohibits fiduciaries from
using any assets of the plan for the benefit of a party in interest.' In
1986, Congress provided further protections to employees by amend-
ing ERISA to bar age-based discrimination against employees in terms
of benefit plans.'
In 1993, in Commissioner v. Keystone Consolidated Industries, Inc.,
the United States Supreme Court held that an employer's contribution
of unencumbered real estate to its pension plan was a prohibited sale
9" See Vitrify, 116 S. Ct. at 1079, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2773-74.
91 See id.
92 See id. at 1090-91, 19 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 2786 ('Thomas,,)., dissenting).
93 Id. at 1069, 19 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 2763.
91 id. at 1068, 19 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 2762.
See. rarity, 116 S. Ct. at 1078-79, 1090-91, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2773-74,
2786 (Thomas,,)., dissenting).
* By Elizabeth C. Franzosa, Staff Member, BusToN Cor1,E6F; LAW REVIEW.
1 116 S, Ct. 1783, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1257 (1996).
2 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1985 & Stipp. 1996); see Lockheed, 116 S. Ct. at 1788, 20 Employee
Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1259.
11 29 U.S.C. § 1106; see Lockheed, 116 S. Ct. al 1788, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1259.
See Lockheed, 116 S. Ct. at 1790, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1261.
5 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(2); see Lockheed, 116 S. Ct. at 1787, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA)
at 1258.
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or exchange under ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code ("Code")
where the employer used the property to satisfy its minimum contri-
bution obligations. 6 In Keystone, the employer contributed unencum-
bered real estate valued at almost $15 million to its pension trust.' The
employer credited the value of the real estate toward its minimum
funding obligation to the trust.sThe employer also claimed deductions
on its federal income tax returns for the fair market value of the
property and capital gains on the property, thus treating the contribu-
tion of the property to the pension trust as a "sale or exchange" for
income tax purposes. 9 The petitioner, the Commissioner of the Inter-
nal Revenue Service, claimed the transfers of the property to the
pension trust were sales or exchanges prohibited by section 4975 of
the Code ("section 4975"), creating tax liability for the respondent.'"
In deciding that the transfers were sales or exchanges, the Su-
preme Court reasoned that Congress intended section 4975 to bar
transactions likely to injure pension plans." This intent, the Court
reasoned, is evident in the fact that section 4975 was among those
provisions Congress enacted in response to pension plan abuses that
threatened the security of the plans. 12 The Court reasoned that Con-
gress intended section 4975, like section 406 of ERISA, to protect the
security of pension plans." Because the transfer of property to a pen-
sion plan had the potential to burden that plan, even when the prop-
erty is unencumbered, the Court reasoned that Congress intended to
prohibit such a transaction." Thus, the Court held that the employer's
contribution of unencumbered real estate to its pension plan was a
prohibited transaction under ERISA and the Code."
In 1994, in Johnson v. Georgia -Pacific Carp., the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that an employer did not vio-
late its fiduciary duties to retirees under ERISA by amending its retire-
ment plan to increase benefits to current employees."' In Johnson, the
Great Northern Nekoosa Corporation ("GNN") unsuccessfully tried to
' 1 508 U.S. 152, 161-62, 16 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) 2121, 2125 (1993).
7 Id. at 154-55, 16 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 2122.
a See id. at 155, 16 Employee Benefits Gas. (RNA) at 2122.
See id.
L° See, id. at 156, 16 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2122; see also 26 U.S.C. § 4975(e) (1980).
11 Ktysione, 508 U.S. at 160, 16 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2124.
12 Id. One example of a pension plan abuse was a sponsor's sale of property to a plan at an
inflated price. See id.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 162, 16 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2125.
15 M. at 161-62, 16 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2125.
19 E3d 1184, 1190, 18 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1218, 1224 (7th Cir. 1994).
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resist a takeover bid by the Georgia-Pacific Corporation ("Georgia-
Pacific") by altering its pension plan to make the takeover less aurae-
tive. 17
 GNN amended the plan by increasing benefits to current em-
ployees in order to exhaust the plan's substantial surplus, thus forcing
Georgia-Pacific to contribute to the plan should it take over GNN. 18
The plaintiffs in Johnson were retired GNN employees who claimed
they were also entitled to increased benefits because their plan con-
tributions created the surplus.'" The plaintiffs sued Georgia-Pacific,
GNN's successor, claiming that GNN violated its fiduciary duties under
ERISA by amending the plan. 2°
The Johnson court implicitly reasoned that because GNN was not
acting as a fiduciary when it amended and implemented the plan, it
did not violate its fiduciary duties to the retired employees. 21 The
Seventh Circuit looked at the plain language of ERISA and stated that
ERISA's definition of "fiduciary duties" did not include the estab-
lishment or amendment of a pension plan. 22 The court also rejected
the plaintiffs' argument that using the surplus to pay increased benefits
amounted to "disposing" of the plan's assets within the meaning of
section 1002(21) (A) (i) of ER1SA.23
 The word "disposition," the court
stated, referred to selling, exchanging or transferring assets of the plan
and not to paying out benefits. 24
 Thus, the Seventh Circuit held that
GNN did not violate its fiduciary duties under ERISA by amending its
pension plan to increase benefits to future retirees. 25
In 1995, in Curtiss- Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, the United States
Supreme Court held that an employer's reservation of the right to
amend its pension plan satisfied section 402 (b) (3) of ERISA. 2" Section
17
 Id. at 1185, 18 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1218.
u1 See id. at 1185, 18 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 1219.
1 •/d. at 1186, 18 Employee Benefits Cas. (RNA) at 1219.
2° See id.
21 See Johnson, 19 F.3d at 1188, 18 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1222.
22 Id. ER1SA states, in pertinent part:
[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any
discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management to such
plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of
its assets, (ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct
or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any
authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or
discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1996).
213Johnson, 19 F.3d at 1188-89, 18 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1222.
2 ' 1 /d. at 1189, 18 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1222.
25 Id. at 1190, 18 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1224.
20 115 S. Ct. 1223, 1226, 18 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2841, 2841 (1995).
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402 (b) (3) requires that every employee benefit plan provide both an
amendment procedure and a procedure for identifying those persons
who may amend the plan. 27 The employer in Curtiss-Wright maintained
a post-retirement health care benefits plan for employees. 28 The plan
included a provision allowing the employer to amend the plan at any
time. 2" The employer amended its health benefits plan by adding a
clause providing for the cancellation of health care benefits for retirees
"upon the termination of the facility from which they retired."" The
plaintiffs in Curtiss-Wright were those retirees whose health care bene-
fits were terminated as a result of a subsequent plant closure. 31
 The
plaintiffs claimed that the new provision constituted an amendment to
the benefits plan, that the defendant did not have a proper amend-
ment procedure in place as required by ERISA section 402(b) (3) and
thus, that the cancellation provision should be declared void. 32
The Supreme Court in Curtiss-Wright reasoned that employers are
generally free to modify welfare benefits plans at any time and for any
reason, thus, the plaintiffs would only have a cognizable claim if the
defendant amended the plan in a manner barred by ERISA.ss The
Court then looked to the plain language of section 402(b) (3) and
determined that ERISA merely requires procedures for amending a
plan and for identifying those people with authority to amend the
plan.'" The Court reasoned that the employer's reservation clause
actually outlined substantial procedures for amendment and for iden-
tifying those with authority to amend. 35 Because section 402(b) (3) does
not require any specificity in these procedural provisions, the Court
held that the employer's provision did not violate ERISA. 3t'
In 1996, in Varity Corp. v. Howe, the United States Supreme Court
held that an employer breached its fiduciary duty under ERISA by
intentionally misrepresenting to its employees the future of plan bene-
fits in connection with plans to restructure the corporation." In Varity,
the appellant corporation ("Varity") induced employees of its finan-
cially unstable division, Massey-Ferguson, to switch to a newly created
27 Id.
28 hi. at 1227, 18 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2841.
29 See id. at 1226, 18 Employee Benelits Cas. (BNA) at 2841.
See id. at 1227, 18 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2842.
91 115 S. Ct. at 1227, 18 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at '2842.
32 See id.
99 Id. at. 1228, 18 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2843.
91 Id.
:e Id. at. 1228-29, 18 Employee Benefils Cas. (BNA) at 2844.
36 Curtiss- Wright, 115 S. CL at 1226, 1229, 18 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2841, 2844-45.
37 116 S. Ct. 1065, 1074, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2761, 2769 (1996).
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division, Massey Combines, which would release Massey-Ferguson from
its obligation to provide benefits. 38 Varity told Massey-Ferguson employ-
ees their benefits would remain secure if they voluntarily transferred
to Massey Combines." Varity also told employees that the financial
outlook for Massey Combines was bright." This assurance, however,
was false, as Massey Combines was insolvent from the day of its crea-
tion:I' In Varity, the plaintiffs were employees who voluntarily switched
to Massey Combines and lost their non-pension benefits when the
division ended its second year in receivership. 42
The plaintiffs sued the plan's administrator, seeking the benefits
they would have been owed under their old plan had they not trans-
ferred." The Supreme Court in Varity held that the appellant corpo-
ration was acting as a plan administrator when it intentionally misled
employees about the security of their benefits. 44
 The Court concluded
that the employer was acting as a fiduciary because plan administration
falls within ERISA's definition of a fiduciary's duties." The Varity  Court
distinguished an employer making statements to employees about its
financial future, which would not invoke ERISA's fiduciary duties, from
an employer deliberately tying such statements to the future security
of benefits in order to create a misleading impression." The Court held
that the latter is not beyond the scope of plan administration. 47 The
Court reasoned that misrepresenting the security of benefits to employ-
ees "is inconsistent with the duty of loyalty owed by all fiduciaries
and codified in section 404(a) (1) of ERISA."" Thus, the Varity Court
held that the employer violated its fiduciary duties under ERISA when
it amended its pension plan and induced employees to switch em-
ployers:19
During the Survey year, in Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, the United
States Supreme Court held that the payment of benefits pursuant to
" Id. at 1068-69, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2762-63.
39 See id. at 1069, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2763.
4o See.
41 See id.
42 I Id S. Ct. at 1069, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2763.
" Sea id.
44 /d. at 1074, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2769.
45 1d. at 1073, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2768.
44i Id. at 1074, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2768-69.
17
 tivity, 116 S. CA, at 1074, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2769.
at 1074-75, l9 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2769 (citing Peoria Union Sloth Yards
Co. v. Penn Mut. Lift Ins. Co., 698 F.2d 320, 326, 3 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2590 (7th Cir.
1983)).
49 Id. at 1074, 19 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 2769.
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an early retirement program was not a prohibited transaction under
section 406(a) (1) (D) of ERISA where the employer conditioned pay-
ment on the participants' release of employment claims against the
employer." The Supreme Court also held that an employer's amend-
ment of its benefits plan did not violate section 406(a) of ERISA. 5 t
Finally, the Court held that sections 9201 and 9202 of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 ("OBRA"), which amended ERISA
to prohibit age-based discrimination in pension plans, applies prospec-
tively rather than retroactively. 52
In Lockheed, the petitioner Lockheed Corporation ("Lockheed")
employed the respondent, Paul Spink ("Spink"), in 1979." At that
time, the terms of the Lockheed Retirement Plan for Certain Salaried
Individuals ("the plan") barred employees over the age of sixty from
participation." ERISA expressly permitted such terms in 1979. 55 Spink
was sixty-one years old when Lockheed hired him and, thus, was ineli-
gible to participate in the plan. 56
In 1986, Congress enacted sections 9201 to 9203 of OBRA, amend-
ing ERISA and barring employers from ceasing benefit accruals, re-
ducing benefit accrual rates or excluding employees from pension
plans based on age. 57 Lockheed complied with the new laws by allowing
all employees to participate in the plan regardless of age beginning
December 25, 1988. 58 Lockheed did not, however, credit employees like
Spink for their years of service prior to December 25, 1988. 59
In an attempt to streamline operations, Lockheed later amended
the plan by developing two programs to induce certain employees to
retire early!" Both programs offered increased pension benefits, pay-
able out of the plan's surplus assets, to those employees who chose
to retire early!" Under both plans, Lockheed required the retirees
to waive any possible employment-related claims against Lockheed."
Spink was qualified to participate in one of the early retirement plans
"116 S. Ct. 1783, 1788, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1252, 1259 (1996).
51 Id. at 1790, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 126I.
TO Id. at 1792, 20 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 1264.
" Id. at 1787, 20 Employee Benefits Gas, (BNA) at 1258.
51
 See id.
" See Lockheed, 116 S. Ct. at 1787, 20 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 1258.
5" See id.
57 See id.
58
 See id.
59
 See id.
6" See. Lockheed, 116 S. Ct. at 1787, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1258.
61 See id.
"2
 See id.
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but refused to waive his claims and, thus, was ineligible for the in-
creased benefits." Spink then retired and sued both Lockheed and
members of its Retirement Committee, alleging violations of section
406(a) (1) (D) of ERISA and claiming that the OBRA amendments to
ERISA required Lockheed to count his years of service prior to 1988
toward his accrued pension benefits."
In holding that Lockheed did not violate section 406(a) (1) (D) by
amending the plan, the Court followed the reasoning of Johnson and
looked at ERISA's definitions of "fiduciary duties.""5 The Court rea-
soned that the plain language of the statute makes clear that only a
fiduciary can violate section 406(a).'"' Thus, the Court explained, un-
less Lockheed was acting as a fiduciary when it amended the retire-
ment plan to create the early retirement incentives, Lockheed could
not have violated section 406(a) (1)(D) of ERISA. 67 In determining
whether Lockheed acted as a fiduciary, the Court reasoned that be-
cause ERISA's definition of fiduciary duties does not include the de-
sign of a pension plan, Lockheed was not acting as a fiduciary when it
amended its plan."8 Instead, the Court reasoned, Lockheed's actions
were analogous to those of a settlor of a trust. 69 The Court followed
the reasoning of Johnson, which noted that while seniors do have
fiduciary duties, those are not the same duties contemplated by the
pertinent sections of ERISA. 7" Drawing on the reasoning of both Varity
and Curtiss-Wright, the Court noted that the mere act of amending a
pension plan does not trigger ERISA's fiduciary provisions. 71 Thus,
Lockheed could not have violated section 406(a) solely by amending
the pension plan.72
The Court further held that Lockheed's Retirement Committee
did not violate section 406(a) ( I ) (D) by paying out the increased re-
tirement benefits." The Court did not reach the issue of whether or
not the Committee was acting as a fiduciary, but held that the act of
payment itself was not a prohibited transaction within the meaning of
63 See id.
64 See id.
65 Lockheed, 116 S. Ct. at 1789, 20 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 1260.
66 Id. at 1788-89, 20 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 1260.
671d .
66 Id. at 1789, 20 Employee Benefits Gas. (RNA) at 1260-61,
69 Id. at 1789, 20 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 1260.
71 Lockheed, 116 S. Ct. at 1789, 20 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 1260.
71 See id, at 1789, 20 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 1260-61.
72 See id. at 1790, 20 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 1261.
73 Id. at 1792, 20 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 1263.
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the pertinent section of ERISA. 74 The Court set forth a two-pronged
analysis and examined both the nature of the prohibited transactions
contemplated by section 406(a) (1) (D) and the nature of the benefit
Lockheed received in the bargain. 75 The Court again looked at the
plain language of ERISA and noted that section 406(a) does not
include the payment of benefits as a prohibited transaction. 76 Instead,
the Court noted, the statute names transactions which have the poten-
tial to threaten the security of a pension plan, such as sales, exchanges
or leases of property. 77 The Court reasoned that the payment of bene-
fits to retirees, unlike the prohibited transactions listed in section
406(a) (1) (D), was not likely to jeopardize the security of the plan and
therefore ERISA did not reach such a transaction. 78 In applying the
facts of Lockheed to the second prong of the Court's analysis, the Court
stated that the benefit. Lockheed received by obtaining claim waivers
from retirees was indistinguishable from benefits that plan sponsors
may legally receive in exchange for operating a pension plan. 79 Thus,
the Court held that the payment of increased benefits to retirees in
exchange for waivers of claims was not a prohibited transaction within
the meaning of section 406(a) ( )(D)."
While concurring in most of the Court's judgment, Justice Breyer
dissented on the issue of whether Lockheed's action was prohibited by
section 406(x) (1) (D). 81 In particular, justice Breyer disagreed with the
majority's broad holding that a transaction is not prohibited by ERISA
"regardless of what the plan requires of the employee in return for .
benefits."82 Justice Breyer argued that the Court should not have even
addressed this issue because of its complex legal nature.83 Instead,
Justice Breyer stated, the Court should have followed the recommen-
dation of the Solicitor General and allowed the issue to be further
71 Id.
75 Lockheed, 116 S. Ct. at 1790-91, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1261-62.
76 Id. at 1790-91, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at. 1262.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 1791, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1262.
78 Id. Among the legitimate benefits a plan sponsor may receive are retaining employees,
paying deferred compensation without increasing wages, increasing employee turnover and
reducing the likelihood of' lawsuits by inducing employees who would have been laid ofT to
voluntarily retire. M.
8° Lockheed, 110 S. Ct. at 1792, 20 Employee Benefits Cas, (RNA) at 1263.
at Id. at 1793, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1264 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
"Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
83 Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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developed in the lower courts before making such a broad pronounce-
In e n L 8.1
Finally, although the Court in Lockheed did not find an ERISA
violation, it went on to address the issue of whether the OBRA amend-
ments should be applied retroactively."`' The Court first determined
that the OBRA amendments not only barred age discrimination in
terms of plan participation, but also in terms of benefit accrual rates." 6
The Court then rejected the reasoning of the lower court., which held
that the OBRA amendments should apply retroactively because exclud-
ing an employee from plan participation would effectively reduce that
employee's benefit accrual rate."? The Court stated that; where Con-
gress has included a provision specifically addressing the temporal
effects of a statute, that language "trumps any general inferences that
might be drawn from the substantive provisions of the statute.'" Thus,
the Court reasoned, the mere fact that an employee's pension benefits
would accrue at a lesser rate because of the employee's earlier exclu-
sion from a plan was legally irrelevant."" Because the OBRA amend-
ments include a specific temporal provision, the Court held that the
amendments must be applied prospectively rather than retroactively.''
In holding that Lockheed did not violate section 406(0( 1)(D),
the Supreme Court seemed to place emphasis on whether the transac-
tion at issue had potential to injure the pension fund.'" The Court
relied on Keystone, which noted that Congress intended for ERISA to
protect employee benefits plans and thus, employees." 2 The effect of
Lockheed, however, may be that employers enjoy greater protection
under ERISA than employees." Indeed, due to the Court's broad
holding, employers may now have free reign to induce employees to
give up legal claims and more in exchange for increased retirement
benefits.•' While the Court termed Lockheed's action a "quid pro quo"
H4 hi, (Breyer, j., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
45 Lockheed, 116 S. Ct. at 1792, 20 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 1203.
Id. at 1787, 20 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 1258.
(rd. at 1792-93, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1264.
48 Id. at 1793, 20 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 1264. Section 9203(a) (1) of OBRA states
that employers may not exclude employees from plan participation based on age "only With
respect to plan years beginning on or after January 1, 1988." 29 U.S.C. § 1052, note (1996).
89 Lockheed, 116 S. Ct. at 1793, 20 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 1264.
90 Id. at 1702, 20 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 1264.
91 See id. at 1790-91, 20 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 1262.
92 See id. at 1788, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1259; Commissioner v. Keystone
Consolidated Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 152, 160, 16 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2121, 2124 (1993).
93
 See Lockheed, 116 S. Ct. at 1792, 20 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 1263.
91
 See id.
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that is indistinguishable from legitimate benefits employers may re-
ceive in exchange for operating pension plans, such an exchange is
fundamentally different because employees are required to relinquish
a legal right. 95 Thus, the Court has actually given employers more
power to insulate themselves from lawsuits and has taken power from
employees in an era of increased downsizing and decreased employ-
ment security.96 In granting employers this power, the Court may have
opened the door to a flood of employer actions involving pension
plans that have potential to injure employees, but leave the pension
plans intact.97 Under Lockheed, as long as the pension plan itself is not
jeopardized it appears an employer can escape liability under section
406(a) (1) (D) despite putting employees at risk. 98
Indeed, as Justice Breyer argued in his dissent in Lockheed, the
Court should never have reached the issue of whether Lockheed's
action was a prohibited transaction within the meaning of section
406(a) (1) (D) . 99 The Court probably could have analyzed the Lockheed
Retirement Committee's liability by first addressing its fiduciary status,
rather than determining whether the transaction itself was prohibited,
and reached the same result.im Justice Breyer specifically took issue
with the majority's broad wording of its holding "that the payment of
benefits pursuant to an amended plan, regardless of what the plan
requires of the employee in return for those benefits, does not constitute a
prohibited transaction."'°' Thus, a majority of the Court appears to be
sending a message to employers that they have a great deal of freedom
in amending pension plans and controlling employee choices by using
their benefits plans as bargaining chips.'" While noting that Congress
intended the statute to protect employee benefits plans, and thus
employees, the Court interpreted Congress's words to protect the em-
ployer instead. 10 "
On the other hand, the Court strictly interpreted Congress's lan-
guage when it held that the OBRA amendments applied prospec-
L6 See id. at 1791-92, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1262-63.
96 See id. at 1792, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1263; see also Downsizing—The Toll
Keeps Going Up, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 30, 1993, at 16.
See Lockheed, 116 S. Ct. at 1792, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1263.
Id.
99 Id. at 1793, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1264 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
'°° See id. at 1792, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1263.
11 See id. at 1793, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1264 (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
ilr2 See Lockheed, 116 S. Ct. at 1792, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1263.
1U3
 See id. at 1788, 1792, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1259, 1263.
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tively.'" Although the Court's holding on this issue advantages the
employer rather than the employees, this was clearly what Congress
intended.'"' Where Congress has explicitly laid out its intentions, there
is no need for further judicial interpretation.'" Furthermore, the
Court's holding is correct because it is likely to discourage litigation
not only regarding the OBRA amendments, but also regarding other
statutes that include similar explicit temporal provisions."" When Con-
gress's intention is so clear, litigation claiming otherwise should be
discouraged and terminated at the outset.'" The Court's holding re-
garding the OBRA amendments in Lockheed may have this desired
effect. 1 °9
In conclusion, the United States Supreme Court in Lockheed de-
cided three issues. 11 " First, the Court held that an employer's payment
of early retirement benefits in exchange for the recipient's waiver
of all legal claims against the employer is not prohibited by section
406(a)(1)(D) of ERISA."' Second, the Court also held that an em-
ployer's amending of a benefits plan does not violate section 406(a)." 2
Third, the Court held that sections 9201 and 9202 of OBRA are to be
applied prospectively rather than retroactively."' The Court's broad
holding on the first issue implies a willingness to allow employers to
condition an employee's receipt of retirement benefits on virtually any
requirement.'" The dissent, however, took issue with the majority's
sweeping pronouncement that regardless of what an employer requires
an employee to do in exchange for benefits, the employer will not
engage in a transaction prohibited by ERISA." 5 Indeed, the majority
opinion in Lockheed appears to indicate a move toward protection of
employers' rights over those of the employee, a shift that may lead to
both increased litigation and decreased employee security.""
m4 Id. at 1792, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1263-64.
165 See id.
")° See id. in 1793, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1264.
197 See Lockheed, 116 S, Ct. at 1793, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1264.
100 See id.
109 See id.
110 1d. at 1786, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1257-58.
III Id. at 1788, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1259.
112 Lockheed, 116 S. Ct. at 1790, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1261.
113 Id. at 1792, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1264.
111 See id. at 1792, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1263.
115 See id. at 1793, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1264 (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
116 See id. at 1792, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1263.
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IV. REHABILITATION A•r
A. *Sovereign Immunity Shields Federal Agency Programs from
Monetary Damages Claims Under Section 504: Lane v. Penal
Section 504 of The Rehabilitation Act ("the Act") of 1973 prohib-
its federal agencies and federally funded programs from discriminating
on the basis of disability. 2 The purpose of the Act is to promote and
expand employment opportunities in the public and private sectors for
persons with disabilities, as well as to provide for the integration of the
disabled into mainstream society.; In 1978, when Congress amended
section 504 to include federal agencies, it added a remedies provision
that explicitly equates the remedies available under section 504 with
those available under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title
VI")) Congress modeled section 504 on Title VI, and in interpreting
it, courts have looked to both Title VI and Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 ("Title IX"), which is likewise modeled on Title
VI.' The question of whether monetary damages are available under
section 504 has been the subject of some dispute among the circuits,
in part because the precise damages available under Title VI has itself
been somewhat unsettled."
* liy Nora F. Field, Stall Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
I Lane v. Pena, 116 S. Ct. 2092, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) 973 (1996).
2 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994). Section 504 states:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States ... shall
solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity
conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service,
Id.
In 1978, Congress amended this section to provide for executive agency liability. Id. Section
501 of the Act prohibits discrimination by the federal government as employer. Id. § 791(a); see
Lane, 116 S. Ct. at 2097, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 976. Prior to the passage of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 ( -ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101-213 (1994), the Rehabilitation Act was the
primary means of redress for persons with disabilities in this country, and its relevance persists
because the ADA excludes the federal government from its coverage. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101-213
(1994).
29 U.S.C. § 701(a).
'I See id. § 794a(a) (2). Section 505 of the Act states in part, "The remedies, procedures, and
rights set forth in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... shall be available to any person
aggrieved by any act or failure to act by any recipient of Federal assistance or Federal provider
of such assistance under section 794 or this title." Id.
5 See, e.g., Lane, 116 S. Ct. at 2101-02, 5 Al)., Cases (RNA) at 978-79 (Stevens, j., dissenting);
Doe v. Attorney General, 941 F.2d 780, 786-87, 58 Fair Erupt. Prac. Cas. (RNA) 627, 631 (9th Cir.
1991).
6 See, e.g., Guardians Assoc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 593-602 & n.23, 603, 32 Fair
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Further complicating the issue of available remedies under section
504 is the doctrine of sovereign immunity.' Under this doctrine, the
federal government is generally shielded from liability unless it explic-
itly consents to being sued. 8 While the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA") provides a waiver for non-pecuniary claims against the govern-
ment brought under federal statutes, it does not provide for monetary
relief." Although the foundation on which sovereign immunity origi-
nally rested—the king "can do no wrong"—has long since disappeared,
the doctrine has persisted. 1 ° Furthermore, the United States Supreme
Court recently strengthened the government's immunity by holding
that the requisite consent to be sued must consist of an unambiguous,
explicit waiver found in the language of the statute in question and
cannot be supplied by its legislative history."
In 1991, in Doe v. Attorney General, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act permits a private right of action for damages against the Justice
Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI" ).' 2 In Doe,
the plaintiff was a physician who performed pre-hiring physical exami-
nations of FBI agents under an annually renewed procurement con-
tract. 1 ' When the FBI learned that the physician had AIDS, the FBI
stopped referring agents to him." The Ninth Circuit determined that
Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 250, 254-58 & n.23 (1983); Dorsey v. United States Dept of Labor, 41
F.3d 1551, 1554, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) 1651, 1652-53 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In Guardians, the Supreme
Court held that damages available for past, unintentional violations of Title VI were limited to
declaratory and injunctive relief. 463 U.S. at 607, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 260. The
majority opinion did not address whether monetary damages are available for intentional viola-
tions of the statute. See id. at 597, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 256. In Franklin v. Grinned
County Public Schools, however, the Court stated in dicta that a majority of the Justices in
Guardians expressed the view that damages were available in actions for intentional violations of
Title VI. 503 U.S. 60, 70, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 213, 216-17 (1992).
7 See Lane, 116 S. Ct. at 2096, 5 A.D. Cases (RNA) at 974.
8 See, e.g., Doe, 941 F.2d at 787-88, 58 Fair Einpl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 632.
9 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994). The APA states, "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute," may bring "an action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than money
damages ... ." Id.
1 ° See, e.g, United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 42-43 (1992) (Stevens, j.,
dissenting) (citing Langford v. United Stales, 101 U.S. 341, 343 (1880) ("We do not understand
that ... the English maxim has an existence in this country.")).
11 Nordic. Village, 503 U.S. at 37, 39.
12 941 F.2d at 795, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (ANA) at 637. Doe was decided prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Nordic Village, therefore, the court looked not only at the language
of section 504 but also at its legislative history to find a waiver of sovereign immunity. See id. at
788-93, 58 Fair Erni)]. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 632-36.
15 Id. at 782, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 627.
14 See id.
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the language and structure of the Act evinced Congressional intent to
prohibit discrimination against persons with disabilities by anyone and
to create a unitary enforcement mechanism.I 5 The court reasoned that
by amending the language in section 504 to include "any program or
activity conducted by any Executive agency," rather than adding an
entirely new statutory section, Congress must have intended to place
the federal government on equal footing with the other defendants
included in section 504. 16 The Ninth Circuit further reasoned that,
because section 505 (b) of the Act allows the prevailing party to recover
attorney's fees, Congress intended for all defendants under the Act to
be treated alike)? Additionally, the court reasoned that although never
explicitly stated by Congress, Congressional debates on the amend-
ments to the Act unequivocally expressed Congress's intent to subject
federal agencies to private actions for money damages. 18 Thus, the
Ninth Circuit held that federal agencies that violate section 504 must
pay monetary damages in civil actions.' 9
In 1992, in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, the United
States Supreme Court held that the implied right of action under Title
IX supports a claim for monetary damages. 2° In Franklin, the plaintiff
was a high school student who alleged that a teacher had sexually
harassed and abused her. 2 ' Franklin sued under Title IX, which pro-
hibits sexual discrimination by federally-funded education programs. 22
First, the Court reaffirmed that Title IX is enforceable through an
implied right of action.° Next, the Court addressed the separate issue
of what remedies are available under this implied cause of action. 24 The
Court examined a long line of its precedents that establish that federal
courts have the power to award any appropriate relief in a cause of
action brought under a federal statute. 25 Additionally, the Court con-
15 /d. at 791, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 634.
IS Id. at 790, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 633-34.
17 Doe, 941 F.2d at 791, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 634.
18 Id. at 791-93, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 634-36. The Doe court quoted Repre-
sentatives who stated in debates that the purpose of the 1978 amendments was to make the federal
government just as liable for discrimination against the disabled as the other entities already
included in section 504. Id. at 791-92, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 634-35.
19 Id. at 795, 58 Fair Empl, Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 637.
20 503 U.S. at 76, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 219 (1992).
21 Id. at 63, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 214.
22 See id. at 62-63 & n.1, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 214 & n. 1 . Title IX states in
relevant part, "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . ." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
23 Franklin, 503 U.S. at 65, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 215.
24 Id. at 65-71, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 215-17.
25 Id. at 66-71, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 215-17.
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eluded that Congress had in no way limited the remedies available
under Title 1X. 26
 The Court reasoned that the two amendments to Title
IX that Congress passed after the Court recognized an implied right
of action explicitly authorized remedies and broadened the statute's
antidiscrimination coverage, rather than restricting the right of action
or its possible remedies. 27 Thus, the Court held in Franklin that mone-
tary damages are available in actions brought under Title IX. 28
In 1995, in Dorsey v. United States Department of Labor, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that
the federal government has not waived its sovereign immunity from
monetary damages claims for violations of section 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act.29 In Dorsey, the plaintiff was expelled from the Department
of Labor's Job Corps program when a mandatory medical examination
revealed that he was HIV-positive." Although Dorsey was ultimately
readmitted to the program, he alleged that Job Corps members ridi-
culed and harassed him when they learned of his HIV-positive status.'"
The District of Columbia Circuit stated that although the federal
agency might have violated section 504 by its discriminatory conduct,
the statute did not necessarily provide the remedy of monetary relief. 32
The court reasoned that although both Title VI and the Rehabilitation
Act provide for monetary damages in actions against private parties,
sovereign immunity puts the federal government on "different foot-
ing."" The court concluded that no language in the Act or in Title VI
satisfies the Supreme Court's strict requirement of an unequivocal
expression of a governmental waiver of sovereign immunity." Addition-
ally, the District of Columbia Circuit stated that the Act's ambiguous
legislative history did not satisfy the required unequivocal statutory
expression of a waiver." Thus, the District of Columbia Circuit held
that the federal government did not waive its sovereign immunity from
monetary damages for violations of section 504.' 6
During the Survey year, in Lane v. Pena, the United States Supreme
Court held that Congress has not waived the Federal government's
sovereign immunity against monetary damages awards for violations of
26 M. at 73, 59 Fair Etnpl, I'rac. Cas. (RNA) at 218.
27 See id. at 65, 72-73, 59 Fair Dupl. Prac, Cas. (BNA) at 215, 217-18.
28 Franklin, 503 U.S. at 76, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 219.
29 4 1 F.3d at 1552-53, 3A.D. Cases (BNA) at. 1651.
n Id. at 1553, 3 A.D. Cases (RNA) at 1051-52.
See id. at 1553, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1652.
n Id. at 1553-54, 3 Al). Cases (TINA) at 1652.
55 Id, at 1555, 3 A.D. Cases (RNA) at 1653.
34 Dorsey, 41 F.3d at 1555, 3 A.D. Cases (RNA) at 1653.
Id. at 1555, 3 A.1). Cases (BNA) at 1654.
36 1d. at 1552-53, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1651.
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section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act." The Court strictly applied its
precedents on the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and thus held that
the Act's lack of an unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity with
regard to federal agencies disallowed Lane's damages claim."
In Lane, the United States Merchant Marine Academy ("the Acad-
emy") dismissed the plaintiff, a student, because he had diabetes." The
Department of Transportation administers the Academy through the
Maritime Administration.'" During his first year at the Academy, Lane
was diagnosed by a private physician as having diabetes mellitus. 4 ' After
Lane reported the diagnosis to the Academy's Chief Medical Officer,
the Academy's Physical Examination Review Board conducted a hear-
ing to determine Lane's "medical suitability" to continue at the Acad-
emy. 42 Three months later, the Academy dismissed Lane on the ground
that his diabetes rendered him ineligible to be commissioned for
service:13 After unsuccessfully challenging his dismissal before the Mari-
time Administrator, Lane brought suit in federal district court, alleging
that his discharge from the Academy violated section 504." The gov-
ernment disputed an award of damages on the ground that sovereign
immunity protected it from claims for monetary damages. 45
The Court began its analysis of Lane's damages claim by examin-
ing its precedents on waivers of the federal government's sovereign
immunity:1" The Court cited several precedents holding that it. must
strictly construe waivers of sovereign immunity in favor of the sover-
eign:17 Additionally, the Court reaffirmed that the text of a statute must
17 116 S. Ct. 2092, '1096-100, 5 A.D. Cases (13NA) 973, 974-78 (1996).
See id.
n Id. at 2095, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 974.
'I° See id. at 2095, 5 A.D. Cases (11NA) at 973.
" See id.
4'2 See Lane, 116 S, Ct. at 2095, 5 A.D. Cases (DNA) at 973.
'II See id. at 2095, 5 A.D. Cases (RNA) at 974.
'11 See id.
45 See id. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Lane and ordered him
reinstated, but deferred resolution of the specific amount of compensatory damages due. See id.
Shortly thereafter, the Cimrt of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled in Dorsey that the Act
did not waive the government's .sovereign inununity against monetary damages for violations of
section 504. See id. at 2096, 5 A.D. Cases at 974 (citing Dorsey v. United States Dep't of Labor, 41
F.3d 1551 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). The District Court subsequently vacated its award of' damages to
Lane, holding that he was not entitled to a compensatory damages award against the federal
government. See id, On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected Lane's
request for en bane review of Dorsey and granted the government's motion for summary affir-
mance. See id. '['he Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among the circuits. See id.
16 Id. at 2096-97, 5 A.D. Cases (11NA) at 974-75.
47
 Lane. 116 S. Ct. at 2096, 5 A.D. Cases (111s1A) at 974-75 (ening United States v. Williams,
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unequivocally express a waiver of sovereign Mummify and that a stat-
ute's legislative history is not sufficient to supply such a waiver. 4 "
The Court then concluded that the relevant provisions of the Act
did not include the required unequivocal waiver of sovereign immu-
nity. 49
 The Court analyzed section 504's remedies provision, section
505(a) (2), which states that the remedies available for violations of
Title VI will be available for violations of section 504 "by any recipient
of Federal assistance or Federal provider of such assistance .. . 
."51) The
Supreme Court reasoned that the absence of the more "far-reaching"
language of section 504 in the remedies provision specifically limits the
provision's waiver of sovereign immunity to the federal providers men-
tioned.' The Court also rejected Lane's argument that the Department
of Transportation is a federal provider under the meaning of the Act. 52
Additionally, the Court compared the language of section
505(a) (2) with the language in section 505(a) (1), the section that
provides the remedies for violations of section 501. 53
 The Supreme
Court reasoned that the contrast between section 505(a) (1)'s broad
language allowing monetary damages for any violation of section 501,
and section 505(a) (2)'s narrower language suggests that Congress
intended to treat executive agencies differently under section 504 in
terms of remedies. 54
 With respect to section 501, the Court saw further
evidence of a clear waiver of sovereign immunity in the Civil Rights Act
of'1991 and in the Act's attorney's fees provision." The Court reasoned
that this contrasting clarity is further evidence of the absence of such
a waiver in sections 504 and 505(a) (2). 5"
The Court stated that the statutory scheme in the Act—which
subjects the government to awards of injunctive relief, attorney's fees
and monetary damages when it acts as a "federal provider," but does
not subject it to monetary damages only when a federal agency violates
section 504—is "admittedly somewhat bewildering." 57
 Nevertheless, the
Court found support for such a scheme in the APA, which provides for
115 S. Ct. 1611, 1616 (1995); Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 318 (1986); Lehman v.
Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 161 (1981)).
49 Id. at 2096-97, 5 A.D. Gases (13NA) at 975.
49 Id. at 2097, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 975.
" Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. 4 794a(a) (2) (1994)).
51 Id.
52
 See Lane, 116 S. Ct. at 2098, 5 A.D. Cases (RNA) at 975-76.
55 Id. at 2097, 5 A.D. Cases (RNA) at 975.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 2097-98, 5 A.D. Cases (RNA) at 975.
56 Id.
57 Lane, 116 S. Gt. at 2098, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 976.
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agency liability but not monetary damages. 58 Thus, the Court reasoned
that the Rehabilitation Act's "bewildering" scheme is not entirely irra-
tional. 59
Additionally, the Court rejected Lane's reliance on Franklin."1) The
Court emphasized that Franklin's holding concerned only the availabil-
ity of monetary damages under Title [X's implied cause of action
against non-federal defendants, and reasoned that it should not apply
to federal defendants because of sovereign immunity."'
The Court also rejected Lane's argument that the "equalization"
provision of the 1986 amendments to the Act reveals Congress's intent
to make the same remedies available against all defendants for viola-
tions of section 504. 62 Section 1003 of those amendments provides that
a state will be subject to all the remedies available for a violation of
section 504 in a suit against "any public or private entity other than a
State.'" The Court disagreed with Lane's argument that this provision
implies that all public and private entities are on equal footing with
respect to remedies."' The Court reasoned that there are two other
plausible interpretations: first, that "public entities" refers to those
non-federal public entities receiving federal funds that are subject to
the Act and the other statutes covered by the provision, and; second,
that the reference to "public or private entities" suggests a distinction
between remedies available against the two types of defendants, or
otherwise Congress would have simply stated "every other entity."" 5
Again, although the Court stated that neither reading was "entirely
satisfactory," it concluded that section 1003 was too ambiguous to be
an unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity.'"'
In his dissent, Justice Stevens examined the purpose and history
of the Act and concluded that Congress clearly intended to authorize
a damages award against a federal agency that violates section 504. 67
He strongly objected to the majority's purely textual approach to waiv-
ers of sovereign imtnunity.'i 6 Ignoring relevant legislative history, he
" See id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994)); see supra note 9 for relevant text of APA.
59 Lane, 116 S. Ct. at 2098, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 976,
6° See id.
61 See id. at 2099, 5 A.D. Cases (RNA) at 976.
62 See id. at 2099-100, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 977-78.
63 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a) (1994).
64 See Lane, 116 S. Ct. at 2099-100, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 977.
65 Id. at 2100, 5 A.D. Cases (RNA) at 977-78.
1-'6 Id. at 2100, 5 A.D. Cases (15NA) at 978.
67 Id. at 2100-06, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 978-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66 Id. at 2106, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 982 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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argued, hinders the Court's ability to carry out the will and intent of
Congress.''.'
Justice Stevens began by reviewing the historical interpretation of
the first versions of the Act and Title VI." He cited precedent that
interpreted both acts as providing for damages remedies through pri-
vate actions. 71 He also cited Franklin as support for the premise that
both Title IX and section 504 contain an implied private cause of
action for all traditional forms of relief, including monetary damages."
He criticized the majority's distinguishing Franklin on the ground that
it involved a non-federal defendant, because the Court in Franklin
relied on precedents that upheld monetary awards against the United
States. 73
 justice Stevens concluded that when Congress amended sec-
tion 504 to include federal agencies in 1978, it understood that the
pre-existing provision had already created an implied, private right of
action and a damages remedy. 74
Further, Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority's conclusion
that section 505(a) (2), the remedies provision, restricts the reme-
dies available tinder section 504. 75 According to Justice Stevens, the
legislative history of section 505(a) (2) explains why the statute is lim-
ited to "federal providers." 76
 He posited that this 1978 addition to the
Act merely codified the application of Title VI's enforcement pro-
cedures to section 504. 77
 justice Stevens concluded that because Ti-
tle VI does not prohibit discrimination by executive agencies, sec-
tion 505(a) (2) should have no bearing on enforcement of executive
agencies' section 504 violations and Lane's relief thus lies in section
504. 78
As interpreted by the Court in Lane, the Rehabilitation Act makes
the federal government liable for monetary awards as an employer and
a provider of funds but not when it acts as a director of its own
programs, such as a military academy or the Job Corps program." Such
a statutory scheme is illogical and, as the Court states, "somewhat
("9
 Lane, 116 S. Ct. si 2106, 5 A.D. Cases (I3NA) at 982 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
7 ' ) /d. at 2101-02, 5 A.D. Cases (RNA) at 978-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71
 Irl. at 2101, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1)78-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72 hi. at 2102, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 979 (Stevens,,1., dissenting) (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett
County Pub. Sells., 503 U.S. 60, 65-71 (1992)).
73
 Id. at 2105 n,13, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 982 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74 Lane, 116 S. Ct. at 2102-03, 5 A.D. Cases (RNA) at 979-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75 Id. at 2103, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 980 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
711 Id. at 2104, 5 A.D. Cases (RNA) at 980-81 (Stevens,,]., dissenting).
77 Id. al 2103-114, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 980 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
7H M. at 2105, 5 A.D. Cases (RNA) at 1)81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79 See 116 S. Ct. at 2097-98, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) ;it. 975-76.
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bewildering."8" The Court's holding is contrary to the legislative intent
behind Congress's 1978 amendments to prevent discrimination against
persons with disabilities by federal agencies." As the Doe court correctly
pointed out in its analysis, the language and structure of the Act and
its legislative history clearly demonstrate that Congress intended to
treat alike all defendants under the Act. 82 In addition, Justice Stevens
convincingly argued that when Congress amended section 504 in 1978
to provide for executive agency liability, Congress sought to strengthen
and expand the Act's reach and had no reason to expect that the Court
would require a more explicit waiver of sovereign immunity that was
not, at that time, required."
Furthermore, the Court's interpretation of section 1003 of the
1986 amendments to the Act—which stipulates that the same remedies
available against any public or private entity be available against a
state—is wholly unconvincing." First, the term "public" is not normally
subject to the narrow definition the Court ascribes to it, namely, only
those non-federal, non-state public entities such as municipal hospitals
and local school districts, and; second, the fact that Congress included
the terms "public or private" rather than "every other entity" more
likely implies Congressional intent to treat all defendants, both public
and private, exactly alike, rather than an intent to distinguish between
the two without instructions on how to do so, as the Court suggested. 85
The Court's holding, however, was the inevitable result of its
current, strict approach to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 86 Prece-
dent demanded that an explicit waiver of the government's sovereign
immunity be found in the language of the statute; the absence of such
a waiver in section 504 and its remedies provision dictated the Court's
conclusion. 87 The Lane Court has exposed a loophole that Congress
created in 1978 when it amended the section to provide for agency
liability but neglected to include those agencies in the new remedies
provision." Perhaps Congress will amend the Act in response to Lane
8() See id. at 2098, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 976.
81 See Doe v. Attorney General, 941 F.2d 780, 791-93, 58 Fair Empl. Prat, Cas. (BNA) 627,
634-36 (9th Cir. 1991),
82 See id.; see supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
83 See Lane, 116 S. Ct. at 2102-03, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 979-80 (Stevens,-., dissenting).
" See id. at 2099-100, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 977 (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)
(1994)).
"5 See id.
88
 See id. at 2096-97, 5 A,D, Cases (BNA) at 974-75.
87 See id.
88 See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994); 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) (1994); see generally Lane, 116 S. Ct.
2092, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) 973.
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to close this loophole, just as it did in 1986 when it amended the Act
to explicitly provide for state liability in response to a prior Supreme
Court holding that the Act lacked an explicit abrogation of state
sovereign immunity. 8" Lane solidifies the Court's current, strict ap-
proach to waivers of sovereign immunity, in that the Court is willing to
reject not only the Act's legislative history, but also a logical interpre-
tation of the Act in favor of a "bewildering" one that protects the
government from damages claims.""
Although the Court's holding in Lane is limited to the compara-
tively small number of potential cases in which a federal agency dis-
criminates against a disabled person in the administration of its own
program, its effect on those cases is severe."' It totally eliminates the
possibility for recovery of monetary damages, such as lost income, not
to mention compensatory damages for emotional suffering. Despite
this harmful effect on the rights of persons with disabilities, however,
the Court may have strengthened other potential damages claims un-
der section 504. Prior to Lane, the Supreme Court had not specifically
addressed the issue of whether monetary awards were available under
section 504, and this issue was in dispute among the circuits." 2 In dicta,
the Court states explicitly, "Title VI provides for monetary damages
awards," and because Title VI's remedies apply to federal providers
under section 504, Lane should lead to more certainty for most section
504 claimants seeking monetary damages, including employees of en-
tities receiving federal funds."
In conclusion, the Supreme Court in Lane held that the Rehabili-
tation Act does not waive the government's sovereign immunity with
respect to monetary damages awards against. federal agencies under
section 504.94
 The Court seized on the puzzling discrepancy between
section 504's inclusion of executive agencies and section 505(a) (2)'s
omission of those agencies in their remedies provisions, and found the
sr
	 116 S. Ct. at 2099, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) au 977. In Ataseadero State Hospital n Scanlon,
the Supreme Court held that states were not subject to Stlitti by litigants seeking monetary relief
under section 504 because the Act did not unequivocally abrogate the states' Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity. 473 U.S. 234, 235, 247, 38 Fair Empl. I'rac. Cas. (BNA) 97, 98, 102 (1985). In
1986, Congress responded by passing section 1003 of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986,
which explicitly provided for states' liability under the Act. See Lane, 116 S. Ct. at 2099, 5 A.D.
Cases (BNA) at 977.
" See Lane, 116 S. Ct. at 2098, 5 A.D. Cases (RNA) at 976.
91 See id. at 2105, 5 A.D. Cases (RNA) at 982 (Stevens,,]., dissenting).
92 See, e.g, Dorsey, 41 F.3d at 1554, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1652-53.
113
 See. Lane, 116 S. Ct. at 2096, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 974 (discussing 29 U.S.C. 794a(a)
(2) (1994)).
1"M. at 2096-100, 5 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 974-78.
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Act lacking in terms of an explicit statutory waiver of sovereign immu-
nity. 95
 Ironically, although the Court has eliminated the availability of
monetary relief for some section 504 claimants, by implication it may
have assured the availability of monetary damages for future section
504 plaintiffs who have claims against private entities receiving federal
funds and federal agencies acting in a funding capacity.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. *Applying First Amendment Principles to Shield Independent
Government Contractors from Retaliatory Dismissal: Board of
County Commissioners v. Umbehrl
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution protects
the rights of citizens to speak freely on social, political and economic
subjects without risking acts of retribution by the government. 2 A civil
remedy exists under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for any person who, under color
of state law, is deprived of any right, privilege or immunity secured by
the United States Constitution. 3 Under section 1983, an independent
contractor whose government contract is terminated may challenge
the government's decision on the grounds that it violated his or her
free speech rights protected by the First Amendment.' In light of the
government's mission as a contractor to provide public services effi-
ciently and effectively, the government as contractor has a greater
interest in regulating the independent contractor's speech than the
government as sovereign has in regulating the speech of the general
population.5 Balancing the independent contractor's right to free
speech with the government's interest in regulating that speech deter-
95
 See id. at 2097, 5 A.D. Cases (RNA) at 975.
* By Patrick J. Cammarata, Staff Member, BOSTON CoLLEGE L,w REVIEW.
1 116 S. Ct. 2342, 11 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (RNA) 1393 (1996).
2 U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably 10 assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
3 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Section 1983 states, in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, .
	 of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
See, e.g., Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2345, 2352, 11 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (RNA) at 1395, 1400.
5 See id. at 2347-48, 11 lndiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1396.
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mines the extent of the protection provided to independent govern-
ment contractors under the First Amendments
In 1968, in Pickering v. Board of Education, the United States Su-
preme Court held that a public employee has a First Amendment right
to speak out on issues of public importance without risk of termination
of employment, as long as the speech does not substantially affect the
efficient functioning of the government employer's enterprise.'' In
Pickering, the Board of Education in Will County, Illinois Fired a school-
teacher for submitting a letter to the local newspaper that: criticized
the amount of funding allocated to the community's athletic pro-
grams.' The Court noted that, although the teacher's letter unques-
tionably addressed an issue of public concern, the government's inter-
est in regulating the speech of public employees differs significantly
from its interest in regulating the speech of private citizens." The Court
reasoned that in deciding whether the First Amendment's guarantee
of freedom of speech protects government employees from retaliatory
dismissal, it must strike a balance between the interests of the em-
ployee, as a citizen, in commenting on issues of public concern and
the interests of the government, as employer, in promoting the effi-
ciency of public services.'" The Court further reasoned that the letter
criticized the Board of Education rather than any of the teacher's
direct superiors or co-workers, and that such criticism would not likely
interfere with the general operation of the school." Thus, the Court
held that the teacher's First. Amendment right to speak freely on
matters of public concern outweighed the Board of Education's inter-
est in promoting efficiency, and therefore, his dismissal was unconsti-
tutional.' 2
In 1972, in Perry v. Sinderman, the United States Supreme Court
elaborated on the Pickering analysis, holding that a lack of contractual
or tenure right, taken alone, does not defeat a claim that the non-re-
newal of a contract violated the First Amendment. 13 In Perry, a non-
tenured professor at a state junior college claimed that the Regents of
the college refused to renew his contract because the professor had
been openly critical of the administration." The Court stated that the
13
 See id. at 2348, 2352, 11 lmliv, Empl. Rights Gas. (BNA) at 1396, 1400.
7 See 391 U.S. 563, 574, I balk/. Ettipl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 8, 13 (1968).
8 Id. at 566, 1 Indiv. Empl. Rights Gas. (BNA) at 10.
9 Id. at 568, 571, 1 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 10, 11.
10
 Id. at 568, 1 lmliv. Elul)]. Rights Gas. (BNA) at 10.
11 1d. at 569-70, I Indiv. Empl. Rights Gas. (RNA) at 11.
12 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574, 1 [why. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 13.
15 408 U.S. 593, 597—J8, 1 Indiv. Empl, Rights Cas. (BNA) 33, 34 (1972).
14 Id. at 595, 1 1ndiv. Em p1. Rights Gas. (BNA) at 33.
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principals set forth in Pickering apply regardless of whether the public
employee has a contractual claim to a job.' 5 The Court reasoned that
even though an individual has no right to a valuable governmental
benefit and the government may deny an individual the benefit for a
number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the govern-
ment may not rely.' 6 The Court further reasoned that if the govern-
ment could deny such a benefit based upon the employee's constitu-
tionally protected speech, the employee's exercise of those freedoms
would, in effect, be inhibited. 17 Consequently, this would allow the
government to produce a result that it could not command directly.'s
Thus, the Court held that a public employee's lack of contractual or
tenure right to reemployment is immaterial to his or her free speech
claim."
In 1977, in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v.
Doyle, the United States Supreme Court once again modified the Pick-
ering balancing test by holding that the government may choose not
to rehire a public employee who exercises his or her constitutionally
protected speech if the government can show that it would have ar-
rived at the same decision absent the protected conduet. 2" In Mt.
Healthy, the Board of Education (the "School Board") refused to renew
a teacher's contract on two separate grounds. 21 First, the School Board
cited the fact that the teacher had made obscene gestures at two female
students and, second, that he had called a local radio station criticizing
the School Board's dress code for teachers. 22 The Court noted that,
even though the call to the radio station was protected free speech
under the Pickering balancing test and was a motivating factor in the
School Board's decision not to rehire the teacher, the firing would be
deemed legitimate if the School Board could show that they would
have arrived at the same decision in the absence of the protected
conduct.° The Court reasoned that borderline or marginal candidates
should not have their employment terminated because of constitution-
ally protected conduct:24
 Nevertheless, those same candidates ought
not, by engaging in protected conduct, prevent their employers from
15 Id. at 598, 1 1to1iv. Empl, Rights Cas. (BNA) at 34.
16 Id. at 597, i hlk!. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 34.
17 1d.
to See Perry, 408 U.S. at 597, 1 hicliv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 34.
Id. at 597-98, I	 Empl. Rights Cas. (DNA) at 34.
2°429 U.S. 273, 287, I Imliv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 76, 80 (1977).
21 Id. at 282-83, I hilly. Empl. Rights Gas. (BNA) at 78-79.
22 See id. at 282 -83, I Incliv. Empl. Rights Cas. (RNA) at 79.
23 M. at 287, 1 hitliv. Empl. Rights Gas. (BNA) at 80.
24 Id. at 286, 1 hliv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 80.
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reaching the same decision that they would have arrived at had the
free speech issue not existed:25
 Thus, the Court held that, even though
constitutionally protected speech may be a motivating factor in the
dismissal of a public employee, the government's decision may still pass
constitutional muster if it, can show that it would have arrived at the
same decision absent the protected speech issue. 26
In 1982, in Connick v. Myers, the United States Supreme Court
held that the limited First Amendment protection provided to employ-
ees under the Pickering balancing test does not require a government
employer to tolerate speech that substantially disrupts the working
environment and undermines the employer's authority. 27 In Connick,
an assistant district attorney prepared and circulated a questionnaire
to the other attorneys in the office concerning the office transfer pol-
icy, office morale, the need for a grievance committee, the level of con-
fidence in supervisors and pressure to work on political campaigns. 28
The Court noted that the threshold determination for a wrongful
termination suit on First Amendment grounds is that the speech at
issue must address a matter of public concern.29 The Court reasoned
that whether a public employee's speech addresses a matter of public
concern so as to shield the employee from discharge for expressing
those views must be determined by the form, content and context of
the particular statement." Having found that one of the survey ques-
tions addressed an issue of public concern, the Court next balanced
the employee's interest in distributing the questionnaires against the
employer's interest in regulating the speech.'' The Court concluded
that the employer's belief that the questionnaire would disrupt the
workplace, interfere with the office's close working relationships and
undermine the authority of supervisors outweighed the employee's
limited First Amendment privilege." Thus, the Court held that the
employee's questionnaire did not constitute free speech protected by
the First Amendment because it adversely affected the government's
interest as an employer in maintaining the smooth operation of its
enterprise while only minorly addressing issues of public concern."
25 See Aft. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 286, I lndiv. Erni)]. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 80.
26 Id. at 287, 1 Indiv. Einpl. Rights Cas. (11NA) at 80.
27 461 U.S. 137, 154, I Indiv. Entpl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 178, 185 (1983).
28
 Id.. at 141, 1 lndiv. Empl. Rights Gas. (BNA) at 179.
29 Id. at 145, 146, 1 1ndiv. Entpl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 182.
30
 Id. at 14718, 1 Indio. Entpl. Rights Cas. (BMX) at 182.
31 id. at 149-50, 1 Indiv. FIT!. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 183.
32 Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 1 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 185.
" Id.
426	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 1Vol. 38:301
During the Survey year, in Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr,
the United States Supreme Court held that the First Amendment
protects independent contractors from the termination or prevention
of automatic renewal of at-will government contracts in retaliation for
their exercise of their freedom of speech. 34 The Court further held that
the Pickering balancing test, adjusted to weigh the government's inter-
ests as contractor rather than employer, determines the extent of the
independent contractor's protection. 3  The majority noted that this
holding, while important in that it extends the application of the
Pickering balancing test to situations involving independent govern-
ment contractors, is limited and does not radically affect the state of
the law."
In Umbehr, the Board of County Commissioners for Wabansee
County, Kansas (the "Board") chose to terminate a contract between
the county and the respondent, Keen Umbehr. 37 The contract gave
Umbehr the exclusive right to haul trash for each of the county's six
cities." The contract also provided that it would be automatically re-
newed annually unless either party terminated it at least sixty days
before the end of the year.'"
During the term of the contract, Umbehr was an outspoken critic
of the Board, the three-person governing body of the county." Umbehr
spoke at several of the Board's meetings and wrote critical letters to
the editor of the local newspaper regarding, among other things: 1)
the county's landfill user rates; 2) the cost of obtaining official docu-
ments from the county; 3) alleged violations by the Board of the Kansas
Open Meetings Act; and 4) the county's alleged mismanagement of
taxpayers' money.4 ' Umbehr's allegations regarding violations of the
Kansas Open Meetings Act were vindicated in a consent decree signed
by the Board's members. 42 During this time, Umbehr also made an
unsuccessful bid to win election to the Board. 43
The Board's members allegedly took Umbehr's criticism badly,
threatening the county paper with censorship for publishing his let-
ters.'" Finally, in 1991, after ten years of hauling the county's trash, the
31 116 S. Ct. 2342, 2352, 11 !why. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1393, 1400 (1996).
" Id. at 2349, 11 Incliv. Empl. Rights Gas. (BNA) at 1397-98.
36 Id. at 2352, 11 hulk,. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1400.
27 Id. at 2345, 11 Imliv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1395.
38 See id. at 2345, 11 Incliv. Empl, Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1394.
39 See Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2345, 11 Indio. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1394.
19 See id.
41 See id.
42 See id. at 2345, 11 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1394-95.
43 See id. at 2345, 11 litchi:. Empl. Rights Cat. (BNA) at 1395.
44 See Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2345, 11 Indic. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1394.
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Board voted two to one to terminate Umbehr's contract." Umbehr
subsequently negotiated new contracts with five of the six cities he had
previously served. 46
In 1992, Umbehr brought suit against the two members of the
Board who had voted against him in both their individual and profes-
sional capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 47
 Umbehr alleged that they
had terminated his contract. in retaliation for his criticism of the county
and the Board.48
 The Board members moved for summary judgment,
and the district court granted the motion, holding that government
contractors are not entitled to the same First Amendment protection
afforded to public employees.'''
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that
the First Amendment protects an independent contractor from retali-
atory government action in the same manner as it would a government
employee. 50
 Thus, the court held that it would determine the extent
of such protection through a Pickering analysis, weighing the interests
of the contractor in exercising his or her free speech against the
interests of the government as contractor in the efficient running of
its enterprise.'' The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
order to resolve a conflict among the circuits as to whether, and to
what extent, independent government contractors are protected un-
der the First Amendment. 52
The Court reasoned that the First Amendment should protect
independent government contractors from retaliatory dismissal
because their situation closely parallels that of government employ-
45 See id. at 2345, 11 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (TINA) at 1394-95.
113
	 id. at 2345, 11 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (RNA) at 1395.
17 42	 § 1983 (1988); see Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2345, 11 !why. Empl. Rights Cas. (RNA)
at 1395.
'IN See Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2345-46, 11 Indiv. Empl, Rights Cas. (RNA) at 1395.
'19 See id. at 2346, 11 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (RNA) at 1395; Umbehr v. McClure, 840 F.
Stapp. 837, 839 (D. Kan. 1993).
5° See Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2346, 11 bully. Empl. Rights Cas. (RNA) at 1395; Umbehr v.
McClure, 44 F.3d 876, 883 (10th Cir, 1995).
51 See Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2346, 11 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (RNA) at 1395.
52 See id. The Fifth and Eighth circuits agreed with the Tenth circuit, allowing independent
contractors to sue for termination based on their speech and political activities. See, e.g., Black-
burn v. Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 931-35 (5th Cir, 1995); Copsey v, Swearigen, 36 F,3d 1336, 1344
(5th Cir. 1994); Smith v. Cleburne County Hosp., 870 F.2d 1375, 1381 (8(11 Cir. 1989). The Third
and Seventh circuits have held, however, that an independent contractor who duet not have a
property interest in his or her contract with the government has no right to i)revcnt that contract
from being terminated in retaliation for his or her exercise of First Amendment freedoms of
political affiliation and participation. See, e.g., Downtown Auto Paris, Inc. v. Milwaukee, 938 F.2d
705 (7th Cir. 1991); Horn v. Kean, 796 F.2d 668 (3d Cir. 1986) (en ham:),
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ees.'3 The Court noted that both contractors and employees depend
heavily on the valuable financial benefits that come with their relation-
ship to the government. 54 As a result, the threat of losing this benefit
in response to the exercise of their free speech right would likely chill
the speech of government contractors in much the same way that it
would government employees.5• Furthermore, the Court observed that
through their relationship to the government, contractors, like govern-
ment employees, are often in the best position to know what ails the
agencies with which they work. 56 Because they are in a better position
than the general public to know of the problems within government
agencies, the interest of independent government contractors in being
able to speak freely on matters of public concern is similar to that of
employees. 57
The Court also reasoned that the government's interest in main-
taining the efficiency of its functions is similar when dealing with both
employees and contractors. 58 The government needs to be free to
terminate both employees and contractors for poor performance, to
improve the efficiency, efficacy and responsiveness of service to the
public, and to prevent the appearance of corruption. 59 Furthermore,
absent contractual, statutory or constitutional restriction, the govern-
ment is entitled to terminate employees and contractors for no rea-
son at all. 6t 1 Because the public's interest in promoting free speech and
the government's interest in the effective functioning of its services
are substantially similar for both government employees and govern-
ment contractors, the Court held that independent contractors are
protected from retaliatory dismissal for exercising their right to free
speech. 61 Following from this reasoning, the Court also held that the
Pickering test, used to evaluate the extent of public employees' pro-
tection, should also be applied to cases involving government con-
tractors.62
In a separate opinion addressing the Court's decisions in both
Umbehr and its companion case, O'Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of
53 Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2346-47, 11 Indiv, Empl. Rights Gas. (BNA) at 1396.
54 Id. at 2347, 11 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1396.
55 See id.
55 Id. (citing Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S, 661. 670, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 801,
805 (1994) (plurality opinion)).
57 Sea id.
35 See Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2347, 11 Indiv. Empl. Rights Gas, (BNA) at 1396.
5" See id.
5( ' See id.
61 Id. at 2347, 2352, 11 Indic,. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1396, 1400.
6 '1 Id. at 2349, 11 Indiv. blip'. Rights Gas. (BNA) at 1397.
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Nonhlake,G'Justice Scalia, joined by justice Thomas, dissented from the
majority's holding that independent contractors and government em-
ployees are similar with respect to First Amendment protection." jus-
tice Scalia reasoned that public employees are almost always individuals
whose public jobs represent their sole livelihoods."" Consequently, ter-
mination of a public employee's job is typically the termination of his
or her livelihood."" Public contractors, on the other hand, are often
corporations that also conduct business with private customers."? Ter-
mination of a public contract, Justice Scalia noted, rarely results in the
public contractor losing his or her entire business, or even an indis-
pensable part of it."8 As a result, fear of retaliatory dismissal would not
likely affect a contractor's decision to speak out on issues of public
concern to the same degree that it would affect a government em-
ployee.''`' Thus, Justice Scalia reasoned that because public contractors
depend far less heavily on the benefit they derive from their relation-
ship with the government than do public employees, the First Amend-
ment should not afford contractors the same protection that it affords
public employees."
The majority's holding that the First Amendment protects inde-
pendent contractors from the termination of government contracts in
retaliation for their exercise of the freedom of speech proves consis-
tent with the Court's other precedents in this area of the law. 7 ' The
Court noted that Umbehr is part of a larger body of case law to which
61 116 S. Ct. 2353, 11 Indiv. Etnpl. Rights Gas. (BNA) 1377 (1996).
Umbehr; 116 S. Ct. at 2362, 11 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1401 (Scalia,,]., dissenting);
O'Hare, 116 S. Gt. at 2362, 11 Indiv. Empl. Rights Gas. (BNA) at 1384 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
1 '5 Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2366, 11 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1404 (Scalia, J., dissenting);
O'Hare, 116 S. Ct. at 2366, 11 Indiv, Empl. Rights Gas. (BNA) at 1387 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
66 See Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2366, 11 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1404 (Scalia, ,f.,
dissenting); O'Hare, 116 S. Ct. at 2366, 11 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1387 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
67 See Umbehr; 116 S. Ct.. at 2366, 11 Indiv. Empl. Rights Gas. (BNA) at 1404-05 (Scalia, .1.,
dissenting); O'Hare, 116 S. Ct. .0 2366, 11 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1387 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
68 See Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2366, 11 !lny. Empl. Rights Gas. (BNA) at 1401-05 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); O'Hare, 116 S. Ct. at 2366, 11 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1387 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
69 See Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2366, 11 Indiv. Empl. Rights Gas. (BNA) at 1405 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); O'Hare, 116 S. Ct. at 2366, 11 Indiv. Empi, Rights Cas. (RNA) at 1387 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
7° See Umbehr, 116 S. CI. at 2366-67, I I Indiv. Empl. Rights Gas. (BNA) at 1404-05 (Scalia,
J., dissenting); O'Hare, 116 S. Ct. at 2366-67, 11 I n div. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1387 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
71 See, e.g., Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2350, 11 Indiv. Empl. Rights Gas. (BNA) at 1398; Pickering
v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. E563, 568, 574, 1 [Itchy. Empl. Rights Gas. (BNA) 8, 10, 13 (1968).
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the Court refers as its "unconstitutional conditions" precedents. 72
Throughout this line of cases, the Court has consistently held that
where citizens have a relationship with the government which provides
them with a valuable benefit, the government may not deny them that
benefit if such a denial infringes upon their constitutionally protected
interests—especially the freedom of speech." The Court correctly rea-
soned that if the government could deny a benefit to people because
of their constitutionally protected speech, their exercise of those free-
doms would in effect be penalized and inhibited:74 In turn, this denial
would allow the government to produce a result that it could not
command directly. 75
Over the past quarter century, the Court has broadly applied this
general principal to situations where citizens receive a rather insub-
stantial government benefit, such as tax exemptions or employment
benefits, as well as to situations where citizens derive a substantial
benefit, such as public employment or welfare payments. 76 In each of
these cases, the Court determined the scope of the First Amendment
protection by weighing the citizen's interest in speaking out on issues
of public concern against the government's interest in regulating that
speech.77 Because the size of the benefit which an independent con-
tractor receives from his or her relationship to the government lies
somewhere between tax exemptions and public employment, the
Court's holding in Umbehr falls squarely within the parameters of the
Court's unconstitutional conditions doctrine."
Examining Umbehr in light of these other unconstitutional condi-
tions precedents, the Court's decision to employ a modified version of
the Pickering balancing test in order to determine the extent of an
independent contractor's First Amendment protection proves both
reasonable and logical. 79 The majority clearly illustrates that govern-
ment employees and independent contractors share many of the same
characteristics which factor into a Pickering analysis.8° First, both con-
tractors and employees derive a substantial financial benefit from their
72 Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at '2349, 2350, 11 1ndiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1396, 1398.
" See, e.g., id.; Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597, 1 Indiv, Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 33,
34 (1972).
7 ' 1 See Perry, 408 U.S. at 597, 1 Indiv. Empl. Rights Gas. (BNA) at 34.
75 See id.
76 See, e.g., id.
77 See, e.g., Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2350, 11 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1398; Perry, 408
U.S. at 597, 1 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 34.
78 See Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2350, 11 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1398.
79 See id. at 2349, 11 Indiv. Empl. Rights Gas. (BNA) at 1397.
HU See id. at 2346-47, 11 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1396.
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respective relationships to the government.TM 1 The Court is correct in
concluding that, as a result, fear of losing this benefit in retaliation for
exercising their right to free speech would likely prevent both parties
from speaking out on issues of public concern." 2 Second, because both
contractors and employees deal closely with government, they are
often in the best position to know what ails the agencies for which they
work." Finally, the interest of the government in regulating the speech
of both contractors and employees is similar; for in its capacity as either
an employer or contractor, the government needs to be free to termi-
nate both contractors and employees for the same reasons."4
 Because
of these similarities, the same Pickering balancing test that the Court
has successfully used to determine the extent of First Amendment
protection in government employment precedents can easily and ef-
fectively be applied to cases involving independent contractors.
The dissent's criticism of the majority's holding in Umbehr is gen-
erally unpersuasive, in part because it ignores the fact that the case's
central issue revolves around the freedom of speech." Instead, the
dissent Focuses primarily on the issue of political patronage raised by
Umbehr's companion case, O'Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of North-
lake. 86 The dissent errs in its reasoning that these two First Amendment
rights can be treated interchangeably, and although it articulately
raises some questions about the Court's holding in O'Hare, these ques-
tions do not apply to the free speech issues in Umbehr.87 Thus, the
dissent's miscategorization of the issues raised by the majority in Um-
behr precludes it from seriously challenging much of the reasoning
upon which the Court relies For its decision.
The dissent does, however, directly challenge one aspect of the
majority's reasoning in Umbehr."" The dissent challenges the majority's
assertion that there is no difference of constitutional magnitude be-
et See id. at '1347, 11 Indiv. Erupt. Rights Gas. (BNA) at 1396,
82 See id.
83 See Umbehr 116 S. Ct. at 2347, 11 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (ISNA) at 1396 (citing Miters,
511 U.S. at 670, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rights Gas. (BNA) at 805 (1994)).
8 ' 1 See id.
85 See id., at 2361, 11 Indiv. Empl. Rights Gas. (BNA) at 1401 (Scalia, J., dissenting); O'Hare,
116 S. Gt. at 2361, 11 Indiv. Empl. Rights Gas. (BNA) at 1383-84 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
86 See generally O'Hare, 116 S. Ct. 2353, 11 Indiv. Empl. Rights Gas. (BNA) 1377.
87 See Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2362-66, I I Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1401-04 (Scalia,
J., dissenting); O'Hare, 116 S. Ct. at 2366, 11 Indiv. Empl. Rights Gas. (BNA) at 1387 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
88 See Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2366, I I Indiv. Empl. Rights Gas. (BNA) at 1404-05 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); O'Hare, 116 S. Gt. at 2366, II Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas, (BNA) at 1387 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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tween public employees and independent government contractors."'
This challenge proves unpersuasive because it relies upon stereotyped
and oversimplified characterizations of both government employees
and independent contractors.•"' Assuming, however, that the dissent is
correct in its assertion that government employees are far more de-
pendent On the benefit they derive through their relationship with the
government than are independent contractors, it is nevertheless naive
to propose that such a difference substantially diminishes the chilling
effect that the threat of retaliatory dismissal has on the speech of in-
dependent contractors. Furthermore, even in the circumstances where
a contractor is so independent from government support that the
threat of losing business would have little chilling effect on his or her
speech, the dissent's argument does not account for the fact that public
employees might also be able to find work elsewhere if they lose their
government jobs. Consequently, the dissent's reasoning that the threat
of retaliatory dismissal would not have a chilling effect on the speech
of independent contractors proves unpersuasive, for it does not seem
to address the realities of the situation.
In sum, in Umbehr, the United States Supreme Court held that the
First Amendment protects independent contractors from the termina-
tion or prevention of at-will government contracts in retaliation for
their exercise of the freedom of speech. 9 ' The Court further held that
the Pickering balancing test, adjusted to weigh the government's in-
terests as contractor rather than as employer, determines the extent of
the independent contractors' protection. 92 This decision proves con-
sistent with the Court's other precedents in this area and provides
a workable solution to the complex and fact-sensitive problems sur-
rounding the scope of First Amendment protection.93
89 SIT Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2366, 11 Indiv. Empl. Rights Gas. (BNA) at 1404 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting; O'Hare, 116 S. Ct. at 2366, 11 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (MA) at 1387 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
9' 1 See Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2366, 11 Indiv. Empl. Rights Gas, (BNA) at 1404 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Onare, 116 S. Ct. at 23(16, 11 Indiv. Empl. Rights Gas, at 1387 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia perpetuates the myth that most government contractors perform services for the
government that are merely ancillary to their overall business. Ur/the/a, 116 S. Ct. at 2366, 11
[itchy. Empl. Rights Gas. (RNA) at 1404 (Scalia, J., dissenting); O'Hare, 116 S. Ct. at 2366, 11 Indiv,
Empl. Rights Gas. at 1387 (Scalia, (., dissenting). It is important to note that although this
characterization does not apply to the plaintiffs in either Umbehr or O'Hare, justice Scalia fails to
highlight any specific facts supporting his characterization of government contractors to be the
norm, rather than the exception. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2366, 11 Indiv. Empl. Rights Gas. (13NA)
at 1404 (Scalia, J., dissenting); O'Hare, 116 S. Ct. at 2366, 11 Indiv. Empl. Rights Gas. at 1387
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
Umbeltr, 116 S. Ct. at 2352, 11 !wily. Empl. Rights Gas. (RNA) at 1400.
911
" See generally, e.g., Perry, 408 U.S. 503, 1 Indiv. Erupt. Rights Gas. (13NA) 33; Pickering, 301
U.S. at 568, 574, 1 Wk. Empl. Rights Gas. (BNA) at 13.
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B. *Extension of the Right to Privacy to Medical Prescription
Information: Doe v. Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation Authority'
The courts have long recognized that the United States Constitu-
tion protects individuals' right to privacy. 2 justice Brandeis and Samuel
D. Warren introduced the concept of a guaranteed right to privacy in
1890. 5
 The United States Supreme Court first recognized a right to
privacy in -1965 in Griswold v. Connecticut.`' In 1977, in Whalen v. Roe,
the Court identified two types of interests protected by the constitu-
tional right to privacy: an interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters and an interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions.' Although Whalen provided some guidance for
the courts, it did not specify the scope of the constitutional right to
privacy." In particular, courts have differed in their determination of
whether Whalen clearly establishes a constitutional right to privacy that
extends to protection against disclosure of medical information.?
In 1977, in Whalen v. Roe, the United States Supreme Court held
that the patient-identification provisions of a New York statute, which
required that the names and addresses of people obtaining certain
prescription drugs be recorded, did not violate patients' constitution-
* By Kari C. Kwiatkowski, Staff Member, BoSTON COLLEGE LAW Review.
72 F.3d 1133, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2721 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 117 S. CL
51 (1996).
2 See Edward A. Lyon, The Right to Die: An Exercise of Informed Consent, Not an Extension of
the Right to Privacy, 58 U. CIN. L. Rev. 1367, 1368-69 (1990); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy,
102 HARV. L. Rev. 737, 744-45 (1989),
3 See Lyon, supra note 2, at 1368 & n.8; Katherine M. Allen, Note, Moneybag v. Zech: The
Wrong Case for Asserting a Right of Privacy for Homosexuals, 63 N.C. L. REV. 749, 749 n.2 (1985);
see generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. Rev. 193,
193-220 (1890).
381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); see also Lyon, supra note 2, at 1368 & n.8; Rubenfeld, supra note
2, at 744.
5
 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
6
 See Adams v. Drew, 906 F. Stipp. 1050, 1056 (E.D. Va. 1995) (rioting that Whalen permits
states to inquire into individual's medical information but does not indicate how far states must
go to protect information once obtained).
7 Compare Doe v. Marsh, 918 F. Supp. 580, 585-86 (N.D,N.Y. 1996) (holding that individual's
right to privacy in medical information is a conditional right) and Doe v. Town of Plymouth, 825
F. Supp. 1102, 1107 (D. Mass. 1993) (holding that constitutional right to privacy encompasses
nondisclosure of HIV status) with Adams, 906 F. Stipp. at 1056-57 (holding that there is no clear
rule regarding right to prevent disclosure of personal information). The United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit also initially' concluded that Whalen did not extend to recognizing
a right to privacy against disclosure of personal matters, Mason v. Regional Medical Center, 121
F.R.D. 300, 301-02 (W.D. Ky. 1988), but later aligned with the majority and held that art individual
had a privacy interest in the nondisclosure of private information regarding AIDS status. Doe v
City of Cleveland, 788 F. Stipp. 979, 985 (N.D. Ohio 1991).
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ally protected right to privacy. 8 In Whalen, a group of patients and
physicians sued the State of New York to enjoin enforcement of a
statute requiring that physicians submit copies of all prescriptions for
Schedule II drugs to the Department of Health for entry into the
state's centralized computer system.' The Court acknowledged that
patients, fearing misuse of the computerized data and subsequent
stigmatization as a drug addict, may refuse to accept prescriptions for
Schedule II drugs.'" Nonetheless, the Court determined that the New
York statute's patient-identification program did not violate a patient's
right to privacy because the statute did not sufficiently threaten the
patient's interests to constitute a constitutional violation."
The Court reasoned that New York had a vital interest in control-
ling the distribution of dangerous drugs and determined that the
statute was a reasonable exercise of the State's broad police powers. 12
The Court further reasoned that the statute's specific nondisclosure
provisions sufficiently safeguarded against improper public disclosure
of the medical information. 13 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that
requiring disclosure to state representatives responsible for public
health did not constitute an improper invasion of privacy because
patients regularly make the same type of disclosure to health care
providers." The Court also reasoned that the statute did not deprive
the public of access to the drugs because it did not prohibit use of the
drugs or condition their use upon the consent of state officials.'' After
balancing these considerations, the Court held that the statute's pa-
tient-identification program did not violate the right to privacy of
patients receiving prescriptions for Schedule II drugs.' 8
In 1980, in United States v. Westinghouse Electric Coip., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health ("NIOSH") could have
access to certain employee medical records from Westinghouse with-
out violating the employees' constitutionally protected right to pri-
8 429 U.S. at 591 & n.4, 603-04 (discussing New York State Controlled Substances Act of
1972, 1970 N.Y Laws 474, amended by 1971 N.V. Laws 7).
• See 429 U.S. at 591, 595-96. The statute categorizes the most dangerous drugs that also
have legitimate uses, including cocaine, methadone and amphetamines, as Schedule 11 drugs. See
id. at 592-93.
1 ° Id. at 595, 599-600.
11 Id. at 600.
12 Id. at 598.
18 See id. at 594-95, 598, 600-02.
14 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 602.
18 Id. at 603.
16 Id. at 600-02,603-09.
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vacy.' 7 In Westinghouse, Westinghouse refused to provide NIOSH access
to the medical records of its employees who worked in an area sus-
pected of being contaminated with chemicals causing allergic reac-
tions.' 8 The employer justified its refusal on the grounds that disclosure
of the medical records would constitute an invasion of the employees'
right to confidentiality.'"
The court reasoned that the constitutional right to privacy extends
to employee medical records because they may contain intimate per-
sonal facts. 2" Nonetheless, the court determined that the right to pri-
vacy is limited and that intrusion into privacy concerning medical
records is permissible if the public interest in disclosure outweighs the
privacy interest at risk:2 ' The court expanded upon the generalized
weighing of competing interests which the United States Supreme
Court had conducted in Whalen by establishing a balancing test involv-
ing the consideration of seven specific factors. 22
 The court balanced
these factors and determined that the public interest in employees'
occupational safety and health, NIOSH's reasonable need for the re-
quested medical information, and NIOSH's safety procedures provid-
ing protection against improper disclosure sufficiently outweighed the
employees' privacy interests in their medical records to justify intrusion
into the employees' right to privacy." Accordingly, the court held that
Westinghouse could not refuse to allow NIOSH access to its employees'
medical records, although the court conceded that each employee was
entitled to prior notice of the disclosure. 24
In 1987, in Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. City of Philadel-
phia, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that
the City of Philadelphia's requirement that applicants to its Special
Investigations Unit ("SW") disclose certain medical information did
17
 638 F.2d 570, 572, 580, 8 0.5.1-1. Cas. (BNA) 2131, 2132, 2138 (3d Cir. 1980).
u4 Id. at 572-73, 8 0.5.11. Cas. (BNA) at 2132.
19
 See id. at 572-73, 8 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) at 2132-33.
2° Id. at 577, 8 O.S.H. Cas. (DNA) at 2136. The individual's interest in not having his or her
private affairs made public by the government falls within the first category set firth by the United
States Supreme Court in Whalen r Roe. See id. at 577, 8 Cas. (11NA) at 2135-36.
21 Id. at 578, 8 0.S.11. Cas. (BNA) at 2137.
22 Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578, 8 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) at 2137; see Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598-604.
The factors arc: the type of record requested, the information contained in the record, tlte
potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure, the potential for injury from
disclosure, the existence and adequacy of safeguards against unauthorized disclosure, the degree
of the need for the information, and whether there is an express statutory provision or other
public interest requiring disclosure. See Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578, 8 Cas. (BNA) at
2137.
23
 Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578-80, 8 0.511. Gas. (RNA) at 2137-38.
24
 Id. at 580-81, 8 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) at 2138-39.
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not violate the applicants' constitutionally protected right to privacy. 2'
In Fraternal Order of Police, a union of police officers challenged the
constitutionality of a questionnaire, which the department required all
SIU applicants to complete. 2" The officers claimed that three questions
on the questionnaire violated their right to privacy. 27 The court ac-
knowledged that people have a reasonable expectation that medical
information will remain confiden tia1.28 Nonetheless, the court applied
the balancing test articulated in Westinghouse, reasoning that disclosure
of private information is required if the public interest in disclosure
outweighs the individual's privacy interest. 29
The court acknowledged that the police department required the
medical information to select officers physically and mentally suited
for the type of work performed by the S1U. 3° The court determined
that the City could not have made the overly broad questions more
specific without potentially losing valuable and relevant information."t
The court further reasoned that officers had a reduced expectation of
privacy in the information because the application process customarily
requires disclosure of the same type of medical infortnation. 32 After
balancing these considerations, the court held that the questions seek-
ing medical information did not unconstitutionally violate the officers'
right to privacy."
In 1990, in Doe v. Borough of Barrington, the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey held that a police officer's disclo-
sure of an individual's medical condition to a neighbor violated his,
and his family's, constitutional right to privacy." In Borough of Bar-
25 812  F.24 105, 107, 114, 1 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1496, 1997, 1503 (3d Cir. 1987).
26 Id. at 107-08, 1 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1497—'38.
27 See id. at 108, 112, 1 Indiv. Empl, Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1498, 1501. The three questions
were:
18. List any physical defects or disability, also list any extended time spent in the
hospital for any reason.
19. Are you presently using any prescription drugs? If yes, stale the drug, the need
for it and the dosage.
20. Are you now or have you ever been attended, treated or observed by any
doctor or psychiatrist or at any Hospital or Mental Institution on an in-patient or
out-patient basis for any mental or psychiatric condition? If yes, give the dates and
nature of die treatment.
Id. at 112, 1 Incliv. Einpl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1501.
25 Id. at 112-13, 1 Indiv. Empl. Rights Gas. (BNA) at 1501-02.
29 Id. at 110-13, 1 lndiv. Empl. Rights Gas. (BNA) at 1499-1502.
3° Fraternal Order of Police, 812 F.2d at 114, 1 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1503.
21 1d. at 113, I 1ndiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1502.
32 1d. at 113-14, I hulk Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1502.
55 1d. at 112-14, 1 lndiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1500-03.
54 729 F. Supp. 376, 385 (D.N.J. 1990).
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ringlon, the plaintiffs, Mrs. Doe and her children, alleged that they
suffered harassment, discrimination and humiliation because a police
officer had informed their neighbor that Mr. Doe had contracted
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS") 
. 35 The court found
that the plaintiffs had a constitutional right to privacy in medical
records and medical information that entitled them to protection from
governmental disclosure of Mr. Doe's infection with the AIDS virus.s6
The court reasoned that the government had a duty to avoid
disclosing confidential information. 37
 The court further reasoned that
individuals have an even greater privacy interest. regarding AIDS than
ordinary medical information, due to the sensitivity of the information
concerning the HIV virus and the stigma attached to the disease."
Accordingly, the court found that the government was required to
show that the breach of the Does' privacy interest in their medical
information and records furthered a compelling state interest in order
to justify the disclosure. 39
 The government failed to demonstrate a
compelling state interest.° Therefore, the court determined that the
government's interest in disclosure did not outweigh the substantial
privacy interest involved. 41
 The court thus held that the officer's disclo-
sure violated the Does' constitutional rights.42
During the Survey year, in Doe v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Trans-
jiortation Authority, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation
Authority's ("SEPTA") inadvertent discovery and minimal disclosure
of the plaintiff's medical prescription records did not violate his con-
stitutionally protected right to privacy.'I 3
 Although the court recognized
that patients have a right to privacy in their medical prescription
information, disclosure of the information did not constitute a consti-
35 Id. at 378-79. A Barrington police officer arrested plaintiff's husband, who informed the
police officer that he was HIV positive to alert the officer to be aware of his lesions while searching
him. See id. While present at the scene of an accident involving plaintiff's automobile, the police
officer subsequently informed a Runnemede police officer of Mr. Doe's condition, See id. The
Runnemede police officer then informed the Does' neighbor that Mr. Doe had AIDS. See id.
36 Id. at 382.
37 Id. at 383-84.
38 Id. at 384.
s" Borough of Barrington, 729 E. Stipp. at 385.
'I" See id.
41 See id.
4'2 See id.
43 72 F.3d 1133, 1134, 1138, 1143, 19 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) 2721, 2722, 2725, 2730
(1996). SEPTA is a public transportation authority that operates various transportation facilities
in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and receives ()pending funds limn slate and federal subsidies. See
id. at 1134 n.l , 19 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 2721 ILE SEPTA operated a self-insured
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tutional violation unless the invasion outweighed the need for access
to the information. 44
SEPTA discovered that the plaintiff had AIDS from a pharmacy
report which contained the plaintiff's name and medical prescription
information." Doe, the plaintiff, brought suit alleging that this discov-
ery violated his right to privacy." Although SEPTA did not request the
patient-identification information on these reports, SEPTA's pharmacy
submitted a report to SEPTA's Chief Administrative Officer identifying
the names of employees who had obtained prescriptions costing more
than $100 in the previous month.° The Chief Administrative Officer
and the Director of Benefits reviewed the report and were unable
to identify one of Doe's prescribed medications." They contacted a
SEPTA staff physician and Doe's doctor to determine the drug's use
and, in doing so, discovered that Doe had AIDS."
The court reasoned that a person's limited right to privacy in his
or her medical records includes medical prescription records because
people using prescription drugs have a right to expect that the infor-
mation will remain private. 5" The court applied the balancing test
articulated in Westinghouse to determine whether the disclosure of
Doe's prescription information constituted a violation of his constitu-
tionally protected right to privacy. 51 Applying the balancing test, the
court reasoned that the minimal intrusion upon Doe's privacy was
insufficient to require SEPTA to prove it had a compelling interest in
obtaining the information."
The first two Westinghouse factors are the type of record requested
and the information disclosed." The court determined that the report
health program and contracted with Rite-Aid Drug Store for the provision of prescription drugs
for its employees. See id. at 1135, 19 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 2722.
44 See id. at 1135-36, 1143, 19 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 2722-23, 2730.
45 See id. at 1135-36, 19 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 2722-23.
46 See id. at 1134-35, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2721.
47 See id. at 1135, 1138, 19 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 2722, 2726. Pursuant to its
contract with SEPTA, the pharmacy produced certain reports which identified costs associated
with the prescription drug program and included statistics regarding the prescriptions being
filled by SEPTA employees. See id. at 1135, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2722.
48 See Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 72 F.3d at 1135-36, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA)
at 2722-23. Doe was taking Retrovir, a medication used solely for the treatment of AIDS. See id.
at 1135, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2722. Retrovir is the prescription name for AZT. See
Doe v. Town or Plymouth, 825 F. Supp. 1102, 1104 n.3 (D. Mass. 1993).
49 See Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 72 F.3d at 1155-36, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA)
at 2722-23.
5" Id. at 1138, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (RNA) at 2725.
51 Id, at 1139-40, 114213, 19 Employee Benefits Gas. (liNA) at 2726-30.
52 Id. at 1139-40, 19 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 2726-27,
55 See id. at 1140, 19 Employee Benefits Gas. (RNA) at 2727; supra note 22 (listing seven
factors).
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submitted by the pharmacy to SEPTA contained employee identifica-
tion and medical prescription information. 54
 The court concluded that
the Constitution protects the confidentiality of such medical informa-
tion contained in those types of pharmacy reports?
The third and fourth Westinghouse factors are the potential for
harm from disclosure and the injury resulting from the disclosure.'"
The court acknowledged that disclosure of Doe's medical condition
could result in great potential harm to Doe because of the increased
risk of social stigma, harassment and discrimination due to public
perception of AIDS."/ Nonetheless, the court determined that the dis-
closure had not harmed Doe, whose later promotion negated any
claim of harm?
The fifth Westinghouse factor requires consideration of the ade-
quacy of safeguards for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure?
The court noted that SEPTA did not have any mechanisms for prevent-
ing the disclosure of prescription information contained in pharmacy
reports provided by Rite-Aid Drug Store pursuant to Rite-Aid Drug
Store's contract with SEPTA? Nonetheless, the court reasoned that
SEPTA had not foreseen the need for instituting safeguards against
disclosure because it had not requested the confidential information."'
The court further reasoned that SEPTA compensated for its lack of
safeguards by subsequently destroying the report and instructing the
pharmacy to omit names from future reports.62
The sixth and seventh Westinghouse factors are the need for access
and whether there is statutory authority or public interest favoring
access to the information? The court determined that the public has
a strong interest in permitting SEPTA to conduct research regarding
its prescription program in order to contain its costs."' The court
further found that SEPTA had a legitimate need for the reports—to
keep insurance costs down by monitoring the prescription program for
54 Southeastern Pa. Tramp. Auth., 72 F.3d at 1140, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2727.
55
 Id. at 1137, 1140, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2724, 2727.
56
 See Id. at 1140, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2727.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 1136-37, 1140-41, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2723-24, 2727-28. The court
specifically noted that it was undisputed that Doe did not suffer any economic deprivation, any
discrimination or any harassment. Id. at 1141, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2728.
51' See Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 72 F.3d at 1140, 1142, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA)
at 2727, 2729-30.
6° Id. at 1142, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2729-30.
61 Id. at 1136, 1142-43, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2724, 2729-30.
52 Id.
113 See id. at 1140, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2727.
Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 72 E3d at 1140, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2727.
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fraudulent use of drugs and abusive behavior.65 The court reasoned
that employers also have the right to inspect reports from prescription
suppliers to ensure that only authorized patients are obtaining drugs
and that the pharmacy is minimizing costs by providing generic drugs
whenever possible. 66
After balancing these factors, the court determined that SEPTA's
need for access to its employees' prescription information outweighed
the employees' interest in keeping the information private.° Accord-
ingly, it held that SEPTA's minimal intrusion on Doe's privacy did not
violate his constitutional rights. 68
In Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, the Third
Circuit expanded the scope of the privacy protection under Whalen to
include medical prescription records." The court noted that the West-
inghouse court held that medical records fell within the scope of fun-
damentally private information entitled to constitutional protection. 7"
The court then extended this protection to prescription records, rea-
soning that the policy for affording constitutional protection to medi-
cal records required finding medical prescription information private
as well, because private facts about a person's medical condition can
be determined from his or her prescription records. 7 '
The court also emphasized the Third Circuit's reliance upon the
factors enunciated in Westinghouse in balancing the competing inter-
ests of the state and the individual. 72 In Borough of Barrington, the court
seemed to move away from the strict balancing test set forth in West-
inghouse." The Barrington court acknowledged the Westinghouse factors
but distinguished its facts from those in Westinghouse and suggested
that the particularly sensitive nature of medical information about
AIDS mandated requiring states to show a compelling interest in dis-
closure. 74 Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, which also
concerned disclosure of a patient's HIV status, implicitly rejected a
heightened standard of state or public interest. 75 The Third Circuit
65 Id. at 1141, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2729.
66 Id.
57 Id. at 1143, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2730.
68 Id.
69 See Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 72 F.3d at 1137-38, 1143, 19 Employee Benefits Cas.
(RNA) at 2724-25, 273{}.
7U Id. at 1137, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2724.
71 See id. at 1137-38, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2724-25.
72 See id. at 1140, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2727.
73 See Doe v. Borough of' Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 382-85 (D,N.J. 1990).
71 Id. at 383-84.
75 See Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 72 F.3d at 1140-42, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA)
at 2728-29.
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considered the degree of need and public interest in disclosure within
the framework of the Westinghouse balancing test. 76 Furthermore, the
court disregarded the great potential harm to Doe by finding that he
suffered no actual harm. 77
 Thus, while Borough of Barrington suggested
that the potential and actual harms associated with disclosure regard-
ing AIDS require the state to show a compelling interest, Southeastern
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority established that potential harm
and actual harm are only two of the seven factors the court should
consider. 78
In summary, Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority ex-
tends limited constitutional protection to the unauthorized disclosure
of medical prescription information. 7" The court will preclude access
to private information, or award an individual damages for disclosure
of private information, when it determines that the individual's privacy
interest in the information outweighs any public or state interest in
obtaining the infortnation. 8"
7i'
	 id. at 1141-42,19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2728-29, These are Bic:tors six and
seven of the Westinghouse balancing test. See id.
77
 See id. at 1140-41,19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) al 2727-28,
7H
 See id.; Borough of Barrington, 729 E Stipp. at 383-85.
a See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
KU See supra notes 43-66 and accompanying text.
